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Summary:

This paper attempts to contribute to ongoing research on Special Economic Zones (SEZs) by discussing the characteristics, prospects and limitations of the SEZ experiment in India. The paper is divided in three sections. The first one deals with the origins of SEZs, going back to the first examples of Asian SEZs and deepening the analysis with a comparison of Chinese and Indian experiments. Grounding on this juxtaposition, the paper highlights the reasons why SEZs have been important strategies in both China and India and the role played by the two governments in shaping the characteristics of their 'SEZ policy'.

The second section takes a critical look at India's SEZ policy. Grounding on field work outputs, Indian SEZs' strengths and weaknesses are assessed focusing on three different aspects: old and new SEZs; single-sector and multi-sector zones; and original support and planning backed by private or public developers. To provide an all-embracing evaluation of Indian SEZs strategy, these themes are approached from two different perspectives: the one of developers, and the ones of national and foreign firms investing in local SEZs.

The third section explores European reactions to Indian SEZs strategy, elaborating on a series of interviews with European diplomatic representatives based in New Delhi. After

giving an account of the approaches of four EU countries towards SEZs -Spain, France, Germany and Italy-, this paper continues to identify, with the help of collected data, the reasons why the interests of foreign investors towards these zones have not generated the kind of response that was anticipated.

In conclusion, an assessment of the current status of Indian SEZs is offered, as well as a few suggestions on how to improve their rate of success, effectiveness, and foreign investments attractiveness.

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Indian Special Economic Zones: The Difficulties of Repeating China's Triumph

Introduction

The rise of both China and India is capturing the world imagination. Taken together, the economic emergence of both countries represents a seismic event that promises to alter the global economic, geopolitical, social, and environmental landscape¹.

Discussing the growth trajectories of these two countries requires careful consideration of the economic stimuli triggered by the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) policy they have adopted to boost national development.

SEZs can be defined as geographical enclaves ruled by economic rules and regulations that are usually more liberal than the ones adopted for the rest of the country. The category 'SEZ' covers a broad range of more specific zone types, such as Free Trade Zones, Export Processing Zones, and Urban Enterprise Zones. According to the International Labor Organization:

¹ The research for this paper has been generously sponsored by the Italian research centre Osservatorio Asia and academically stimulated by the CSH in New Delhi. Without their support no research in the field or critical thinking on this controversial issue would have been possible.

A presentation based on this research has been organized at the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi in February 2008. The remarkable feedbacks received in that occasion have been crucial for the development of this paper.

A previous draft has been published in 2009 in S. Mezzetti e G. Prodi (eds.), *Produrre nella terra dei servizi. Le imprese italiane in India*, Bologna, Il Mulino. The title of the chapter is "Indian Special Economic Zones: Problems and Prospects".

A special thanks should be devoted to Dr. Loraine Kennedy, for her precious help during research and her subsequent never ending support that pushed me to go through all revisions needed to write this paper.

‘free trade zones (FTZs) and export processing zones (EPZs) are sites where foreign or domestic merchandise may enter without a formal customs entry or the payment of customs duties or government excise taxes. EPZs are dedicated to manufacturing for export, whereas FTZs also handle imports. If the final product is exported, no customs duty or excise tax is levied. This applies to both free trade and export processing zones. If the final product is imported into the host country, state, or region, it may receive preferential treatment, depending on the FTZ².

This Occasional Paper aims at presenting the Indian SEZ experiment from an outsider’s perspective. Accordingly, the characteristics, prospects and limitations of this model are discussed, focusing on both internal growth rates and opportunities for foreign investors, especially the European ones.

Aware that New Delhi launched its SEZ revolution in April 2000 to secure the country a two digit growth rate, copying from China what during the previous two decades proved to be an excellent strategy, this paper proposes a new form of comparison between China and India SEZ strategies. It starts reviewing the historical conditions that pushed China and subsequently India to choose to implement their SEZ strategy as well as the national economic preconditions that shaped and influenced their success.

After remembering the first examples of Asian SEZs and reviewing the literature covering SEZs supporters and detractors, the paper continues focusing on the role the two governments played in shaping their models and on the international interest they raised during the last few decades. Finally, some of the mayor differences between the Indian and Chinese policies will be highlighted, and their SEZs approach will be linked to their overall development strategies.

The background drew in section one will be crucial to deepen the analysis of Indian SEZs in section two. Grounding of field work outputs, the paper continues assessing Indian SEZs’ strengths and weaknesses focusing on three different aspects: old and new SEZs; single-sector and multi-sector zones; and original support and planning backed by private

² International Labour Organization, National Framework for Globalization, <<http://actrav.ilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/frame/national.htm#Special Economic Zones>>, accessed 7 March 2010.

or public developers. With the aim of providing an all-embracing evaluation of Indian SEZs strategy, these themes are approached from two different perspectives: the one of developers, and the ones of national and foreign firms investing in local SEZs.

The third section deepens the analysis on European reactions to Indian SEZs strategy elaborating on a series of interviews with European diplomatic representatives based in New Delhi. After giving an account of the approaches of four EU countries towards SEZs -Spain, France, Germany and Italy-, this paper continues identifying, with the help of the collected data, the reasons why SEZs have not generated the kind of response from foreign investors that was anticipated. This section will also effectively highlight the main differences between the national and international debate on Indian SEZs. Explaining why in India the discussion tends to be sharply divided along ideological lines while the approach of the rest of the world is more consistent and pragmatic. Implying that the dissimilarities in terms of interests at stake make the difference.

In conclusion, an assessment of the current status of Indian SEZs is offered, as well as a few suggestions on how to improve SEZs rate of success, effectiveness, and foreign investments attractiveness.

Asian SEZs: historical roots and economic implications

India was the first Asian country to use SEZ to boost national economic growth. The first zone was inaugurated in Kandla, in Gujarat, in 1965. The second one was opened in 1979, close to the Mumbai airport. However, it was only in the late 1980s, that is after China consolidated its two-digit growth rate, partially thanks to the stimulus provided by the SEZs strategy implemented in the late 1970s, that New Delhi started discussing the opportunity of re-launching its SEZs with the aim of keeping up with the rise of Beijing.

Before India, it is worth noticing that ‘the first successful implementation of an EPZ was at Ireland’s Shannon International Airport in 1956, which provided the impetus for other countries to pursue similar lines of development. Puerto Rico (in 1962) and India (in 1965) were the first two nations to experiment the EPZ idea in the developing world’. The Indian and Puerto Rican experiences were immediately followed by Taiwan, the Philippines, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama and Brazil. All this happened before

the 1970s, but the great expansion of SEZs and EPZs came after the 1970s. Before 1980 fifty more zones were created, mainly in East and South Asia, but also in Latin America, Middle East and the Mediterranean, and some in Africa and in the Caribbean. Implying that even before ‘the Chinese miracle’ there was huge expectation that SEZs and EPZs could favorably impact economic growth.

It is usually difficult to make inferences about SEZ and EPZ performances from the literature. Since applied studies are usually grounded on case studies based on examples of individual countries’ experiences, their results are often difficult to compare or generalize. Further, most non-performing zones are usually neglected by researchers, and cost-benefit analysis can be difficult to be carried out³. SEZs and EPZs spillover effects on employment, infrastructure building, foreign direct investments attraction, imports and exports sustainability do not depend on SEZ set up only, but also on a number of other factors such as the industrial sector in which the SEZ is going to specialize, the availability of raw materials, skilled and unskilled manpower around the area, the average FDI attractiveness of the country under scrutiny, its import/export duties, and the socio-economic and political skills of the government. The variety of these conditions from one country to another makes any generalization on SEZs performances problematic.

The only abstractions literature can make while analyzing the SEZ phenomena are the ones concerning vertical and horizontal linkages among SEZs and the country hosting them. Regarding vertical linkages, ‘theoretical analysis shows that benefits from SEZ investments spread to the mainland through purchasing relations, if the SEZ-technology is expressing constant returns to scale and the purchased goods are not traded internationally. In this case, the additional demand from SEZ-firms leads to a strengthening and expansion of the respective intermediate goods producing industries on the mainland. This structural shift entails economic diversification, if the industries in question are non-traditional’⁴. As far as horizontal linkages are concerned, while it is

³ Aggrawal A., M. Hoppe, and P. Walkenhorst, ‘Special Economic Zones in South Asia: Industrial Islands or Vehicles for Diversification?’, *World Bank*, pp. 3,4, <http://api.ning.com/files/JMh8ZtAWJase6C2gGPzp-6i*1DtluZUE00S2VN6BhXge4ElzEYbi7VP0ilhAjOoblqcCE3XYINy2OqJ2SoN9jKJzoEh*XwAr/SEZinSouthAsia.pdf>, accessed online 7 May 2010.

⁴ Ibid.

widely recognized that SEZs facilitate technology transfer from foreign to domestic firms, it can be more complicated to understand that knowledge spillovers are not confined to the SEZs, rather their direct and indirect benefits can stretch beyond the zones.⁵ ‘Successful SEZ-enterprises were reported as demonstrating to mainland firms how to produce, market, sell and distribute manufactured goods on the world market and thereby acted as catalysts for the diversification and growth of mainland production and exports’.⁶ FDI also represent an alternative channel to spread new ideas: ‘foreign affiliates may (...) provide an important example for potential indigenous exporters in terms of the required managerial, technical and marketing know-how to supply the world market’.⁷ The combination of local endowments and skills with managerial experience, marketing knowledge and mastery of relevant technology has often proved to be a successful path to boost economic growth as well as productive diversification.

It is difficult to argue whether SEZs supporters represent the majority in SEZs literature or not. There is a broad literature focusing on SEZs disadvantages and potential negative implications, which is worth mentioning here.

The first theorist of the negative impact of EPZs on developing countries is K. Hamada, whose main argument stresses that the inflow of foreign capital generated by EPZs can attract labor from the domestic economy. He points out that welfare effects of a zone are determined by the factor intensities of protected sectors, which means that if the protected sector is capital intensive, removal of labor from the domestic economy increases production of the protected sector but it also reduces the welfare. On the contrary, if the protected sector is labor intensive, its output falls but welfare increases.⁸ If these are the dynamics impacting EPZ production, Hamada argues that since many of the protected sectors in developing countries are capital intensive, it becomes easy to conclude that

⁵ Johansson, H., Nilsson, L., ‘Export processing zones as catalysts’, *World Development*, Vol. 25 No.12, 1997, pp.2115-28.

⁶ Aggrawal A., M. Hoppe, and P. Walkenhorst, ‘Special Economic Zones in South Asia: Industrial Islands or Vehicles for Diversification?’, *World Bank*, pp. 3,4, <http://api.ning.com/files/JMh8ZtAWJase6C2gGPzp-6i*1DtluZUE00S2VN6BhXge4ElzEYbi7VP0ilhAjOoblqcCE3XYINy2OqJ2SoN9jKJzoEh*XwAr/SEZinSouthAsia.pdf>, accessed online 7 May 2010.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Hamada, K., ‘An economic analysis of the duty free zone’, *Journal of International Economics*, Vol. 4, 1974, pp.225-41.

EPZs can reduce welfare in most of the countries where they are created, therefore their impact on host economy can be negative⁹.

Other issues connected to EPZs and SEZs inefficiencies are related to the different kind of economic incentives offered by countries. In some cases EPZs have been set up as industrial clusters. Usually, outside the zones the government maintains inward-looking policies. In other cases, an outward-looking economic policy for the whole country has been implemented simultaneously with the EPZ policy¹⁰.

SEZs are often accused of being too large or too small in relation to the economy. Despite the negative emphasis provided by scholars that do not consider the SEZ policy as the best one for boosting growth and development in developing countries, several analysts admit that SEZs attractiveness depends heavily on the expectations in terms of foreign direct investments attractions, export growth, and technology transfers.¹¹ However, they also point out that in terms of costs-benefits, any time a country does not have a significant infrastructures endowment, in terms of public expenditure the cost of establishing SEZs infrastructures may outweigh the benefits generated by SEZs regarding employment creation and foreign exchange earnings.¹² Further, the SEZs model has been accused of being unable to promote exports of manufactured goods for the whole national manufacturing sector, to generate foreign exchange earnings, or to create solid linkages with the domestic economy.¹³ It is recognized that “judged in terms of optimal policy, EPZs are not the ideal instrument for industrial development”. Indeed, it would be preferable to “promote exports throughout the economy, for this induces linkages and greater local value added, hence more employment, income and technology transfer”.

⁹ Ibid., Devereux, J., Chen, L.L., ‘Export zones and welfare: another look’, *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 47, 1997, pp.704-13.

¹⁰ Kaplinsky, R., ‘Export processing zones in the Dominican Republic: transforming manufactures into commodities’, *World Development*, Vol. 21 No.11, 1993, pp.1851-65.

¹¹ Devereux, J., Chen, L.L., ‘Export zones and welfare: another look’, *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 47, 1997, pp.704-13, Johansson, H., Nilsson, L., ‘Export processing zones as catalysts’, *World Development*, Vol. 25 No.12, 1997, pp.2115-28.

¹² Bhagwati, J., ‘Outward orientation; trade issues’, in Carbo, V., Goldstein, M., Khan, M. (Eds), *Growth-Oriented Adjustment Programs*, IMF/World Bank, 1987, Washington, DC; Warr, P.G., ‘Export promotion via industrial enclaves: the Phillipines Bataan export processing zone’, *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 23 No.2, 1987, pp.220-41.

¹³ Kaplinsky, R., ‘Export processing zones in the Dominican Republic: transforming manufactures into commodities’, *World Development*, Vol. 21 No.11, 1993, pp.1851-65.

However, until the government will not be ready to offer to the exporters in the customs territory the same incentives as exporters in the EPZs, the maintenance of these zones would remain crucial for the economic development of any country¹⁴.

SEZs have been criticized for not succeeding in favoring the technology transfer or in upgrading labor skills as much as expected. SEZs detractors argue that this is happening because these zones usually produce manufactured goods with the help of very simple technology in labor intensive assembly plants. Accordingly, they need standard machinery and unskilled workers to assemble low value-added productions.¹⁵ If it is true that the reduction of employment rate usually affects unskilled labor rather than skilled labor, it is important to stress that such a situation is not ‘undesirable for a country in which a considerable proportion of the labor force is unemployed and has limited industrial skills’, as it is the case for many developing countries.¹⁶ Further, since SEZs have been usually implemented to boost national economic growth and development, it is consistent to list technology transfer and labor skills upgrade among SEZs long-term benefits.

The evolution of China’s economic development has already proved that this interpretation is less unrealistic than many SEZs detractors think. After the implementation of its SEZs policy in the late 1970s, China concentrated in its newly established zones labor intensive manufacturing plants employing very simple technologies. It took three decades to a country which has in the meanwhile become the world’s second-largest economic power to complete a partial technological upgrade in the plants located in its SEZs. Confirming that it is unrealistic to expect SEZs to favor technology transfer and labor skills upgrade in a short-term range.

A concluding remark from Kaplinsky highlights that ‘the advantages of EPZs may be eroded by simultaneous adoption of the instrument in competitor countries’.¹⁷ Although

¹⁴ Willmore, L., ‘Export processing zones in the Dominican Republic: A Comment on Kaplinsky’, *World Development*, Vol. 23 No.3, 1995, pp.533-4.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Willmore, L., ‘Export processing zones in the Dominican Republic: a comment on Kaplinsky’, *World Development*, Vol. 23 No.3, 1995, pp.529.35.

¹⁷ Kinunda-Rutashobya L., ‘Exploring the potentialities of export processing free zones (EPZs) for economic development in Africa: lessons from Mauritius’, *Management Decisions*, 41/3, 2003, pp. 226-232, p. 229.

this observation apparently goes against the empirical evidence showing developing countries importing the SEZs development model aiming at reproducing in their own country the growth and development effects they have contributed to trigger in other nations, it should be remember that Kaplinsky study focuses on the Dominican Republic experience. Accordingly, while stating that EPZs simultaneous adoption might reduce competitiveness for the countries choosing EPZs what he had in mind was the Central America context, where the specialization of similar countries in similar productions to be promoted by almost identical policies could significantly impact the effectiveness of SEZs-led development.

This is not what is happening in Asia. Even if it is true that in the 1990s India decided to elaborate its own SEZs policy dazzled by the explosive economic performance of the People's Republic of China, introducing SEZs as well as any other policy in a country is not enough to help the model to succeed.¹⁸

Although this paper focuses on a case study research, it is important to remember that since 1990s, as soon as Indian EPZs started to be converted into SEZs and to be set up and managed by private developers rather than by the government, there has been an ongoing, fiery debate on SEZ efficiency among Indian politicians, academics and activists. The same did not happen in China for several reasons. First, SEZs are public and, accordingly, managed by the government. Second, while China has become the favorite destination of FDI and continues to attract new capitals, the majority of investments directed to Indian SEZs are national rather than international. While Indian politicians continue debating about SEZs, Chinese leaders have been unanimous in their appreciation of SEZs as useful tools to attract foreign capital boosting national growth, provided they are limited to certain regions rather than spread throughout the whole country.

A study of SEZs effectiveness in different countries will further prove what has already emerged from this brief comparison between China and India: SEZs impact is not linked to SEZ *per se*, rather to the context in which they are established and to the political and economic powers supporting them.

¹⁸ Einhorn B., 'India struggles to copy China's SEZs', *Bloomberg Businessweek*, October 9, 2006.

In China, for example, the SEZs strategy has proved to be so effective to convince Beijing to adopt it abroad any time the nation is interested in strengthening commercial connections with third countries. This research argues that this is happening for two reasons. On the one hand the Chinese government finds both useful and safe to concentrate its efforts on a geographically limited area where any change can be constantly monitored¹⁹. On the other hand, the government is free to both decide and launch any national or regional development plan without fearing any form of obstructionism or large-scale protests. Indian long tradition of democracy, instead, is often simplistically quoted as one of the reasons why public protests succeeded in prejudicing the success of national SEZs strategy.

Although recognizing that the differences between China and India in terms of government and civil society's strengths, power of democracy, geographical and economic pre-existing conditions, and available resources are huge, this research argues that these elements are not enough to assess the effectiveness of India's SEZ strategy. However, before discussing the characteristics of India's SEZs and examining their performance, it is useful to make a brief comparison of Chinese and Indian SEZs and to analyse their respective role in boosting the development path of the two countries.

SEZs in China and India: A Comparison

SEZs implementation has been usually associated to the need to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) and to boost exports. While India has been one of the first countries in Asia to recognize the effectiveness of this model in promoting exports, after setting up Asia's first EPZ in Kandla in 1965, New Delhi did not seriously pursue the policy until the 2000s. Since then, SEZs have rapidly proliferated and will probably keep on multiplying during the next few years²⁰.

China's economic rebirth started in 1978, when the then leader Deng Xiaoping announced the 'SEZs experiment' during his famous trip to Shenzhen, which within twenty years developed from a fishermen's village into a metropolis with a population of

¹⁹ It is not a coincidence that the first attempt to restructure China's financial system has been done through the approval, in early 2012, of the first Chinese special financial zone in Wenzhou.

over ten million people and transformed the Guangdong region into one of the most developed in the country. 'The SEZs were established primarily to attract foreign direct investment, expand China's exports, and accelerate the infusion of new technology'²¹. These are the reasons why the original four zones, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, 'were sited in coastal areas of Guangdong and Fujian, that had a long history of contact with the outside world through out-migration, and at the same time were near Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan'.²² As soon as China opened to foreign trade and investment, the SEZs had an immediate impact on national economic trends. In 1981, the four zones accounted for 59.8 percent of total FDI in China. In 1984, Chinese SEZs accounted for 26 percent of national FDI and, by the end of 1985, the rate was 20 percent²³. 'The combination of favorable policies and the right mix of production factors in the SEZs resulted in high rates of economic growth unprecedented in China'.²⁴

One decade later, in 1991, China's larger neighbor, India, was experiencing what appeared at the time as a chronic economic and fiscal crisis: the government was close to default, the central bank was refusing new credit and foreign exchange reserves were terribly low. Large fiscal deficits, at both the Center and state levels, had spillover effects on the trade deficit that culminated in an external payment crisis. High inflation further deteriorated the economic stability of the country, pushing P.V. Narasimha Rao, the Indian Prime Minister that took over in June 1991, to appoint the current Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister and elaborate with him a broad reform package that while progressively liberalizing Indian economy also considered using the China-inspired SEZ model to boost national economic growth.

The SEZs policy was officially announced only in April 2000, and although it partially contributed to India's growth by promoting exports and infrastructures building, it has not achieved the same results Chinese SEZs accomplished in the last few decades. The weaknesses of the Indian SEZ model are usually listed as follows: zones are too

²¹ Yeung Y., J. Lee, and G. Kee, 'China Special Economic Zones at 30', *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 2009, 50, n.2, pp. 222-240, p. 223.

²² Ibid. p. 223.

²³ Wong, K., "China's Special Economic Zone Experiment: An Appraisal," *Geografiska Annaler Series B, Human Geography*, 69, pp. 27-40, 1987.

²⁴ Yeung Y., J. Lee, and G. Kee, 'China Special Economic Zones at 30', *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 2009, 50, n.2, pp. 222-240, p. 224.

numerous; too small compared to Chinese ones; targeted by local investors only; and not flexible enough in terms of labor laws. Only tax holidays are better, since they offer higher rates and last longer than in China²⁵.

It has already been mentioned that although India set up its first SEZ in the 1960s, the Chinese model of SEZ-led economic growth was borrowed by New Delhi politicians only at a later stage. However, while the original intent was to replicate the Chinese success story, India ended up with a policy very different from the one implemented by Beijing.

One of the reasons why this happened is connected to the idea that India did not have the political constraints that shaped the Chinese SEZs policy in the early 1980s. With SEZs the Chinese government attempted to observe the consequences of the implementation of liberal policies in certain regions ‘while insulating the rest of the economy from their influence’.²⁶ In order to implement the SEZs policy, the Chinese government identified huge tracts of land, mainly in coastal regions, where cities could be built supported by all required infrastructures. Accordingly, five mega SEZs were built, and even today SEZs remain less than ten in number, with a medium-large scale (the biggest one is in Hainan, with its 34.000 square kilometers), and owned by the government. Even adding to this list the economic and technological industrial development zones (usually established in large and medium-sized cities to play the dual roles of engine for developing foreign oriented economy, generating foreign exchanges through exporting products and importing technologies, and the one of accelerator of inland economic development), as well as coastal development areas, the total number of zones is approximately one hundred.

In India there are hundreds of SEZs. Their dimensions vary from sector-specific ones, covering just ten hectares of land, to multiproduct ones, covering a maximum of one thousand hectares of land. Finally, rather than being owned by the government, India’s SEZs are usually structured like closed industrial parks, in some cases managed by the government and in other cases run by private developers.

²⁵ ‘Will India recreate China’s SEZ magic?’, *The Economic Times*, 14 November 2006.

²⁶ ‘Will India recreate China’s SEZ magic?’, *The Economic Times*, 14 November 2006.

This research argues that these characteristics are already enough to explain why the economies of scale that have been working so well in China by reducing production costs and improving plants productivity were not replicated in India. Huge size, geographical concentration, and developing funds availability represent a promising starting point for re-launching a solid expansion. However, this paper identifies some other differences between the Chinese and Indian SEZ strategies that further reduced the chances for the Indian model to be equally successful.

SEZs in the People's Republic of China were treated in the 1980s as an experiment to test an alternative economic system to the social and collectivistic one Beijing adopted in the past, which had to be based on the "Chinese interpretation" of free trade and free market. Thanks to either the limited number of SEZs or the regional areas in which they were originally barred, the Beijing government succeeded in monitoring its market experiment and, at a first stage, avoided any kind of spillover in bordering regions.

China also succeeded in capitalizing on its pre-existing "facilities" and in grounding SEZs development on them. It was from this perspective that SEZs costal locations were selected. The presence in these areas of schools and infrastructures since the Mao Zedong era made them the ideal place to find a skilled labor force and to limit the capital that needed to be invested in renovating infrastructures. Further, the geographical and cultural proximity of rich Chinese communities in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries were critical in terms of attracting industrial capital for SEZs development. Finally, coastal region location made input imports and products exports easier and faster for SEZ units.

In India, SEZ were originally identified as instruments useful to promote national economic growth and the rationalization at a state level the system of cluster and industrial districts aggregation. A district usually represents the evolution of a system in which a group of factories located in the same area and specialised in a particular sector try to join their forces in convincing the local government to invest to build the social and economic infrastructures that the whole area needs to further boost its own development. The shoe-making district in Chennai groups together foreign companies that decided to move their production to this area not because they were attracted by the benefits of a

SEZs, rather because their economy of scale proved successful in a place with a high concentration of similar factories. Accordingly, the rationale behind the SEZs development model is to provide national and foreign investors industrial platforms equipped with social and economic infrastructures, offering fiscal benefits as well as raw materials and skilled labor force. The Indian government has often stressed that SEZ implementation would have facilitated and accelerated a development trend that would have emerged in any case, although much slowly.

Some analysts argue that even though in India no “pre-existing facilities” could orient SEZs localization, other factors could have been chosen to rationalise their geographic distribution, such as raw materials and labor skills availability. In order to promote their industrial clusters, Indian SEZ developers always refer to the benefits investors can enjoy while choosing a particular location for their factory. Stressing that any SEZ offers different advantages. According to developers’ marketing strategy, multiproduct, gems and jewelry, hi-tech or any other SEZ location is chosen considering human capital and industrial inputs availability in the area. However, this paper shows that even though this aspect is broadly considered, it is not the only priority developers need to contemplate in their decision-making process.

Differently from China, India has not been forced to confine SEZs to specific areas to constantly monitor the political implications of their economic development. A condition that, from another perspective, is still preventing the country from enjoying the advantages of geographical concentration. India’s SEZ model also missed the opportunities coming from an already existing infrastructure network, neighboring Chinese communities’ investments, and government investment capacity. Accordingly, it was clear from the beginning that New Delhi was not in a position to duplicate the Chinese model as it was originally implemented.

Since the very beginning Indian SEZs strategy has been conceived to involve private developers into its implementation. A choice made compulsory by the awareness that national development could not be boosted by a financially weak government or by diaspora communities, and which had some implications. Among them, the most

important was linked to the need of dumping the burden or rationalise SEZs distribution to private developers.

In turn, aware of both Indian traditional development bottlenecks and New Delhi's inability to sustain national economic growth with a medium-term plan concentrated on infrastructure building and education promotion, private developers were pushed to build SEZs all over the country, wherever they could acquire land and find raw materials and skilled and semi-skilled workers.

While in the People's Republic Chinese communities investments became the pacers for more differentiated FDIs and the SEZs development model progressively started driving economic growth in all coastal areas at the beginning and in inland areas at a later stage, in India the only effect of what appeared as an uncoordinated land-acquisition move seemed to have the potential to end up in a jeopardized SEZs map associated to equally disbanded investments.

SEZs detractors usually identify two main pitfalls in Indian SEZs strategy. The first one is linked to developers' land acquisition plan and the necessity of regulating which fields could be transformed in SEZs. An issue that immediately raised the delicate problem of agricultural land acquisition²⁷. Another recurrent source of criticism is Indian SEZs lack of flexibility in labor laws. Economists know that labor law flexibility can play an important role in attracting foreign investors. Generally speaking, in rigid labor markets businesses that need to dismiss workers must make large payments, give long notice periods or even seek government authorization before making layoffs. Other rigidities include limitations on working hours and on reassigning workers within the company or, on the hiring side, the difficulties of making new employees permanent after a short trial period when it is requested. In India, employers need government approval for redundancies and face relatively long notice periods and high severance pay for formal workers with long tenure.²⁸

²⁷ The practice of productive agricultural land conversion led to numerous protests, some of which resulted in the scrapping of SEZ projects. These demonstrations, driven by opposition political parties, NGOs and expropriated farmers, eventually pushed New Delhi to make it mandatory that all SEZs proposals should have a certificate from the state government notifying that the land being used was non-agricultural for at least 90%.

²⁸ Allard G., 'Rigid Labour Markets', *Business*, 17 March 2010.

Several economists consider that the lack of flexibility in Indian labor laws, introduced here as the second pitfall, has significantly hampered the effectiveness of national SEZs. Professor Kaushik Basu believes that India needs a legal regime allowing firms to write different kinds of contracts with their workers depending on their needs. Admitting that ‘an injection of flexibility in labor market regulation can attract foreign capital, create jobs and unleash higher growth’, Basu recognizes that reforming the labor market is not an easy task.²⁹ The most important labor law in the country is the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), which came into force on April 1, 1947. The fact that IDA is very old makes it under certain cases out-of-date and inappropriate for the market today³⁰. The amendments approved in the 1980s did not leave much room for free contracting. Rather, they made compulsory for any firm employing more than one hundred workers to get permission from the state government before retrenching workers, a permission that is seldom given.³¹ According to some analysts, the worst consequence of Indian labor law rigidity is that it keeps ‘hundreds of thousands of workers unemployed because firms, wary of the fact that they will not be able to offload them, do not hire in the first place’.³²

While agreeing that a labor law reform might be able to boost industry and create more jobs and, accordingly, that the current lack of flexibility might seriously hamper SEZ performance, this paper finds it useful to stress two kinds of inconsistencies in SEZ detractors’ perspective. The lack of labor law flexibility related to SEZs is an argument that can lose part of its strength when the Indian case is compared to the Chinese one. The Rigidity of Employment Index, an indicator used by the World Bank to measure the regulation of employment, the hiring and firing of workers and the rigidity of working hours, has been practically the same for both China and India in 2008 and 2009. China scored 31 in both years, and India 30. Other Asian economies such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines scored 0/0, 0/0, 12/16, 21/21, 29/29 respectively.³³ A trend that has been confirmed during the following years, global

²⁹ Basu K., ‘Why India needs labor law reform’, *BBC*, 27 June 2005.

³⁰ Only small scale enterprises, in the unregistered sector, are not compelled to follow the labor laws.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ World Bank, *Doing Business Project 2008-2009*.

financial crises consequences notwithstanding. It is worth noticing that India scored 48 in 2005, which means that the situation has been noticeably improved in just a few years.

The second argument questioning the consistency of SEZs detractors is grounded on the outcomes of the forthcoming empirical section. Where it is shown how private developers have been able to ease some of the restrictions linked to Indian labor legislations, demonstrating that, at least within SEZs, labor laws are not always carefully enforced.

This section has provided a brief comparison between Chinese and India SEZs from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. It has been shown that there are some theorists that do not believe in the economic benefits triggered by SEZs and others that perceive SEZs as useful tools to boost national growth in India. The main differences between the economic conditions standing behind the implementation of the SEZs model in both countries have been reviewed, highlighting that while some of them proved to be a disadvantage in the Indian case, others have been less significant than expected. Before moving to the empirical section of this paper, it seems useful to quote some of the points of view of Indian and foreign analysts regarding SEZ policy implementation.

The difficulties of SEZs implementation

It has already been mentioned that the undeniable success of Chinese SEZs inspired the Indian government to re-introduce SEZs in its reforms plan. However, to help the reader to understand how sparking the debate on SEZs strategy approval has been, it is useful to rephrase the arguments of the scholars that, since the beginning, highlighted the pitfalls of Chinese SEZs to convince New Delhi's government to change its mind.

Some scholars argue that Chinese SEZs got into trouble in the early 1980s, as soon as durable goods entering them started threatening local industry, causing foreign exchange shortages and risking a rise in inflation, which forced Beijing to impose a moratorium on zones and to ban imports of 17 durable goods.³⁴ Further, it is argued that the attractiveness of SEZs diminished as soon as the rest of the country began to liberalize,

³⁴ Reardon L., 'The Rise and Fall of China's Export Processing Zones', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 5, n. 13, November 1996.

and that certain SEZs (such as Shenzhen, Guangdong) have been more successful than others (such as Shantou) due more to their FDI receptiveness than to their SEZs status.³⁵ It should be clarified that the idea that national economic liberalization would have limited SEZs attractiveness was clear since the time in which this policy had been elaborated. China chose to monitor the impact of economic reforms on these enclaves because it feared the political and social consequences of its first openings to the logic of market economy. However, the original plan of the Beijing government has always been the one of slowly but widely expanding SEZs benefits to the rest of the country as soon as China's new economic system proved to be safe, sustainable and effective. Further, this research finds crucial to stress that the role of Hong Kong proximity in terms of Guangdong SEZs performance should not underestimated. The approval of new SEZs near the border offering unprecedented economic and commercial advantages inevitably pushed Hong Kong businessmen to move their plants in Mainland China, contributing to the rapid transformation of what is now a Special Administrative Region of China into a powerful and world-reputed financial hub.

Other scholars argue that the most important 'Chinese lessons' that should have prompted India not to borrow their SEZ model are linked to the two above mentioned pitfalls: the illegal-speculative land-grabbing and the widespread abuse of labor force.

Aware that another research paper would be needed to analyze these two topics, this section tries to briefly describe the main aspects characterizing these controversies and the issues at stake.

The problem of agricultural land conversion has been nurturing protests in many Indian states³⁶. In India there are millions of people whose livelihood depends on agricultural land. Accordingly, as soon as the introduction of SEZs has resulted in the dispossession of agricultural land, farmers and agricultural labourers started to be negatively affected by this process. Influenced by local politicians and backed by activists, Indian farmers have been progressively convinced that the only way they had to reverse what was perceived as a dangerous trend was to join local and national protests organized to

³⁵ Wong K., 'China's Special Economic Zone Experiment: An Appraisal', *Geografiska Annaler, Series B, Human Geography*, Vol 96, N.1, 1987.

³⁶ Rappai M.V., 'China vs India. The SEZ reality check', *Realpolitik*, April 2007.

safeguard their interests as well as to present in litigations and court cases challenging the establishment of SEZs. Most of them were based on farmers' accusations that the procedure under the Land Acquisition Act had not been followed fairly; that they were promised to receive a compensation as well as a job in SEZs factories and they actually received only a monetary compensation below the market land rate. Showing that only when political parties started directly and indirectly supporting the farmers, the resistance against SEZs became massive.

This section is intended to show the impact of these protests briefly describing the most important ones. Among dozens of SEZ related confrontations between farmers and the government, this research has chosen to focus on the ones that took place in Jamnagar and Nandigram. Further, the tumults in Singur are also quoted, even though in that case protests targeted the installation of a large plant rather than a SEZ.

In November 2006, farmers from the Jamnagar District in Gujarat moved first the High Court of Gujarat, and later the Supreme Court to challenge the setting-up of a 4000 hectare SEZ by Reliance Corporation. Farmers claimed that the acquisition of large tracts of agricultural land in the villages of the district was against the public interest and violated the Land Acquisition Act. This move pushed the government to consider putting a ceiling on the maximum land area that could be acquired for multi-product zones and to slow down the rate of SEZs approval. Despite that, the Reliance SEZ in Jamnagar kept on growing and expanding its oil refinery plants in the area.

The Nandigram violence is the second most famous SEZ-related incident. Nandigram is a rural area in Purba Medinipur district of the Indian state of West Bengal. In 2007 the West Bengal government decided to allow the Salim Group to set up a chemical hub at Nandigram under the SEZ policy. As it happened in Jamnagar, farmers of that village disapproved this move, and unfortunately the resistance to forcible land acquisition turned into a battlefield. Unable to handle the situation politically, on 14 March 2007 the Left Front government sent more than 3,000 heavily armed police to the Nandigram area. They had been charged with removing the protestors in order to expropriate 10,000 acres of land for the Salim Group SEZ. A massacre followed: police opened fire, 14 villagers were shot dead and 70 more, including children and women, were injured.

Although not directly related to the SEZ policy, the turmoil involving Tata Motors in Singur, a small agricultural town in West Bengal, was no doubt exacerbated by the Nandigram incident and the overall tension about land being used for industrial projects. In 2006 Tata Motors made an agreement with the ruling party in West Bengal, the Communist Party-Marxist (CPI-M), to acquire 400 hectares land for the construction of its Tata Nano small car factory, scheduled to be operative by 2008. Displaced farmers were promised to receive monetary compensation and jobs in the new factory. The construction for the new Tata location started in January 2007, and a few months later a violent agitation began with farmers asking to have their land back. Singur is currently populated by 12,000 farmers out of 20,000 people, and West Bengal claims to have the most productive agricultural land in the country. Tata's representatives tried to negotiate with local representatives but they could not find any compromise, and in October 2008 Tata decided to move out of Singur and build its new plant in Sanand, in Gujarat.

These examples show some of the controversies associated with SEZs in India. Some analysts think that these zones started with a lot of premature praise and have now become a bone of contention readily exploited by political forces to the detriment of the peasants, who fear losing their means of livelihood.

This paper is not aimed at investigating the rhetorical debate behind the SEZs, nor in assessing whether SEZs are instruments to be used 'to the detriment of Indian peasants' or rather 'to boost national economy' and transform India in the new Asian emerging country. However, the cases of Jamnagar, Nandigram and Singur are useful to show an evolution in political parties' approach to SEZ implementation.

The Jamnagar case can be considered as an attempt to reach an acceptable compromise. The ideas of both putting a ceiling on the maximum land area that could be acquired for multi-product zones and to slow down the rate of SEZs approval were undoubtedly promising, and had the potential of creating a positive precedent in handling SEZs protests. Unfortunately, this compromising approach was subsequently disproved, as soon as it became clear that the Gujarat government wanted to protect Reliance's interests in the state, mainly to avoid losing huge investment that, if recalled, could have badly impacted regional growth and development.

The violence linked to the Nandigram case inevitably transforms what happened in 2007 in the worst example of political mismanagement of a protest. Further, the Nandigram case exacerbated the controversial debate on SEZs implementation. Convincing Indian public opinion that the activists' negative attitude towards this policy could be easily confirmed by facts. A belief that probably pushed West Bengal local representatives not to give in to Tata Motors' requests regarding their Singur plant. At a time in which the Nandigram wound was still bleeding, and probably also to re-gain some credibility among local population.

These considerations notwithstanding, this research is aware that these three cases are not enough to build a consistent trend or to help forecasting how local politicians, activists, farmers and workers might react to a new protest.

Some scholars believe that these kinds of reactions could have been forecasted by observing carefully the Chinese case. In the People's Republic of China urban lands belong to the state and rural lands to the village, and whereas urban land use rights can be transferred to private parties directly, private parties need the government's mediation to use and allocate it. In the areas located near expanding municipalities and within economically growing SEZs, farmers' land started to become insecure, and the situation did not improve when peasants realized that the compensations they received from land acquisition 'were generally lower than the market value of these lands'.³⁷ It was only in 1997 that the Beijing government imposed a moratorium on land use conversion, and in 1998 a new law for agriculture land conversion was approved. In China, 'the SEZ concept promoted land development without directly addressing impacts on cultivable land and the natural resource base'.³⁸ Since the conversion of agricultural land is a sensitive issue in India as well, Chinese records should have been analyzed with a more objective approach. It is argued that tuning a rational, egalitarian, and sustainable conversion plant New Delhi might have avoided at least some of these violent protests.

³⁷ Gopalakrishnan S., *op. cit.*, p. 1493.

³⁸ Cartier C., 'Zone Fever, the Arable Land Debate and real Estate Speculation: China's Evolving Land Use Regime and Its Geographical Contradictions', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 10, n. 28, 2001, pp. 445-69.

In terms of labor force protection, the Chinese experience is enlightening as well. Most of working population in SEZs is composed by migrant workers with almost no legal or social protection. In early 2010 and 2011 several protests and strikes took place in Guangdong factories, where labourers started openly lamenting their unbearable working conditions. These protests expanded to many other regions in the following months. However, suicides and insurrections did not help to change the hiring and working conditions very much. A few improvements have been approved, but none of them can be considered substantial.

The impact of the global financial crisis in China changed migrant workers' perspective again. Chinese exports slowdown started worrying local labourers as soon as their employers considered the option of moving their plants to China's western regions, to regain competitiveness tearing down production costs.³⁹

Chinese workers keep on receiving less than minimum wage, they generally work more than twelve hours per day with almost no breaks or holidays, they are often exposed to dangerous machinery and harmful chemicals, like lead, cadmium and mercury, which means constantly violating local law and international worker standards.⁴⁰

Grounding on Chinese experience, some Indian scholars argue that to attract western FDI New Delhi should be 'ready' to accept pressures aimed at keeping prices down and improving product quality as it is happening in China. This is a dangerous trend that would inevitably worsen working conditions in India, a pattern that might become even more pressing considering the global rise of food, energy and raw materials costs. Concluding that, aware that 'all the elements of the Chinese policy that produced (the previously mentioned) consequences are present in India's policy as well, (...) the Chinese experience should [have been] read not only as a model but also as a salutary warning'.⁴¹

Other downsides of China's SEZ model are the increasing divide between coastal and inland regions, in a country where the boom has progressively led 'to a widening gap and

³⁹ Barboza D., H. Tabuchi, 'Power Grows for Striking Chinese Workers', *The New York Times*, 8 June 2010.

⁴⁰ Barboza D., 'In Chinese Factories, Lost Fingers and Low Pay', *The New York Times*, 5 January 2008.

⁴¹ Gopalakrishnan S., *op. cit.*, p. 1494.

uneven, skewed development – reflecting internal colonialism’, as well as a dangerous intra-provincial divide based on an unprecedented labor migration.⁴² This criticism is not automatically applicable to the Indian case, mainly because SEZs geographical dispersion and their size limits do not create a similar coastal-inland gap.

In conclusion, a recurrent idea in Indian and western scholars’ evaluations on New Delhi’s opportunities to replicate China’s economic success in the Subcontinent is clearly identifiable. However, it is more and more clear that ‘without taking into account the [Chinese] unique historical and geographical context – of 1949-1976, of overseas Chinese investment, a strong social sector, rural reforms, internal debates about the development process and finally, a state and leadership that formulates cohesively and implements firmly – is fraught with India repeating the mistakes’.⁴³

SEZs characteristics and impact. The Indian experience

The Indian government defines SEZs as tax-free enclaves with strictly defined borders and formally considered as parts of external territories as far as commercial activities, fiscal and customs regimes are concerned. As of today almost 600 SEZs have been formally approved and fifty more have received ‘in principle’ approval⁴⁴.

This section aims at exploring the peculiarities of Indian SEZs, focusing on three different aspects that uniquely characterize the Indian experience. These are the SEZs partition into ‘integrated/multiproduct’ and ‘sectorial’ SEZs. The fact that the overlap through time of new SEZs policies oriented at building SEZs with different characteristics has gradually consolidated a huge contrast between old and new SEZs. Finally, the role of ‘developers’ in managing these area. Aware that there is a clear parallelism among old and new SEZs and the role played by public and private developers, this paper finds it interesting to elaborate more on the developer figure as it does not exist in any other Asian SEZ experiment. Accordingly, this research evaluates both whether they have been helpful in influencing SEZs rate of success, and if the link

⁴² Viswanath A., M. Mohanty, ‘SEZ lessons from China’, *Business Standard*, 14 February 2008.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ For a detailed list of SEZs, see annexes 2 and 3.

between SEZ records and private developers' performances is stronger than the one with public developers'.

Before dealing with the in-depth examination of the three main themes of this section, it is important to clarify that the ensuing analysis is grounded on official documents and a series of interviews conducted in February 2008 in two SEZs with local managers and developers.

The first is a semi-private SEZ, a zone managed by a public agency -Riico, Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation- co-financed by private investors (Mahindra Group) located in Jaipur, Rajasthan, a zone that can be considered as 'private' for all practical purposes. The second is a publicly owned and managed SEZ in Noida, near New Delhi.

The managers of the two SEZs have been approached with the same list of questions. They have been asked to show the advantages for both national and foreign investors to move their capital to SEZs; to illustrate the costs of building an industrial plant inside the SEZs as well as to indicate the current status of internal and contiguous infrastructures. Further, SEZs representatives have been questioned about raw materials and workforce availability, existing fiscal regulations and export limits on industrial outputs. Local managers were also requested to prove how their SEZs could guarantee regular supplies of water, gas and electricity. Finally, their intentions in promoting infrastructures upgrade outside SEZs to keep on boosting the development of the surrounding area has been discussed. This point is particularly interesting because several scholars favorable to SEZs list issue-linkages or spillover effects among their benefits. For example, referring to infrastructures, spillovers operate in two different directions. On the SEZs developers' side, they can push investors to strengthen connections and services within the area. Since it is not unusual for private developers to build different SEZs in the same areas, it is evident that a better infrastructure environment outside SEZs can either convince investors not to move elsewhere their industrial plants or facilitate developers expansion plans in the same area. On the investors' side, what Professor Aradhna Aggrawal labels as the 'Bangalore experiment' is a useful example of how SEZs productivity can push private investors to contribute to joint infrastructures redevelopment projects: the

Bangalore airport was a military hub that was renovated and transformed into a civilian airport thanks to the interest shown by a group of industrialists that needed a commercial hub near their industrial plants and to the capitals they provided for its renovation.

As the following three theme sections interestingly show, the answers provided by the Mahindra Group & Riico and Noida SEZs managers to similar problems were not very different. However, the strategies they agreed on to develop their SEZs were different and deeply influenced by the public and private status of the SEZ.

To better understand the rationale behind Indian SEZ contemporary strategy, this paper finds it useful to remember some points of the previously mentioned debate on the profitability of adopting the Chinese industrial-lead growth strategy to balance what is often considered India's unsustainable service-lead development path. Several analysts believe that India is following an alternative path for economic development, focusing mainly on business services (information technology, business process outsourcing, etc.). This argument is usually supported attributing the rationale behind the growth in the IT sector to increased specialization and an above average availability of a large pool of low cost but highly skilled, educated and fluent English-speaking workers on the supply side, matched on the demand side by an increased demand from foreign consumers interested in India's service exports, or those looking to outsource their operations.

Deepening this debate exceeds the scope of this paper. However, to better evaluate Indian SEZs rate of success it may be useful to remind that some scholars believe that the economic future of India depends on the successful development of the IT sector, arguing that SEZs are not the right instrument to boost national growth. On the contrary, other economists suggest that India will not be able to become a world economic power until the problems created by its "four bottlenecks" will be solved. These are strict labor laws; limited investment in soft (financial structures) and hard infrastructures; the difficulties in closing firms as well as in shifting from one production to another; and the persistence of the small scale scheme. That is the existence of several hundred industrial sectors, such as toys, furniture, or other small products, in which Indian entrepreneurs are not allowed to produce with economies of scale'. The Government enables 'small scale industries' to produce on 'small scale' only, not even on medium, and 'small' is defined by the

investment’.⁴⁵ This situation is a legacy of the Jawaharlal Nehru’s policy, which imposed ‘on India a complex of malfunctioning, state-run, industrial white elephants, all the while denying private entrepreneurs the right to seek investments from abroad, or to export without oppressive controls, or to import at will the materials and technology needed to establish competitive industries in India’.⁴⁶

Considering that any evaluation of Nehru’s economic legacy goes beyond the scope of this study, it is a matter of fact that the previous sentences are a bit too strong in judging the first Indian Prime Minister economic performance. It would be more balanced and realistic to remind that in the early 1950s there was anticipation that ‘India would take its place among the leaders of the world’, and that with this aim in mind Jawaharlal Nehru was asked to shape and approve a new national economic policy.

Although Nehru’s intention to follow the Soviet Union model was clear since the early 1950s, when a Planning Commission and a ‘Five Year Plans’ strategy were set up, at the time of drafting the first Five Year Plan (1951-55) the Indian PM was ambivalent and talked of a mixed economy that would accommodate the private sector⁴⁷.

Despite this promising start, what actually followed was a ‘move towards state capitalism’⁴⁸. In a letter Nehru wrote to the secretary of the Planning Commission he stated that ‘it should be our endeavor to effect enormous transformation without challenging the existing order’⁴⁹, while in other occasion he even clarified that ‘there is of course no question of doing away with private capital, though it has to be controlled in the interest of the people’⁵⁰.

With this picture in mind, by 1954 Nehru succeeded in convincing the Parliament to accept the ‘socialist pattern of society’ as Indian model of economic development. In

⁴⁵ Interview with Professor Chandra Rajes, National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi, India, 22 February 2008.

⁴⁶ Varadarjian T., ‘Why the subcontinent is subpar’, *Wall Street Journal*, 19 March 2001, Mukharji J., *Economic Growth and India’s Future*, Occasional Paper n. 26, March 2006, Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.

⁴⁷ Kumar, A. and A. Narendhranath, “Why Jawaharlal Nehru is the root cause of India’s economic troubles”, *Daily News & Analysis*, July 11, 2011.

⁴⁸ Das S., “The Nehru Years in Indian Politics: From a historical hindsight”, *Edinburgh Papers in South Asian Studies*, Number 16 (2001), Centre for South Asian Studies, School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh.

⁴⁹ Gopal S. (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Selected Works*, vol. IX, First Series, 1975, Delhi, pp. 373-4.

⁵⁰ Gopal S. (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Selected Works*, vol. XI, First Series, 1975, Delhi, pp. 310-14.

early 1955, what is now known as the Avadi Resolution was passed, calling for ‘the establishment of a socialistic pattern of society where the principal means of production are under social ownership or control’, and there is ‘equitable distribution of the national wealth’.

While the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 made it seem that India would have a mixed economy, the 1956 version allowed the government only to undertake new ventures in several sectors such as textiles, automobiles and defence. The government started to exercise exclusive control over many other sectors, while for the rest of private enterprises it was agreed that the state would ‘progressively participate’ and would ‘not hesitate to intervene’ if it found progress to be ‘unsatisfactory’⁵¹.

These are some of the reasons regularly mentioned by Indian economists to show why the share of manufacturing in terms of value added in national GDP has remained the same since 1991 (16-17%). Although it is undeniable that 60% of Indian GDP depends on services and that this sector is the engine of national growth, the fact that IT represents just a small niche in Indian economy cannot be underestimated. A group of analysts has calculated that IT yearly contributes to only 1 per cent to national growth rate, and it employs 2.3 million people directly and 6.5 million indirectly. A large workforce in absolute value, but not that significant in a country where the working population counts more than 402 million people. These data confirms that India’s comparative advantage in software and IT services is not strong enough to fill the gap in terms of development with other countries, and investing in IT only cannot guarantee a balanced growth for the whole nation.

As a consequence, the assumption that labor intensive sectors (food processing, light engineering, consumer goods, textile, and garments) are the ones in which India can better exploit its competitive advantage inevitably transforms the SEZs scheme in a useful tool to boost economic growth. It is argued that to be successful SEZs should limit their negative impact (calculated in terms of displaced people) and focus on production that can improve the employment rate of the urban and rural areas in which they are

⁵¹ Kumar, A. and A. Narendhranath, “Why Jawaharlal Nehru is the root cause of India’s economic troubles”, Daily News & Analysis, July 11, 2011.

located. Moreover, it is expected that as soon as Indian SEZs will be able to 'offer' productive environments in which labor and bankruptcy laws have been reformed and efficient infrastructures as well as cheap but skilled labor force is available, New Delhi will start attracting huge amounts of FDIs able to further stimulate national economic growth.

Although these linkages might appear too simplistic, the fact that foreign more than local investors are somehow discouraged to approach Indian SEZs as they feel that the fiscal advantages they offer are not enough to overcome their basic efficiency problems is not new.

During an interview in October 2006, the Union Minister for Environment Jairam Ramesh stressed that 'the single most important benefit from the SEZ would be stimulating investment in labor-intensive manufacturing. If that is not happening, we should review the policy. If it is merely going to promote IT investment, it is nothing great as IT would have developed in any case, because we already have a competitive edge. If the SEZs bring in big investments in textile, leather, agro-processing, light engineering or consumer-oriented engineering, than that would be worthwhile. The Nokia SEZ in Sriperumbudur (near Chennai) is a good example of this kind of labor-intensive initiative. (...) The fact of the matter is that we have a weak manufacturing sector, if you look at it as a proportion of GDP. There is also the fact that our manufacturing sector is not absorbing the surplus agricultural labor force. Had we done something about that 12 years ago, we would not be in this sorry situation. It needs to be seen whether the SEZs can become an instrument to correct it'.

In sum, those analysts who consider that India's growth path is based on Information Technology (IT) and services -the so called third sector- doubt that SEZ represents the most appropriate strategy for boosting economic development. On the contrary, for those who believe that service-lead growth is unsustainable in the long term as well as unable to provide a balanced economic equilibrium in the whole country, the implementation of SEZs (borrowed from the Chinese model and adapted to promote Indian needs and priorities) should be able to attract FDIs and offer national industrialists enough fiscal

and infrastructural advantages to open new productive units and raise national productivity betting on the so called secondary sector.

In order to understand why SEZs have not yet been as successful as expected and to assess their different performances, it is crucial to scrutinize Indian SEZ development strategy focusing on the three aspects characterizing it most: the heterogeneity between ‘old’ and ‘new’ SEZ; the coexistence of ‘integrated/multiproduct’ and ‘sectorial’ SEZs; and the role played by private and public developers.

Indian SEZ strategy: old and new SEZs

This section highlights the main differences between old and new SEZs, comparing a public one located in Noida to a private SEZ in Rajasthan.

The Noida Special Economic zone was established by the Indian government in 1985. It is spread over 310 acres of land and is 24 kilometres away from New Delhi. It is an integrated SEZ where the majority of productive units are specialized in software, information technology, electronics, as well as textiles and gems and jewels⁵².

The Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Ltd. (Riico), instead, was funded in 1969 by an institution aimed at supporting Rajasthan industrialization process providing new means of financial and investment support services to local businessmen. This corporation is active in sustaining large, medium and small scale industrial projects in order to guarantee to national and international investors an easy access to a ready-to-use base with supportive infrastructure facilities in the manufacturing areas, all developed and managed by Riico, to contribute to the growth of the industrial sector in Rajasthan⁵³.

When talking to developers about Indian SEZ strategy, it is common for the public ones to support New Delhi’s choices. According to them, while defining its own strategy in the late ’80s, the central government elaborated a functional and well-balanced policy

⁵² Interview with CPS Bakshi, Noida Special Economic Zone, Noida, India, 21 February 2008.

⁵³ Although it is recognized that without the experience and the capital provided by the Mahindra Group Riico would have never achieved the same results, in 2008 this industrial hub had 61.921 Million Rupees of catalyzed investments; 61.771 acres of land acquired and 39.929 acres of land developed; a working population of 99.709 units; and a net profit of 34.23 Million Rupees in 2002-3 and 1349.65 Million in 2008-9.

covering several implementation phases that have been partially successful, although its setting up has not been completed overall.

Noida developers have stressed that, considering the starting conditions for Indian economic reforms in the 1990s, what has been achieved today has to be recognized as an extraordinary success. According to them, in the late 1990s India did not know where to locate new SEZs, in which industrial sectors national production had to be focused, who was supposed to invest in infrastructures building, whether these areas would have been attractive for foreign investors, and whether the country would have been able to offer enough skilled and semi-skilled labors to be employed in the new industrial plants.

In the 1980s, New Delhi had no option but to fund the creation of some public SEZs: at that time no private investors would have ever been interested in being involved in such an extremely large-scale industrial and development project. At the same time, in order to boost national industrialization and aware that Indian development model was destined to be driven by national investments rather than FDIs, the government could not afford cutting off any capital to promote specialized SEZs rather than multiproduct ones.

Once the first multiproduct SEZs had been established, the limited amount of governmental funds pushed private developers to jump on the bandwagon and invest in smaller and more easily manageable sectorial SEZs, sustaining national growth with a development strategy that was less expensive and risky than the one followed by the central government.

Form a series of interviews collected in a public (Noida) and a private SEZ (RIICO, in Rajasthan), it emerged that in the 2000s, when the state stepped back from investing in SEZs leaving room to private developers, to do that the government committed to infrastructure building and poverty alleviation, promoting what has been called 'a model of sustainable development for India'. The last five-year plan approved by the Government of India in 2007 announced public investments of 333 billion Euro to be used for infrastructure modernization, twice the amount of the investment approved during the previous five-year plan. However, despite its good intentions, already in 2008 the government was compelled to specify that it could realistically cope with only 30% of

the specified amount, and private investors would have to lend support to the national development strategy if they really want to implement it.

After several years, not much has changed. India is still suffering for a huge infrastructure deficit. A condition that is blocking Indian economic development and which is at the same time partially responsible for the limited success of its SEZ strategy.

As far as investors are concerned, the interviews conducted in India have shown that while national businessmen tend to choose old and public SEZs, foreigners usually prefer to open new factories in new and private SEZs. They usually consider them as better managed and they offer high level services and assistance when compared to Indian standards. Further, the almost continuous supply of basic utilities is broadly appreciated as well as the availability of raw material in the closest neighbourhood.

Beyond this basic trend, it is important to remember that foreign investors have basically no direct experience of Indian old and public SEZs. Most of these areas are already full today, therefore not an option for them.

Four more differences can be identified between old and new SEZs: land price; workers' salaries; availability of basic infrastructures; and adherence to environmental laws.

SEZs land costs are continuously rising, and in private and semi-privates they are higher than in public SEZs. This difference seems justified by the fact that the first ones usually offer more services and a higher level assistance to potential investors.

Making a comparison with Gurgaon multiproduct SEZs, which is, similarly to Riico in Rajasthan, a private SEZs, Noida developers, after recalling that land selling price is subject to a yearly increase of 5-10%, stressed that while in their SEZ land could be rented at an average price of 8 Rupees per square meter, in Gurgaon the average price is 40 Rupees per square meter⁵⁴.

Developers are often accused of neglecting the basic rules of labor safety. Since most of the industrial plants located inside SEZs are labor intensive, labor costs transparency is crucial for groups interested in investing in India. As far as workers' salaries are concerned, in Noida skilled labors earn on average about 500 Rupees per day, semi-

⁵⁴ Contracts with local businessmen usually last for five years and the only restriction for renewal depends on the factories' ability to guarantee that the monetary value of exports remains higher than that of imports.

skilled labors about 330 Rupees and unskilled workers 160, and the majority of the labour force is hired without a regular contract.

Mahindra Group & Riico developers affirm that in Rajasthan wages varies between 80 Rupees (1,18 Euro) a day for unskilled workers, 200 Rupees (2,9 Euro) for semi-skilled workers and 500 Rupees (7,4 Euro) for qualified workers. As far as labor conditions are concerned, laborers need to work at least eight or nine hours per day six days a week. Inside factories workers seldom have a working area wide enough for their needs, and their working position do not always have windows or appropriate ventilation system. Finally, they are not allowed to take more than a few breaks a day. However, Mahindra Group & Riico developers are proud to stress that all laborers working in their SEZs have a regular contract including insurance coverage, a retirement plan and paid vacation days. Inside SEZs there are even trade unions that all managers need to approach in case controversies with workers arise, allowing them to verify if both parts have taken all measures to reach a compromise to solve divergences.

Even though developers tend to reassure businessmen highlighting that they will be autonomous in controlling the status of worker's contracts, they always recommend them to guarantee a twelve-monthly salary as well as a productivity bonus to boost output quality and quantity. Interviews in Mahindra Group & Riico plants have confirmed that the social policy within factories remains highly discretionary. However, a new trend is recognizable: all companies interested in approaching the international market, notably when they are specialized in innovative productions, offer more assistance and guarantees to their employees. Other factories tend to limit their pro-workers assistance to the establishment of a canteen with 'acceptable' agreed fee.

This evolution seems happening for three reasons. First, it is assumed that to boost competitiveness it is necessary to strengthen labor force loyalty. Second, any time a factory chooses to specialize in what is considered an 'innovative' production, a subsequent upgrade from a 'mainly unskilled labour force' to a 'mainly skilled' one is usually recognizable. This change has made even more urgent the necessity of hiring 'loyal workers'. Third, considering the recent trend of attacking international brands accused of abusing their workers' rights and to boycott their products, the urgency of

consolidating the image of factories in an ‘internationally accepted way’ recently started to be taken into account by Indian businessmen as well.

Despite this promising background, questioned about how they would react in case the hiring of workers with a regular contract might scare both national and foreign businessmen, Mahindra Group & Riico developers clarifies that despite the official regulations, both inside and outside SEZs labor laws are not often respected. Indeed, most of workers do not have a regular contract. Factories usually hire just a few people with a regular contract. The majority of workers has no contract at all. The number of hired workers in each factory depends on the number of laborers that national regulations impose to each industrial sector. This is the reason why labor statistics in India often report that factories do not hire more than 5-10 workers. Within this limited group of regular workers, there is always the equivalent of a ‘human resources manager’ whose main task is substituting any laborer deciding to dismiss the job, quitting it without notice to get a slightly more convenient position -usually within the same SEZ-, and worker temporarily leaving for family or health reasons. Statistically, developers have noticed that workers with a regular contract tend to wait until its expiration day before dismissing the job and finding a new one. On the contrary, laborers without a regular contract can quit any time. Considering the amount of irregular workers, laborers unexpected mobility is one of the main problems investors have to face while planning their production schedules.

It is argued that developers’ help is crucial also to solve the problems linked to laborers unexpected mobility. They can recommend a reliable ‘human resources manager’, convincing investors that in the area in which they are planning to open a new factory, even though a regular turnover is common, it will never be difficult to find new workers. Stressing that the fact that the majority of hired workers is composed by unskilled labor force can reduce the impact of what is often perceived as a too frequent turnover.

It has already been clarified that infrastructures building and maintenance is one of the main points of private developers SEZ strategy. However, what is important to stress at this stage is that in contrast to what is happening in private and semi-private SEZs, inside Indian public SEZs it is not always easy to distinguish commissioners and supervisors’

responsibilities. Since public developers do not have any obligation to offer more than very basic infrastructures or any other extra service (such as recreational or sanitary structures), and taking care of their maintenance, in the majority of public SEZs these kinds of facilities are not provided. Accordingly, most of private companies need to invest and provide to their own plants what they need. It goes without saying that the outcome of these autonomous investments in infrastructures is sub-optimal for several reasons. First, either local or foreign businessmen usually do not have the expertise to take care of extra industrial facilities and needs. Second, since the timing for investors to move into an SEZ can vary, any coordination in this domain remains unfeasible, even when desired. Third, even if coordination can be achieved, managing maintenance costs would be even more problematic any time it will be necessary to share responsibilities.

According to private developers, poor infrastructures and non-existent services are enough to justify the rental price difference between public and semi-private SEZs. However, their statistics based on a series of interviews conducted among the investors located in their SEZs show that in a medium-long term perspective businessmen tend to prefer private and semi-private SEZs because of their advanced infrastructures environment as well as the maintenance and logistical support developers can provide. The appreciation of developers' services is usually recognized even in the short term any time foreign investors are interviewed.

The environmental approach of old SEZs is different from the one of new SEZs. In Noida, for example, although developers appear stricter when stressing the need to respect national environmental regulations, since most of investors moved to this industrial area long before current environmental laws were approved, it never happened to local developers to reject the application of a potential investor who did not successfully get through the environmental clearance process. The only way in which Noida developers can pressure local investors to improve the environmental standards of their plants is asking them to install new effluent treatment plants. Since public developers have no interest in asking any investor to move out from their SEZ and, at the same time, they do not provide any incentive for the introduction of environmental-friendly technologies, neither they accurately check industrial waste disposal plants, in

most of cases public SEZs remains the less technologically advanced and relatively more polluted productive areas in the country.

One of the greatest advantage of being located in a public SEZ is apparently linked to the fact that interaction with governmental inspectors is mediated by developers. Thanks to their long background of positive interactions with the central government, the latter can easier gain inspectors confidence, and local investors reckon the fact that inspectors often decide not to inspect plants directly rather to trust developers' reports as a precious asset. Interviews collected in Noida highlighted among the advantages of being located in a public SEZ the lower costs for land rental and business management and the chance of interacting with a single representative who is always available, easily reachable, and, even more important, has consolidated through time a sort of "special relationship" with the central government, thereby simplifying procedures and smoothing out any problems that might arise.

Finally, there is one more factor that is influencing businessmen interested in moving their plants into a SEZ, affecting old and new SEZs in the same way: transportation. Mahindra Group & Riico developers, for instance, stressed that the nearest ports and airports to their SEZs are in Kandla and New Delhi, transfer hubs offering extremely convenient packages and a high level assistance for exporters. However, they admit that some investors prefer Mumbai port and airport, highlighting that its efficiency can balance all discomforts linked to the longer distance⁵⁵. The main hindrance while moving from Rajasthan to Mumbai is not the higher costs rather the unpredictable travelling time. Because of very old and congested roads, transport may take longer than expected, and this is another reason why most of developers usually project their SEZs close to the main highways in India, the ones linking New Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai and Mumbai.

Indian SEZ strategy: single-sector and multi-sector SEZs

The 2005 SEZ Act the Indian Parliament approved in 2005 specified that SEZs can have two different dimensions according to their characteristics and purposes. This act further

⁵⁵ The cost of transferring a motor truck from Rajasthan to New Delhi might cost between 5.000 and 6.000 Rupees (70-90 Euro), from Rajasthan to Mumbai between 9.000 to 10.000 Rupees (130-150 Euro).

clarified that the aim of an ‘integrated/multiproduct SEZ’ is the one of welcoming multi-sector industrial activities. Its territory should cover at least 1000 hectares (100 only if they are service-oriented), and be located close to a port or airport hub. These areas should promote ‘integrated economic development’, which means that they are supposed to integrate industrial activities with commercial, residential and recreational buildings projects, although 35% of their territory has to be dedicated to ‘productive’ activities.

‘Sectorial SEZs’ have been introduced as zones focusing on one single sector of activity. Their area should cover at least 100 hectares (10 if they are specialized on IT, gems and jewels and biotechnology), and 50% of their land must be devoted to productive activities.

While the Noida case study refers to a public and multiproduct SEZ, it is useful to remind that in Rajasthan Mahindra Group & Riico developers currently manage four SEZs: three focused on the production of handicrafts, gems and jewels, in Jaipur and Jodhpur respectively, and the third one in Sitapura, twelve kilometers away from Jaipur, specialized in services and Information Technology (IT). Moreover, they are considering to build a new SEZ, this time a multi-product one. Its aim would be accommodating the ‘industrial needs’ of investors interested in moving their production to Jaipur and that currently cannot access the already existing SEZs as their industrial activities do not fall into one of the production categories of the already working SEZs.

It seems consistent to discuss at this stage two of the most frequent criticisms raised against both private and public developers, with the former accused of preferring IT SEZs to the multi-product ones, although they could better promote and sustain national industrialization, and the latter of conducting speculative operations in public multiproduct SEZs.

Interviews in the field have shown that developers’ needs are similar to those of an industrialist investing in a highly-risky sector. They need to buy the land from the government and since then they remain the only referent for both government and investors, who never get in touch directly. Only after they have financed the construction of gas, water, electricity plants and infrastructures, developers can advertise their acres to potential investors, hoping they will be interested in moving their factories to a SEZ.

Further, even when the whole land has been sold or rented, developers need to take care of providing and maintaining utilities.

It has already been mentioned that, according to Indian regulations, multi-product SEZs need to cover at least one thousand hectares of land, or one hundred if they are services oriented. In contrast, sectorial SEZs can cover not less than one hundred hectares of land, or ten if they are specialized in IT, gems and jewels, and biotechnological productions. Because of this regulation, it is logical for private developers to start investing in small (and less risky) SEZs, and wait until their activity and their reliability is widely recognized on the market to think about huge investments in multi-product SEZs, as if developers' motto were 'sector-based first and multi-product SEZs later'.

This commercial inclination does not mean that developers are never involved in speculative investments. This research wants to stress the complexity of facing costs and uncertainties when planning to invest in a multi-product SEZ. However, it is argued that these kinds of difficulties can be overcome when developers can count on a long-term experience gained managing smaller and sector-based projects, preferably choosing the industrial fields in which India maintains a comparative advantage in production.

A useful case study to understand when it is appropriate to talk about speculation initiatives within SEZs is the one of Orient Craft, a SEZ located in Gurgaon, an area not very far from Noida and New Delhi.

Orient Craft was set up in 1978, much earlier than Noida, and like the latter as an integrated SEZ. However, Orient Craft never became operative until its redevelopment was planned, officially to fulfil the growing demand for new production spaces near the capital, especially for textile, considering that the number of investors interested in opening textile manufacturing plants is constantly growing. A request 'forcing' Orient Craft developers to renovate a multiproduct SEZ in Gurgaon, as no sectorial SEZ is allowed to specialize in textile.

This research finds it interesting to stress that the fact that Noida is running at full capacity and Orient Craft is not and further, that Noida is dedicated exclusively to factories and Orient Craft has a large proportion of residential building lends credence to the accusation that the latter has been renovated primarily for speculative reasons.

Orient Craft is located in the nearest periphery around New Delhi, where locals and foreigners seem interested in moving to enjoy recently renovated apartments, shopping malls, and where they can count on less frequent shortages of electricity, gas and water, compared to what usually happens in any other area of the capital.

Some analysts suggest that the fact that Orient Craft was set up in 1978 and developers started planning the opening of a “multiproduct” special economic zone only in 2006 is a clear sign that the original intent of this controversial SEZ was to speculate on highly profitable residential buildings.

Indian SEZs are often criticized as they implicitly leave developers the chance of concentrating in their productive areas residential buildings rather than industrial plants. This accusation is understandable when SEZs such as Orient Craft are set up, and this Gurgaon based SEZ is not the only example of speculative SEZs in India. However, their existence does not imply that among all multiproduct SEZs only a few are really productive. On the contrary, most of India’s functioning SEZs, either multiproduct or sectorial, are industrial areas.

Commenting on residential speculation scandals, Mahindra Group & Riico developers clarified that this risk is higher in public SEZs for specific reasons. Private developers tend to define a development plan when approaching a new area where they are interested in setting up one or more SEZs. They carry out market research first, and according to their findings decide whether to open an IT or gems and jewels or any other sectorial SEZs. At a second stage, in case they have increased their reputation in the region where they are located, they have gained experience in SEZ management, and can count on a slightly better network of infrastructures, they may start planning a multiproduct SEZs.

It should be highlighted that when the time for the construction of a ‘multiproduct’ SEZ is mature, the environment in which it is going to be located is completely different from the one that welcomed the first SEZs. To begin with, part of the area has already been industrialized. Local manpower has been trained according to the needs of the firms that have already invested there and, even more important, investors have recognized that SEZs standards in terms of living conditions, electricity and water supply, health

assistance, and recreational areas availability are higher than the ones available outside SEZs. Accordingly, most of them have shown some interest in moving inside SEZs.

Business people who have already invested in sectorial SEZs tend to move some of their units to a multiproduct SEZ in the same district. For them, geographical proximity is crucial for different reasons. First, it is useful to cluster factories in the same area and consequently enjoy manpower loyalty as well as infrastructures spillovers. When local workers realize that an industrial group is interested in expanding its productive plants in a certain area, it might become more convenient for them to structure their career inside a group that, in the long term, might be interested in hiring them with a regular contract.

Regarding infrastructures, although SEZs developers often underline their interest in seeing new bridges and roads coming up outside SEZs to better connect the whole industrial district, it is contended whether they will ever allocate funds for infrastructures outside SEZs. However, it is argued that a concentration of a few entrepreneurs managing several SEZs and consequently interested in improving infrastructures standards to ease and speed up industrial outputs transportation might be willing to undertake a collective investment to upgrade existing infrastructures.

Finally, the rise of local and foreign investors within the area entails the need of sending expatriates managers to run factories. If this becomes true, SEZs will need to be equipped for hosting them, with comfortable houses, recreational areas, hospitals, and any other service that might be useful for Indian and foreign managers. Since these kinds of services can be provided only in a multiproduct SEZs, private developers argue that the transformation of an area into a productive and efficient industrial territory can be considered completed only when developers can successfully invest in a multiproduct SEZs to both meet the requirements of new factories specialized in activities different from the ones approved in already existing SEZs, and the new necessities of the district. Mahindra Group & Riico developers, for instance, admit that their interest in building a multiproduct SEZ is connected to the economic opportunities offered by the housing market, as returns are much higher than in industry and retail sectors. Accordingly, adding the economic advantage provided by residential constructions to the role that the availability of these kind of structures can play in attracting foreign investors, it becomes

crucial for private developers to include in their long term plan the opening of a multiproduct SEZs.

In order to understand whether this plan might be useful and sustainable in terms of Indian long-term development, it is useful to elaborate more on the impact of these new buildings on Indian rural areas. Scholars and activists opposing SEZs stress that residential complexes, hospitals, recreational areas, and any other facility would be welcomed by foreign managers and investors only. Considering that the largest amount of SEZs investment comes from Indians rather than from foreigners, it follows that these non-productive investments mainly serve speculative purposes.

Developers have tried to defend themselves with the opposite argument, stressing that local communities have to be the ones benefiting most from multiproduct SEZs 'new facilities'. However, aware that local residents will not be easily persuaded either to move inside SEZs residential buildings or to enjoy the recreational activities as well as the better sanitary conditions provided, a new strategy has to be identified to help them to familiarize with SEZs. For instance, it might be useful to organize leisure events recommending workers to attend them with their families. Another option could be the one of offering workers and their families free health check-ups that, if sponsored by factories, might even strengthen their links with workers.

What developers assume is that while getting used to these kinds of services and while rooting their life inside SEZs, as soon as local residents will be free to recreate the same social dynamics and relations they were used to in their original settlements, they may eventually start considering the opportunity of moving inside SEZ.

Hoping that their forecast will become true, Mahindra Group & Riico developers have decided to build a multiproduct SEZ where all categories of residents may feel welcomed. They are building what they define 'luxury' and 'average' residential blocks, designing the former for expatriates workers and managers, and the latter for local workers. Aware that the so called 'average residential buildings' represent a significant improvement when compared to already existing popular housing, developers assume that their presence inside multiproduct SEZs can both ameliorate the living standards of the area and have positive spillover effects in the neighbourhood. In their opinion, once

these new living standards are embraced by the local population, other villages might start being interested in sharing a similar experience. Accordingly, considering that both national and regional governmental support to invest in infrastructures as well as in social and rural renewals remains limited, the only chances to boost development is creating the conditions for an already existing SEZ to be further expanded, or for attracting new developers to invest in the neighbourhood.

This paper finds these linkages too simplistic. Although it is true that while building residential apartments, recreational areas, and sanitary building inside SEZs, social development in the whole neighbourhood is promoted, what developers introduce as a 'spillover chain' cannot be considered the 'natural outcome' of SEZs creation.

Further, according to this research, developers tend to neglect the role that education can play in terms of rural development and local empowerment. Rajasthan developers, for example, did not mention among the category of 'other facilities' any kind of school. It is argued that the presence of both primary and retraining schools inside SEZs might be helpful in terms of development support and SEZs attractiveness. Organizing training and requalification classes for unskilled works would have several positive outcomes: improving the availability of skilled manpower inside SEZs; thank to requalification classes it might be possible to strengthen the variety of skilled workers and train labour that can be employed in a multiproduct SEZ where different types of skills are needed. Finally, when local people realize that these kinds of training can help them to find a job within the SEZ or to advance in their career, they will inevitably start trusting the system, and, as a consequence, pushing their family members to enrol to a retraining school to follow their path. It is assumed that once professional schools will be acknowledged as the tool allowing rural people to change their future, local people might also start considering the option of sending their children to a SEZ primary school, recognizing them as a critical opportunity for their human, social, and professional future⁵⁶.

This paper does not want to imply that private developers have a social responsibility for the development of the country. However, considering the positive impact the creation of

⁵⁶ The second goal of United Nations Millennium Development Goals is oriented at achieving universal primary education ensuring that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

both primary and training schools can have on local communities, national progress, and SEZ factories development, it is argued that either the businessmen that have invested into SEZs or the local governments might stimulate and even financially help developers interested in promoting education within the productive areas they manage⁵⁷.

Private developers admit that for public developers it is often difficult to follow a similar strategy or development plan, mainly because they lack since the beginning the experience to run big multiproduct SEZ.

It is a matter of fact that opening a multiproduct SEZ as first SEZ carries the risk of welcoming any kind of investor whose production is specialized in any kind of sector without previously checking raw materials availability and manpower skills in the area. Accordingly, developers may welcome businessman to build certain plants whose location might soon show to be inappropriate. Moreover, the pressure of attracting investors to face the costs linked to the opening of a multiproduct SEZ can be acknowledged as at least partially responsible for the speculative tendency developers such as the ones managing Gurgaon Orient Craft SEZ have taken.

However, it should be recognized that Gurgaon geographical location in the nearest periphery of New Delhi transform this SEZ in the ideal place where to build residential apartments. The demand for both luxury and affordable houses in the capital region is not likely to slow down in the near future. Accordingly, the prospects of 'easy and fast earnings' for an SEZ that was created in 1978 and which is not even now fully operational has worded as dangerous pitfall for local public development.

Indian SEZ strategy: public and private developers

Until a few years ago foreign investors interested in outsourcing to an Indian SEZ had to apply to the central government directly. In 2006, SEZ 'developers' were appointed as mediators between state and investors. They are in charge of constructing and managing SEZs. They are requested to provide the government with all information about foreign

⁵⁷ It is not a coincidence that in China, a country whose SEZs experience remains the paramount benchmark for India, SEZs have been located near the eastern coast to enjoy the inflow of foreign direct investment from overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia first and from the West later, as well as the availability of already existing infrastructures and training schools.

and national applicants and the societies they own or represent, the areas in which they might be interested in locating new SEZs, the development plan for the infrastructures they have in mind to build, the funds they have to finance their project, and they must commit to present an annual report listing import-export data.

The aim of this section is investigating on the role of ‘developers’, a figure that is missing in any other Asian SEZ experiment, to evaluate whether they have been helpful or not in influencing SEZs rate of efficiency and success.

It has to be admitted that Mahindra Group & Riico’s officers easily give the impression of a team that has studied a (hopefully successful) strategy and is working to implement it⁵⁸. In their SEZ large, medium and small scale projects can get easy access to a ready-to-use base with supportive infrastructure facilities in the industrial area developed and managed by the group.⁵⁹

According to this research, while public developers tend to support local entrepreneurs, the private ones are particularly active in assisting the foreign ones. Jaipur developers believe that to strengthen SEZs attractiveness it is crucial to help investors selecting local partners for joint ventures or finding building contractors to take care of factories construction in a reasonable amount of time (six or seven months). Their help is also necessary to select reliable transportation companies able to guarantee fast productions transfers, and to recruit skilled and unskilled manpower as well as the endowment of the raw materials most frequently processed inside SEZs.

Private developers are used to choose sectorial SEZs locations with the help of market studies oriented at identifying raw materials easily accessible in the surrounding areas, consequently reducing one of the main production costs. Consistently, Mahindra Group & Riico developers pointed out that their recent interest in opening a multiproduct SEZ to

⁵⁸ The Mahindra Group introduces itself as ‘one of India’s foremost industrial houses with diverse business interests in key sector including financial services, trade and logistics, automotive components, farm equipment, information technology and infrastructure development’. The Mahindra Group has contributed to the development of several Special Economic Zones in India: in partnership with Tidco, a Government of Tamil Nadu agency, it set up the ‘Mahindra World City’, New Chennai, India’s first integrated business city and operational Special Economic Zone. Other SEZs have been opened in Jaipur, Pune and Thane, where ready to use platform equipped with acceptable infrastructures and facilities are provided.

⁵⁹ Interview with AK Gupta, Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Cooperation, Jaipur, India, 18 February 2008.

welcome textile plants can be partly explained by Rajasthan huge endowment of raw materials employed in the textile sector.

Another area in which developers' help is particularly appreciated is the management of fiscal advantages. SEZs are fiscally attractive: V.A.T. and income taxes are not applicable inside these areas. Tax exemptions are granted to all semi-processed goods imported into SEZs to be further processed. Export quotas do not exist, and it is not compulsory, as it happens in China, to re-invest profits in India.

Indian SEZs are not even forced to export the whole amount of their industrial output. Developers firmly insist that adopting a similar clause would be counterproductive for SEZs. In case national as well as foreign companies would not be allowed to sell on the Indian market, they might be discouraged to invest in the country. Accordingly, the government has decided to legalize direct sales in the country imposing the duty of paying income tax, V.A.T., and customs duty. This is the reason why developers always recommend to potential investors to carefully calculate the amount of industrial output they can assign to the Indian market and the one they need to export overseas in order not to lose the chance of producing in a fiscally and industrially convenient environment (SEZ), and, at the same time, exploit the new productive hub in India to access a huge and rising national market. Mahindra Group & Riico developers consider that the perfect mix could be exporting 85% of the production and assigning to the national market the remaining 25%.

The central government often identifies developers as the people responsible for guaranteeing the respect of environmental standards within SEZs. It emerged from the interviews conducted in Noida and Rajasthan that in terms of environmental protection private developers seems unavailable to tolerate any compromise regarding the respect of anti-pollution laws. The concession of 'clean production licences' is currently regulated by a national legislation requiring that 'any productive area has to be clean'. Accordingly, licences are issued only when it has been verified that factories have installed at their own costs the purification plants needed for the treatment of industrial waste.

Purification plants vary according to the productive sector in which the factory is specialized. Some of them can be extremely expensive, pushing developers to always


clarify with potential investors that they will never be available to co-finance them. Another reason explaining developers' strict attitude is linked to a new wave of controls they expect New Delhi to carry out to better monitor the environmental implications of national economic development inside SEZs. In case the central government's position on anti-pollution laws becomes stricter, developers are afraid they will have to pay too high a price for their permissiveness towards national and international investors. The government might bind them to cover the costs for purification plants or, even worse, force them to close a 'dirty plant' or a 'dirty SEZ', confirming that developers' activism is linked to their personal interests rather than to a strong environmental consciousness.

Despite that, anti-pollution laws have not pushed businessmen to bring their investment outside SEZ or to other Indian states. A trend that is not necessarily promising from an environmental perspective as it is difficult to verify (as it has been made for labour standards) if any 'special agreement' has been achieved among investors and developers regarding purification plants installation or not. Even though the 'clean production licence' has to be issued by the central government, it is up to developers to control whether purification plants are regularly used or not. A practice that might leave huge room for corruption.

Generally speaking, it seems that the main difference between private and public developers is linked to the risks connected to the opening of a new SEZ and to the responsibility regarding their success. No private developer can afford to experience what happened in Gurgaon, where a multiproduct SEZ remained closed for a few decades, otherwise they will go bankrupted. A condition pushing them to focus on small and regional investments, to be more inclined to respect certain rules, and to remain concentrated on their own developing plans rather than on Indian broad SEZ policy.

Public developers, instead, appears as particularly interested in praising New Delhi's SEZ strategy, stressing that while defining its own development plan in the late '80s, the central government elaborated a functional and well-balanced policy covering several implementation phases that appears today to have been partially successful. Finally, they often highlight that since its enactment has not been completed overall, it is now a private developers' responsibility to help the central government achieving its original aim.

Table 1: Procedure Flowchart for taking land on lease in Mahindra World City SEZ, Jaipur



Special Economic Zones: European Experiences Before and After the Global Financial Crisis

More than forty years after the establishment of the first special economic zone in Kandla (Gujarat), the number of foreign investors approaching Indian SEZs remains limited. The ‘SEZs revolution’ launched at the beginning of the XXI century, followed by India’s rapid economic growth, have partially offset this trend. Given that the future of Indian economic development and SEZs partially depends on foreign transfers of technologies, capitals, skills, and management, it is interesting to explore the characteristics of European countries approach to SEZs. However, it would be short sighted to evaluate European perspectives’ on Indian SEZs without taking into account the impact of the global financial crisis on both FDI trends and Indian economic path and performance.

This section starts presenting four case studies: Spain, France, Germany and Italy⁶⁰. A series of interviews to these nations’ diplomatic representatives in India shows that national support for Indian SEZs depends on how well their representative offices are positioned in the market, and that the endorsement for SEZs varies according to the investment sectors in which each country is most interested in investing its capitals.

The reference frame becomes even more complicated when the impact of the global financial crisis is analyzed. Indeed, this section briefly evaluates two more elements. First, the impact of western economies slowdown on the Indian market. Second, the reasons behind India’s current financial and economic problems. Grounding on these premises and taking into account SEZs strengths and weaknesses highlighted in the previous section, this research scrutinizes whether SEZs might become a useful tool to help India coming out from its contemporary impasse and, if yes, how they should be reformed to more effectively contribute to local economic development.

⁶⁰ The analysis for the four European case studies has been conducted thanks to a series on interviews to the diplomatic representative for Spain, France, Germany and Italy (Councilor José Antonio Bretones, Councilor Michel Bovin, Councilor Ernst Stoeckl-Pukall and Councilor Niccolò Tassoni), supported by a careful reading of Embassies internal documents investigating on the opportunities created by SEZs for each county.

Spain

The Spanish Commercial Councilor in New Delhi does not consider SEZs a useful strategy to boost Indian development. The Spanish diplomat specified that today only a limited number of Spanish companies is interested in transferring capital to SEZs. He expressed his skepticism about SEZs citing the results of a Spanish study indicating that outsourcing to Indian SEZs would not be profitable even for agro-food companies, the sector that have been covering for long the majority of Spanish commercial activities in India.

In order to better understand the Spanish position it is important to keep in mind that the number of Spanish companies outsourcing to India at the time in which the interview was conducted was limited to 100-120 firms, and most of them were related to the agro-food processing sector, a field in which no SEZs is currently specialized.

The Spanish Embassy has openly criticized the SEZs policy not only for the national controversial debate it has raised since the beginning of its implementation, but also because it assumed that it is not able to go along with market and business community's needs and because it has been unfortunately undermined by developers and government's speculative interests. Spanish public officers admit that they are used to recommend to any Spanish investors interested in outsourcing to India to start approaching the country with an all-comprehensive and detailed market research oriented at identifying the regions where raw materials and skilled manpower suitable for their productive sectors are available. Further, Spanish diplomats recommend to national investors to locate their plants as close as possible to the markets in which they are going to sell the majority of their production, arguing that the advantages linked to market proximity are higher than the fiscal ones offered by SEZs.

This research argues that this point is particularly useful in locating Spain within Indian SEZs debate, showing that the country is more interested in outsourcing to India to enter the national market. This attempt excludes *de facto* the chance of approaching any SEZ, where only export-oriented factories can be located, making it consistent to assume that

Spanish scepticism towards SEZs is at least partially influenced by the needs and the interests of Spanish investors .

To strengthen the European comparative approach of this section, it is worth remembering that Spain counts only one Embassy and one Consulate in the country, located in Mumbai, with a staff of about 55-60 people. Regarding bilateral trade, Spain imports mainly poultry and fabrics from India, while the majority of exports include capital goods, tools and machinery, iron goods, as well as a limited quantity of food and consumer goods, a 'commercial basket' that cannot get any particular benefit or advantage from SEZs.

France

The background of French companies in India is completely different from the Spanish one. French institutional presence is much stronger. The country counts one Embassy in New Delhi, four Consulates in Mumbai, Pondicherry, Kolkata and Bangalore, and a staff of about 150 people. France also has a Chamber of Commerce in Mumbai with a small branch in New Delhi and 500 members in total.

In terms of bilateral trade, in 2006 France exported to India 2,5 billion Euro manufactured goods (mainly designed for the aeronautical engineering sector), and imported 2,5 billion Euro fabrics and clothes. What is important to highlight is that the growth of exports (+37,5%) has been much higher than the growth of imports (+18%). A trend that did not remain solid in the following years. After the first downturn linked to the consequences of the global financial crisis, a massive bounce back was registered in 2010. However, in 2011 the volume of bilateral trade slowed down again in 2011 (+5.8% at euro 7.46 billion), and the French bilateral deficit is now growing.

Exploring the interests of French businesspeople in outsourcing to India, the Commercial Councilor clarified that the first priority for any French company interested in moving its production abroad, either in India or elsewhere, is finding a place where relatively cheap manpower together with an acceptable service network are available.

French diplomats clearly specified that the feedback and opinions about SEZs are different depending on whether national businessmen are interested in outsourcing to

India or seeking to set up their plants in the country to access its internal market. They acknowledge that in French experience there is apparently no direct link between relocating a factory to India and approach a SEZ. Any time investors reckon the relocation into SEZ convenient, they go for it. If not, they follow an alternative strategy. Accordingly, the role of French public officers is limited to inform their nationals about both positive and negative aspects of outsourcing to India's SEZs and to keep them updated on SEZs performances and new openings.

In conclusion, the French Councillor pointed out that the benefit in terms of infrastructures efficiency availability as well as fiscal benefits guaranteed by SEZs should not be underestimated in assessing the profitability of investments in India. Giving more credits to the former 'Spanish inference': when the 'commercial basket' is more 'SEZ oriented', Western public officials' evaluation on Indian SEZs performance becomes more optimistic.

Germany

German institutional presence in India is stronger than the Spanish and the French ones, mainly because this country needs to assist a much higher number of German people and factories in the country. Germany is represented in India by one Embassy in New Delhi and four Consulates in Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata and Bangalore, where a staff of about 100 people is employed. Germany also has a Chamber of Commerce counting 7000 members, the majority of whom are composed of small and medium enterprises.

The assessment on SEZs presented by the German Commercial Councillor is very similar to the one provided by his Spanish colleague. After acknowledging all the advantages provided by these industrial areas, the German diplomat underscored that most SEZs are located in states where the average level of infrastructures is very poor. Even though private developers can ameliorate these standards inside their area, in certain cases the outside conditions can significantly offset the internal advantages. Indeed, it is a matter of fact that transportation costs are a crucial variable for any export-oriented investment.

The comments of the German Commercial Councillor are not surprising. They confirm the idea that SEZs convenience depends on the areas in which any country is interested in

outsourcing. Germany is very strong in tools and machinery, automotive and auto components. Its interests would be outsourcing to SEZs specialized in these industrial sectors, but they have not been created yet. Moreover, the fact that the ‘infrastructures spillover’ developers often stress has not yet happened, has pushed Western businessmen to not even consider economically useful the option of moving their plants near SEZs.

In terms of bilateral trade, India imports from Germany tools and machinery, aircrafts, manufactured metal goods, chemical and plastic goods, automotive, and auto components, medical technologies and pharmaceutical products. Confirming that Berlin is one of the most important exporters to India, second only to Beijing. From India, Germany imports fabrics, leather products, shoes, gems and jewels, paper goods, and part of its own exports when their components are reprocessed *in loco*, nurturing and further consolidating very promising trade ties.

Italy

As any other European business professionals, Italian investors interested in outsourcing to India need to know that the economic conditions of Indian states are very different from one another. Their ability in attracting investments and private developers varies according to the conditions of already existing infrastructures and the availability of manpower and raw materials⁶¹.

As far as development and industrialization promotions are concerned, Rajasthan is a very active and successful state. North and East Indian counties, such as Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, are described as the most unstable Indian states because of their poverty and extreme underdevelopment. However, the Italian diplomat argued that differently from Bihar and Orissa, the developing standards in Uttar Pradesh as well as the ones in the neighbouring Himachal Pradesh might improve thanks to SEZs. The governments of these two countries have progressively become more interested in attracting FDI, and to keep on boosting this trend they might even consider to authorize the implementation of new SEZs. These two Northern states share the great advantage of

⁶¹ The Italian case study is more detailed than the other European studies as, being an Italian citizen, it was easier to gain access to the internal reports of the Embassy and to interview Italian diplomat posted in New Delhi in February 2008.

their proximity to two big hydro electrical power plants that could be able to guarantee a continuous supply of electricity to the factories planning to move to these areas.

The Italian diplomat highlighted that West Bengal and Punjab are also growing very well, and the same is happening in Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, although since the end of 2007 these regions started suffering the consequences of rising manpower and land costs.

Beyond states' economic performance, the Councillor recommended Italian investors to carefully evaluate the impact of transportation costs on their outsourcing plans. Processing times in ports and airports are usually very long. Toll road costs that need to be faced any time trucks cross the borders dividing Indian states to reach ports and airports can have a huge impact on managerial costs. Road conditions are often very poor and transportation time can be further slowed down by the presence of bicycles, pedestrians or oxcarts, horse-cars, and camel carts on the streets.

Basic macroeconomic rules decree that a strong growth rate can be guaranteed only if the infrastructures multiplier grows faster than the economy. Accordingly, the attention on infrastructures building and renovation is crucial to avoid stagnating growth and to help foreign businessmen interested in capitalizing on their investment. This is the reason why Italian diplomats (although it is highly possible that other European diplomats are recommending the same), beyond introducing to national businessmen the option of outsourcing into SEZs, advertise joint-ventures to build infrastructures, attempting to guide Italy towards the same success Japan and Germany already gained in this sector.

Italian public officers argued that the recent legalization of public-private partnership authorized by New Delhi and the broadening of industrial sectors in which joint-ventures are allowed have significantly improved the chance for foreign companies to invest in India. They can now select both public and private groups as their associates, and intervene in many more areas, choosing the most suitable partner and sector to raise the productivity of their investments, within and outside SEZs.

Italian institutional presence in India is stronger than the Spanish and the French, but weaker than the German one. The country counts one Embassy in New Delhi, two Consulates in Mumbai and Kolkata and five offices of the Italian Trade Commission in

New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Bangalore and Chennai. Italy is represented by a Chamber of Commerce with a main office in Mumbai and four regional offices in Delhi, Kolkata, Bangalore, and Chennai, with a staff of about 100 people.

In terms of bilateral trade, it has been recalled that India-Italy commercial relations have been strong in the past thanks to the presence of important Italian groups such as Ansaldo, Fiat, Marelli and Piaggio. As the Commercial Councillor noted, and unfortunately for Italy, their presence in the country had already weakened at the time of Indian economic reforms in the early 1990s. However, Italian investors have been coming back recently with a renewed interest for Indian fabrics, automotive components, leather and shoes, and information technology industrial sectors. According to the Italian diplomat, one aspect of Italian outsourcing strategy is the new trend of consultancy firms moving to India that is currently consolidating. These offices are usually approached by national businessmen interested in investigating on the advantages offered by the Indian market with high-profile feasibility studies. Moreover, since the Italian industrial network is mainly composed of small and medium enterprises that might reckon as too high the costs of moving expatriate staff to India to manage their factories or joint ventures *in loco*, the presence of national consultants is already proving to be helpful to contain outsourcing costs.

Concerning SEZs effectiveness, the Italian Commercial Councillor made several positive comments about the development plan elaborated by the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Acknowledging that at national level the SEZs plan looks efficient, the Italian diplomat blamed coordination problems and inefficiencies at regional level. Accordingly, he warned any potential investor from comparing SEZs standards in different Indian states and regions and recommended not to outsource any plant before having analyzed the outcome of an all-comprehensive feasibility study on the industrial sector they are interested in.

Comparing the rates of success of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain development strategies in India, it is interesting to notice that in 2007 Italy and France consolidated the same result in terms of bilateral trade with an investment of 50 million Euro for Italy and 130 million Euros for France. Spain, instead, with an investment very close to the Italian

one managed to consolidate only half of the Indo-Italian bilateral trade inflows. Finally, German result has been remarkably higher compared to the Italian and French ones, although the country invested almost 200 million Euros in India in 2007 only.

The last point to stress is that the Indian market cannot be approached, as it happened for China twenty years ago, with the aim of reducing production costs only, since they have been progressively rising during the last few years. According to several European diplomats, the best strategy for any businessman to outsource to an Indian SEZ would be planning the investment as the first step to enter the local market. Since SEZs rules do not compel foreign investors to export the whole amount of their new or reprocessed industrial outputs, it might be interesting for foreigner to outsource to a SEZ, carefully calculate the percentage of industrial outputs that can be commercialized in the Indian market without being excluded from the SEZ, and consequently test the internal market reaction to their production facing an extremely low risk. This research confirms that such a “step-by-step” approach is the safer one to evaluate the authentic potential of the Indian market for western factories.

It would be short-sighted to disregard the financial, economic, and energetic advantages guaranteed by Indian SEZs. Further, although it is true that the businessmen deciding to invest in an Indian SEZs can legally allocate just a limited portion of their industrial output to the internal market, nobody prevents them from changing their strategy in case the ‘internal test’ proves successful.

In order not to lose the competitive advantage gained in the state where their first plant has been outsourced, foreign investors might even consider to build a new factory just outside the SEZ, to limit management and transportation costs exploiting geographical proximity.

Aware that this evaluation can be feasible only in a long-term perspective, elaborating on European officers positions on Indian SEZs strategy, this research concludes that under the current circumstances the majority of western plants ‘are not ready’ to exploit SEZs advantages. However, this situation might change if New Delhi decides to promote the implementation of multi-products SEZs and to enlarge the variety of the sector-specific

ones. The subsequent section investigates on whether the current financial crisis might favour this evolution.

Conclusion

This paper argues that in order to forecast the destiny of SEZs policy it is crucial to investigate on the way in which India is going to take advantage of them to recover from international finance crisis. At a time in which growth rates are progressively slowing down, the amount of national and foreign direct investment is falling, unemployment and poverty rates are raising, the government needs to find a new strategy to boost national industrial development.

One option for New Delhi might be the one of betting again on SEZs: widening the number of sector in which SEZs can be specialized, creating further advantages for private developers interested in setting up multiproduct SEZs, welcoming FDIs at least in certain infrastructures projects, and facilitating foreign transfer of capital, *know how*, management and expertise. A task highlighted as difficult but not unfeasible.

The first section provided a brief comparison between Chinese and India SEZs from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. It showed that although some theorists are sceptical about the capacity of SEZs to trigger economic benefits, others perceive them as useful tools to boost national growth in India.

The main differences in the economic conditions in India and China, which influence the implementation of the SEZ model in each country, were reviewed, highlighting that while some of them proved to be a disadvantage in the Indian case, others have not played as obstacles as some analysts expected.

The second section provided evidence to show those analysts who consider that India's growth path is based on Information Technology (IT) and services -the so called third sector- are mainly doubtful that SEZ represents the most appropriate strategy for boosting development in that sector. In contrast, for those who believe that service-lead growth is unsustainable in the long term as well as unable to provide a balanced economic equilibrium in the whole country, the implementation of SEZs (borrowed from the Chinese model and subsequently adapted to promote Indian needs and priorities) should

be able to attract FDI and offer national industrialists enough fiscal and infrastructural advantages to open new productive units and raise national productivity, betting on the so called secondary sector.

In order to understand why SEZs have not yet been as successful as expected and to assess their different performances, Indian SEZ development strategy was scrutinized, focusing on the three key aspects: the heterogeneity between 'old' and 'new' SEZ; the coexistence of 'integrated/multiproduct' and 'sectorial' SEZs; and the role played by private and public developers.

When discussing SEZ performance, section two has shown that in terms of FDI attractiveness, semi-private multiproduct SEZs are more efficient than sectorial SEZs⁶². There are several reasons why these represent a better option for international businessmen. First, they usually offer a range of extra services in terms of housing, sanitary and recreational facilities as well as training schools for workers that are crucial for foreign investors and that single-sector SEZs cannot provide. Second, the fact that there are many SEZs of this type offers a kind of guarantee that local developers have already accumulated firm experience and sound reputation in terms of SEZ management. Accordingly, it has been calculated that they can solve more easily the problems that foreign businesses can face during their outsourcing experience.

Section two highlighted that the main difference between private and public developers is linked to the risks connected to opening a new SEZ and to the responsibility regarding their success. It has been recalled that no private developer can afford to experience what happened in Gurgaon, where a multiproduct SEZ remained behind its full proactive potential for several decades, otherwise they will certainly go bankrupt. A condition pushing private developers to focus on small and regional investments, to appear as more inclined to respect environmental code of conduct, and to remain concentrated on their own developing plans.

In interviews, public developers spoke positively about the national SEX policy, stressing that when the central government in the '80 started considering the idea of relaunching an

⁶² Public multiproduct SEZs have been momentarily excluded because since they are already full, it seemed meaningless to investigate on foreign investors interests in them.

almost neglected SEZ policy, it subsequently elaborated a functional and well-balanced policy covering several implementation phases that seems today to have been partially successful. Highlighting that although its enactment has not been completed overall, it is now a private developers' responsibility to help the central government achieving its original aim.

Based on four case studies, the third section discussed the positions expressed by European officers posted in India on the SEZs strategy, concluding that under the current circumstances the majority of western industrialists 'are not ready' to exploit the "advantages" offered by the SEZ policy. However, it was argued that this situation could well change if New Delhi decided to promote the implementation of multi-products SEZs and to encourage greater diversification of the sector-specific ones.

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Annex 1: List of Operational SEZ of India

Annex 2: List of Formal Approvals Granted Under the SEZ Act, 2005

Annex 3: List of Valid In-Principle Approvals

List of Operational SEZ of India

Sl. No.	Name of the SEZ	Location	State	Type
1	Kandla Special Economic Zone	Kandla, Gujarat	GJ	Multi product
2	SEEPZ Special Economic Zone	Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	Electronics and Gems and Jewellery
3	Noida Special Economic Zone	Uttar Pradesh	UP	Multi product
4	MEPZ Special Economic Zone	Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	Multi product
5	Cochin Special Economic Zone	Cochin, Kerala	KL	Multi product
6	Falta Special Economic Zone	Falta, West Bengal	WB	Multi product
7	Visakhapatnam SEZ	Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Multi product

Exports from State Govt./Private Special Economic Zones established prior to SEZ Act.

No.	Name of the SEZ	Location	State	Type
8	Surat Special Economic Zone	Surat, Gujarat	GJ	Multi product
9	Manikanchan SEZ, W. Bengal	Kolkatta, West Bengal	WB	Gems and Jewellery
10	Jaipur SEZ	Jaipur, Rajasthan	RJ	Gems and Jewellery
11	Indore SEZ	Sector-3, Pithampur Distt. Dhar (MP)	MP	Multi product
12	Jodhpur SEZ	Jodhpur, Rajasthan	RJ	Handicrafts
13	Salt Lake Electronic City - WIPRO, West Bengal	Kolkatta, West Bengal	WB	Software development and ITES
14	Mahindra City SEZ (IT), T. Nadu	Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/Hardware and Bio-informatics
15	Mahindra City SEZ (Auto ancillary), T. Nadu	Tamil Nadu	TN	Auto
16	Mahindra City SEZ (Textiles), Tamil Nadu	Tamil Nadu	TN	Apparel and fashion accessories
17	Nokia SEZ	Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu	TN	Telecom equipments/R&D services
18	Moradabad SEZ	Moradabad, UP	UP	Handicrafts
19	Surat Apparel Park	Surat, Gujarat	GJ	Apparel

Exports from SEZs notified under the SEZ Act, 2005:

No.	Name of the SEZ	Location	State	Type
	Andhra Pradesh			

20	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd.	Nanakramguda	AP	IT/ITES
21	APIIC Ltd, Jedcharla	Pollepally Village, Jedcharla Mandal	AP	Pharma
22	APIIC	Atchutapuram Visakhapatnam	AP	Multi product
23	APIIC	Madhurwara, Hill No.3 Visakhapatnam	AP	IT/ITES
24	Brandix India Apparel City Private Ltd.	Achutapuram, Visakhapatnam	AP	Textile
25	Ramky Pharma Cit Pvt. Ltd.	Mandal, Visakhapatnam	AP	Pharmaceuticals
26	CMC Limited	Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES
27	DivyaSree NSL Infrastructure Private Limited	Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES
28	DLF Commercial Developers Ltd	Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES
29	Hyderabad Gems SEZ Ltd.	Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Gems and Jewellery
30	Fab City SPV(India) Pvt. Ltd.	R R District Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES
31	Divi's Laboratories Limited	Chippada Village, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Pharmaceuticals
32	Apache SEZ Development India Private Limited	Mandal Tada, Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Footwear
33	L&T Phoenix Infoparks Pvt. Ltd.	Mandal, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES
34	Lanco Hills Technology Park Pvt. Ltd.	Manikonda Village, Rajendra Nagar, Mandal	AP	IT/ITES
35	Maytas Hill County SEZ Pvt Ltd-Bachupally	Bachupally Village, Mandal	AP	IT/ITES
36	Serene Properties Pvt Ltd.	Pocharam Village, Hayathna Gar, Taluka Ghatkesar Mandal	AP	IT/ITES
37	Sundew Properties Pvt. Limited	Madhapur, RR District	AP	IT/ITES
38	Wipro Limited-Manikonda	Manikonda, Mandal, RR	AP	IT/ITES
39	Navayuga Legal Estates Pvt. Ltd.	Serilingampally village, Ranga Reddy District, AP	AP	IT/ITES

40	Parry Infrastructure Company Pivate Limited	Kakinada, Andhra Paredsh	AP	Food Processing
41	Sri City Pvt. Ltd.	Gollavaripalem, villages Satyavedu Mandals, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Multi Product
42	APIIC, Naidupeta	Nellore, A.P.	AP	Multi product
43	APIIC	Maddipadu and Korispadu, Prakasham A.P.	AP	Building Products
44	GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited	Village Mamidipally, District Ranga Reddy, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Aviation
45	APIIC	Madhurwara, Hill No.2 Visakhapatnam	AP	IT/ITES
46	APIIC Ltd., (Kesarapalli)	Nakkapalli, Kesarapalli, Visakhapatnam	AP	IT/ITES
47	WIPRO Limited (Gopannapally)	Gopannapally, AP	AP	IT/ITES
48	NSL SEZ Uppal (HYD) Pvt. Ltd., (formally Topnotch Infrastructure Ltd.)	IDA Uppal Industrial Development Area, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES
49	Infosys Technolgies Ltd.	Pocharam, Rangareddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT
50	Vivo Bio Tech Ltd. Medak Dist	Medak District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Bio-technology
51	APIIC Ltd, Ibrahimpatnam RR District	Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Aerospace and Precision Engineering industries
52	Hetero Infrastrcurre Private Lintied	Nakkapalli	AP	Pharma
53	Indu Techzone Pvt. Ltd.(Brahmani Infratech)	Mamidipally	AP	IT/ITES
54	Satyam Computer Services Ltd. (Madhapur)	Madharpur, Serilingampally, Mandal, Hyderabad	AP	IT/ITES
55	Satyam Computer Services Ltd. (Bahadurpally)	Bahadurpally Village, RR District, AP	AP	IT/ITES
	Chandigarh			
56	Rajiv Gandhi Technology Park,Phase-1 Chandigarh	Chandigarh	CH	Electronics Hardware, and IT/ITES
57	Rajeev Gandhi Technology Park, Phase-2, Chandigarh	Chandigarh	CH	Electronics Hardware, and IT/ITES

	Gujarat			
58	Mundra Port & Special Economic Zone	Gujarat	GJ	Multi Product
59	Synefra Engg. & comst.Ltd. (Suzlon Infrastructure Limited)	Vadodara	GJ	Hi-tech Engineering products and related services
60	Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (Apparel)	Ahmedabad, Gujarat	GJ	Apparel
61	Reliance Jamnagar Infrastructure Ltd.	Jamnagar	GJ	Multi Product
62	Zydus Infrastrucutre Pvt. Ltd.	Sanand, Ahmedabad	GJ	Pharmaceutical
63	Dahej SEZ Ltd.	Dahej	GJ	Multi Product
64	Larsen & Toubro Ltd.	Ankhol & Bapad, Distt. Vadodara	GJ	IT/ITES
65	Aqualine properties Pvt. Ltd.	Gandhi Nagar	GJ	IT/ITES
66	Euro Multivision Pvt. Ltd.	Vill shikra, Tal Bhachau	GJ	conventional Energy
67	Jubliant Infrastructure Limited	District Bharuch, Gujarat	GJ	Chemicals
68	Gandhinagar Electronic Park SEZ(GIDC)	Gandhi Nagar	GJ	EHTP/ITES
69	E-Complex Pvt. Ltd.	Amreli	GJ	Engineering Goods
70	Tata Consultancy Services Limited	Gandhinagar	GJ	IT/ITES
71	Gift SEZ Limited	Village Phirozpur and Ratanpur, District Gandhinagar, Gujarat	GJ	Multi-services
	Haryana			
72	DLF Cyber City, Gurgaon	Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES
73	DLF Limited	Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES
74	Gurgaon Infospace Ltd, Gurgaon	Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES
	Karnataka			
75	Manyata Embassy Business Park	Bangalore, Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES
76	WIPRO Limited	Varthur Hobli, Electronic City, Banglore, Karnataka	KA	IT
77	WIPRO Limited(SR)	Varthur Hobli, Sarjapur Road, Karnataka	KA	IT
78	Infosys Technologies SEZ Mangalore	Bantwal Taluk, Dakshina, Kannada distt. , Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES
79	Infosys Technologies SEZ Mangalore	Hebbal Inustrial Area, Distt. Mysore, Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES

80	Vrindavan Tech Villages SEZ (Vikas Telecom Limited)	Bangalore, Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES
81	Adarsh Prime Projects Private Limited	Devarabeesanahalli, Bhoganahalli and Doddakanahalli, Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES
82	Shyamaraju and Company (India) Pvt. Ltd. (Divyashree)	Kundalahalli Village, Krishnarajapuram, Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES enabled sevices
83	Cessna Garden Developers Pvt. Ltd.	Bangalore, Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES
84	Tanglin Development Ltd.(Global Village SEZ)	Pattengere/Mylasandra Villages, Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES
85	Biocon Limited.	Anekal Taluk, Banglore, Karnataka	KA	Biotechnology
86	HCL Technologies Ltd.	Bangalore District, Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES
87	KIADB (textile)	Hasan, Karnataka	KA	Textile
88	Information Technology Park Ltd.	Bangalore Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES
89	Primal Projects Private Limited	Banglore, Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES
90	Bagmane Construction Pvt. Ltd.	Bangalore North, Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES
91	Quest SEZ Development Private Limited	Belgaum District, Karnataka	KA	Precision Engineering Product
92	Synefra Eng. & Const. (Suzlon Infrastructure Limited)	Udupi Taluk, Karnataka	KA	hi-tech engineering products and related services
93	KIADB (Food)	Samudravalli, Sankalapura	KA	Food Processing
94	Gopalan Enterprises (India) Private Limited	K.R. Puram, Whitefield, Banglore, Karnataka	KA	IT/ITES
	Kerala			
95	Infopark SEZ	Kochi	KL	IT/ITES
96	Electronic Technology Park-SEZ-I	Trivandrum	KL	IT/ITES
97	Electronic Technology Park SEZ-II	Trivandrum	KL	IT/ITES
98	Cochin Port Trust	Vallapadam, Kerala	KL	Port based
99	KINFRA Film & Video Park,	Trivandrum, Kerala	KL	Animation & Gaming
	Maharashtra			
100	Hiranandani Business Park	Powai, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES

101	Infosys Technologies Ltd.	Rajiv Gandhi Infotech Park, Ph. II, Vill. Mann, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune	MH	IT/ITES
102	Serum Bio-pharma Park	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
103	EON Kharadi	Taluka Haveli, District Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES
104	WIPRO, Pune	Hindawadi Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES
105	DLF Akruti	Hinjewadi, Phase-II, District Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES
106	Maharashtra Airport Dev. Corporation	Mihan, Nagpur, Maharashtra	MH	Multi Product
107	Dynasty Developers Pvt. Ltd.(Pune Embassy India Pvt. Ltd.	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES
108	The Manjari Stud Farm Private Ltd	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES
109	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES
110	Syntel International Pvt. Ltd.	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES
111	Magarpatta Township Development and Construction Company Ltd.	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	Electronics Hardware and Software including information technology enabled
112	MIDC, Aurangabad	District Aurangabad, Maharashtra	MH	Engineering & Electronics
113	Serene Properties Private Limited	Kalwa Trans Thane Creek Industrial Area, MIDC, District Thane, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES
114	Wardha Power Company Pvt. Ltd.	District- Chandrapur, Maharashtra	MH	power sector
115	Arshiya International Ltd.	Village Sai, Taluka Panvel, District Raigad, Maharashtra	MH	FTWZ
116	Flagship Infrastructure Private Limited	VillageHinjawadi, District Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES
	Orissa			
117	Orissa Inudstries Dev. Cor. IT SEZ	Bhubaneswar	OR	IT/ITES
	Punjab			
118	Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.	Plot No. A-41, Focal Point, Mohali, Punjab	PJ	Pharmaceuticals

119	Mahindra World City (Jaipur) Ltd.	Kalwara Village, Jaipur, Rajasthan	RJ	IT/ITES
120	Mahindra World City (Jaipur) Ltd.	Jaipur, Rajasthan	RJ	Light Engineering including Automotive/ Automotive Components
121	Mahindra World City (Jaipur) Ltd.	Jaipur, Rajasthan	RJ	Handicraft
	Tamil Nadu			
122	Tata Consultancy Services Limited	Siruseri and Egattur, Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES
123	ETL Infrastructure Services Limited	Tambaram Taluk, Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES
124	Hexaware Technologies Limited	SIPCOT IT Park, Old Mahabalipuram Road, Siruseri, Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES
125	DLF Infocity Developers(Chennai) Ltd.	Manapakkam & Mulivakkam Vill.,Kancheepuram Distt. Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES
126	Arun Excello Infrstructure Private Limited	Vallncheri and Potheri villages, Chengalpet Taluk, Kancheepuram Dist. Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES
127	ETA Technopark Private Limited	Old Mahabalipuram Road, Navallur Village, Chengalpet Taluk, Kancheepuram District	TN	IT/ITES
128	Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu	Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES
129	Coimbatore Hitech Infrastrure Pvt. Ltd.	Coimbatore	TN	IT/ITES
130	Flextronics Technologies (India) Private Limited	Sriperumbudur, Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu	TN	Electronics Hardware and related services
131	SIPCOT	Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nade	TN	Electronics of Telecom hardware and support services including trading and logistic activities
132	Shriram Properties and Infrastructure Private Limited	Perungalathur village, Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES
133	SIPCOT	Oragadam	TN	Electronic Hardware

134	SIPCOT	Gangai Kondan, tirunelveli	TN	Transport equipments
135	SIPCOT	Perundurai	TN	Engineering
136	Synfera construction Ltd. (Suzlon Infrastrucutre Ltd.)	Coimbatore	TN	Hi-tech engineering sector
137	Cheyyar SEZ	Cheyyar	TN	Footwear
138	Syntel International Pvt. Ltd.	Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES
139	New Chennai Township Private Limited	Seekinakuppam Village, Cheyyar Taluk,	TN	Engineering sector including auto
140	AMRL International Tech City Ltd.	Nanguneri Taluk, Tirunelveli District, Tamil	TN	Multi-product
141	Span Venture Pvt. Ltd.	Kurichi village, Eachanari, Coimbatore District, Tamil	TN	IT/ITES
142	Pear City (CCCL Infrastructure SEZ)	Vadakkukaracheri and Thimmarajapura Villages, Tuticorin District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Food Processing
143	New Chennai Township Private Lintied	Seekinakuppam Village, Cheyyar Taluk, Kancheepuram District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Multi Services
144	Tril Infopark Ltd.	Triplicane Taluk, Chennai District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES
145	Jee Matadjee	Mannur	TN	FTWZ
146	ELCOT-I Madurai	Madurai	TN	IT/ITES
147	Cognizant Technology Solutions India Pvt. Ltd.	SIPCOT IT Park, Siruseri and Kazhipattur villages, Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES
148	ELCOT	Trichy, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES
149	State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu	Ranipet Vellore District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Leather sector
	Uttar Pradesh			
150	HCL Techmnologies	Noida	UP	IT/ITES
151	Moser Baer SEZ, Greater Noida	Greater Noida	UP	Non-conventional Energy including solar energy equipments/ cell
152	WIPRO Ltd.	Greater Noida	UP	IT/ITES

153	Seaview Developers Limited	Sector-135, Noida, Uttar Pradesh	UP	IT/ITES
154	NIIT Technologies Limited SEZ	Plot No.TZ-02, Sector-Tech Zone, ITES Park, Greater Noida, UP	UP	IT/ITES
155	Aachvis Softech Pvt. Ltd.	Sector-144, Noida, UP	UP	IT/ITES
	West Bengal			
156	Unitech Hi-tech Structures Ltd.	Rajarhat, Kolkata, West Bengal	WB	IT/ITES
157	M L Dalmiya & Co Ltd.	Kolkata	WB	IT/ITES
158	DLF Limited	Rajarhat, Kolkata, West Bengal	WB	IT/ITES

LIST OF VALID IN-PRINCIPLE APPROVALS

S. No.	State wise No.	Name of the developer	Location	State	Type of SEZ	Area in hectares
Andhra Pradesh						
1	1	South Coast Infrastructure Development Co. of Andhra Pradesh Private Limited (SCIDCAP)	NH-5 between Prakasam and Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Building materials	118
2	2	Lepakshi Knowledge Hub Private Limited	Ananthapur District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Multi product	1032
3	3	Sri Kubera Infracom India Ltd.	Sadasivpet, Medak District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Engineering (Strategic Manufacturing)	1000
4	4	M/s. Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Manufactures Association	Nakkapalli Mandal, Visakhapatnam District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Pharmaceuticals / APIs/ formulations	120
5	5	M/s. Vivimed Labs Limited	Boyapalem, Naruva & Chittivalasa villages, Ranasthalam Mandal, Srikakulam District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals	131.68
6	6	M/s. Planet SEZ Private Limited	Rajayyapeta village, Visakhapatnam District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Petroleum and Oil & Gas Industry	108
Chhattisgarh						
7	1	M/s. Chhattisgarh Infrastructure Ltd.	Raipur, Chhattisgarh	CG	Gems & Jewellery	29
Gujarat						
8	1	LMJ Warehousing Private Limited	Kandla, Gujarat	GJ	FTWZ	40
9	2	Gujarat Vittal Innovation City Ltd.	Kalgam-Maroli Area, Tal: Umargam, Valsad District, Gujarat	GJ	Multi product	1100
10	3	M/s. Plastene Infrastructure Limited	Bhandhai, Meghapar Kunjisar, Bhachau, Kutch District, Gujarat	GJ	Plastic & Plastic Products	100

11	4	M/s. Sealand Ports Private Limited	Villages - Layaja, Ratadiya, Godhra, Bayath & Undoth, Taluka- Mandvi, District- Kutch, Gujarat	GJ	multi product	1112
12	5	M/s. Avash Logistic Park Private Limited	Villages - Mota Layaja, Godhara & Bayath Taluka - Mandvi, District - Kutch, Gujarat	GJ	Free Trade Warehousing Zone (FTWZ)	496
13	6	M/s. Anique Infrastructure Private Limited	village Pakhajan, Limdi, Kesvan, Padalpor and Trankal, Taluka Vagra, District Bharuch, Gujarat	GJ	Multi Product SEZ	1380
14	7	M/s. OPG Power Gujarat Private Limited	Bhadreshwar, Mundra, Kutch, Gujarat	GJ	Power	104.72.24
Haryana						
15	1	Amira Foods (India) Ltd.	Between Karnal and Ambala Distt. Haryana.	HR	Agro Based	101.9808
16	2	Reliance Haryana SEZ Limited	Jhajjar District, Haryana	HR	Multi Product	5000
17	3	Reliance Haryana SEZ Ltd.	Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Multi product	1000
Karnataka						
18	1	M/s. Ozone SEZ Developers Pvt. Ltd.	Chikkaballapura, Karnataka	KN	Pharmaceuticals	100
Madhya Pradesh						
19	1	Chhindwara Plus developers P Ltd.	Saurar Tahsil, Chhindwara District, M.P.	MP	Multi-product	2000
20	2	Reliable Smart City Private Limited	Pachama (Abdullah Pur) Distt. Sehore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	Multi product	1010
Maharashtra						
21	1	Mumbai SEZ Limited	Gujarat Positra Port Infrastructural Ltd	MH	Multi-product	5000
22	2	Supreme Petrochem Ltd	Taluk Roha, Raigad, Maharashtra	MH	Plastic processing	100
23	3	Gitanjali Gems Limited	Nanded, Maharashtra	MH	Gems and Jewellery	50
24	4	Rewas Ports Limited	Rewas, District Raigarh, Maharashtra	MH	Multi product	2850
25	5	Uttam Galva Group through Uttam Galva Steels Limited (UGSL) & Uttam Power & Steel Private Ltd. (UPSPL)	Khopoli, Taluka Khalapur, District Raigad, Maharashtra	MH	Integrated Steel SEZ	100
26	6	ISPAT Industries Limited	Raigad District, Maharashtra	MH	Multi Product	1012

27	7	Gitanjali Gems Limited	Aurangabad, Maharashtra	MH	Gems and Jewellery	102
28	8	Gitanjali Gems Limited	Nagpur, Maharashtra	MH	Multi product	1000
29	9	Jafza Pvt. Ltd.	Raigad, Maharashtra	MH	FTWZ	85.503
30	10	Maharashtra Airport Development Company Limited	Nagpur, Maharashtra	MH	Power	109.54
31	11	Maharaja Multitrade Pvt. Ltd.	Village Taloshi, Taluka Igatpuri, District Nashik, Maharashtra	MH	Multi services	106.755
32	12	M/s. Chowgule Port & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.	Village Sande Lavgan, near Jaigad, Dist. Ratnagiri, Maharashtra	MH	Port based Engineering	120
33	13	M/s. Videocon Industries Limited	Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	Electronic Hardware and Software	100
34	14	Gitanjali Gems Limited	Nashik, Maharashtra	MH	Multi services	100
35	15	Redi Port Ltd.	Post Redi, district Sindhudurg, Maharashtra	MH	FTWZ	40
36	16	Quippo Infrastructure	Raigarh Maharashtra	MH	Engineering	180
Orissa						
37	1	Posco-India Private Limited	Jagatsinghpur District, Orissa	OR	Multi-product	1620.496
Pondicherry						
38	1	Karaikal Port Private Limited	Vanjore Village, Thirupattinam Commune, Karaikal District, Pondicherry	PD	Port based SEZ	243.503
Rajasthan						
39	1	Arihant Infratech (India) Pvt. Ltd.	Udaipur District, Rajasthan	RJ	Building Materials	220
Tamil Nadu						
40	1	RNB Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd.	Coimbatore Distt. Tamil Nadu	TN	Textile	107.24
41	2	Taneja Aerospace and Aviation Limited	Denkanikottai Taluk, Hosur, Tamil Nadu	TN	Airport / Aviation sector (including MRO)	100

42	3	Vikram Logistics and Maritime Services Private Limited	Vallur and Edayanchavadi Villages, Ponneri Taluk, Tiruvallur District, Tamil Nadu	TN	FTWZ	42.5
43	4	Trac Technologies India Limited	Krishnagiri District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Multi services	1182.19
44	5	M/s. Smart World City Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd	Tuticorin, Tirunelveli District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Multi Product	1000
45	6	Tirunelveli Infrastructure Developers Private Limited(TIDPL)	Khaitar Village, Tirunelveli District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Multi Product	1000
Uttar Pradesh						
46	1	Anand Agrochem India Limited,	Aligarh, UP	UP	Agro Product sector	112
West Bengal						
47	1	Bengal Srei Infrastructure Development Limited	Kharagpur, West Bengal	WB	Auto component	100
48	2	DLF Limited ('DLFL')	Located at Dankuni Township, West Bengal	WB	Textiles	100
49	3	M/s. Coastal Ferrotech Limited	Fatehpur (PO), Nandkumar (PS), Haldia East Mednipur, West Bengal	WB	Metal	111.28

LIST OF FORMAL APPROVALS GRANTED UNDER THE SEZ ACT,2005

Sl. No.	State-wise No.	Name of the developer	Location	State	Type of SEZ	Area Hectares
Andhra Pradesh						
1	1	M/s. Divi's Laboratories Ltd	Chippada, Visakhapatnam, A.P.	AP	Pharmaceuticals	105.495
2	2	WIPRO Limited	Hyderabad, A.P.	AP	IT	6.48
3	3	Apache Investment Holdings Pvt. Ltd.	Hyderabad, A.P.	AP	Footwear	126.9
4	4	M/s. Hyderabad Gems SEZ Ltd.	Hyderabad, A.P.	AP	Gems and Jewellery	80.93
5	5	M/s. Ramky Pharma city (India) Limited	Village Lemarathi, Visakhapatnam District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Pharmaceutic als	247.39
6	6	M/s. K. Raheja IT Park (Hyderabad) Pvt. Ltd. (Sundew Properties Pvt. Limited)	Madhapur, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	16.29
7	7	Information Technology and Communications Department, Government of A.P. and APIIC	Village Madhurawada, Visakhapatnam, A.P.	AP	IT/ITES	16
8	8	M/s. Satyam Computer Services Ltd.	Thotlakonda, Visakhapatnam	AP	IT/ITES	20.23
9	9	M/s. Satyam Computer Services Ltd.	Bahadurpalli, Hyderabad	AP	IT/ITES	10.52
10	10	M/s. Satyam Computer Services Ltd.	Hyderabad	AP	IT/ITES	12.14
11	11	M/s. L&T Phoenix Infoparks Private Limited (Earlier M/s. A.P. Techno Projects Pvt. Ltd.)	Madhupur, Hyderabad	AP	IT/ITES	10
12	12	Information Technology and Communications Department, Government of A.P. and APIIC	Village Madhurawada, Visakhapatnam, A.P.	AP	IT/ITES	36

13	13	Information Technology and Communications Department, Government of A.P. and APIIC	Village Kesarapally, Krishna District, A.P.	AP	IT/ITES	12
14	14	M/s. Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd.	Nanakramguda Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, A.P.	AP	IT/ITES	20.53
15	15	Hetero Infrastructure SEZ Limited	N.Narsapuram, Nallamattipalem, Rajayyapeta, Ch. Lakshmipuram, Tennerla Villages, Nakkapalli Mandal, Visakhapatnam District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Pharmaceuticals - Bulk Drugs / Drug intermediates / Formulations / Chemicals / Allied Chemical engineering ancillaries	100.28
16	16	CMC Ltd.	CMC Centre, Gachibowli, Hyderabad	AP	IT/ITES	20.59
17	17	Sanghi SEZ Private Limited	Rangareddy Distt., AP	AP	IT/ITES	202.4
18	18	Kakinada SEZ Pvt. Ltd.	East Godavari, District in Kakinada	AP	Port based Multi-product	1035.6688
19	19	FAB City SPV (India) Pvt. Ltd.	Hyderabad	AP	FTWZ	120.06
20	20	APIIC	Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Multi Product	2206.03
21	21	Bavana Sai Associates	Uppaluru, Manthana, Kesarapalli Village, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Software Development/ ITES	25
22	22	M/s.Whitefield Paper Mills Ltd	West Godavari District, Nr Kovvur, AP	AP	Writing & Printing Paper Mill	109.81
23	23	Brandix India Apparel City Private Limited (BIAC)	Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Textile	404.7
24	24	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Maheswaram village, Ranga Reddy Dist., Andhra Pradesh	AP	Electronic Hardware	111
25	25	Divyasree NSL Infrastructure Ltd	Raidurga Village, Ranga Reddy District, AP	AP	IT/ ITES	10.52
26	26	Lanco Hills Technology Park Private Limited	Ranga Reddy District, A.P	AP	IT /ITES	11.77
27	27	DLF Commercial Developers Limited	Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	10.617

28	28	Information Technology and Communications (IT&C) Department - Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA)	Sy. No. 239/240 (P), Kokapet Village, Serilingampalli Mandal, RR District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	47.6
29	29	Neogen Properties Pvt. Ltd.	Thumkunta and Gollapuram Village, Hindupur Mandal, Anantpur District, Andhra Pradesh.	AP	Apparel Park	141.64
30	30	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Mulugu Mandal Taluk, Karakpatla vill. Medak District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotech	40.47
31	31	Brahmani Infratech Private Limited	Mamidipalli Village, Sarrornagar, Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	60.7
32	32	Indu Techzone Private Limited	Kanch Imarat Raviryal Village, Maheshwaram Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	60.7
33	33	NSL SEZ Uppal (HYD) Pvt. Ltd., (formally Topnotch Infrastructure Ltd.)	Uppal Industrial Development Area, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	14.5
34	34	Emaar Hills Township Private Limited	Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	10.33
35	35	J.T. Holdings Pvt. Ltd.	Imarat Kancha, Raviriyal Village, Himarath Taluka, Maheshwaram Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh.	AP	IT/ITES	28.33
36	36	Rudradev Infopark Private Limited (RIPL)	Kistapur Village, Chevella Mandal Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	12.25
37	37	Mahaveer Skyscrapers Limited	Chevella, Besides Faraha Engineering College, Ranga Reddy, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	22.78
38	38	Stargaze Properties Private Limited.	Kancha Imarath, Maheswaram (M), District Ranga Reddy, Andhra Pradesh.	AP	IT/ITES/ Electronic Hardware	68.96
		Lahari Infrastructure Limited	Kondakkal, Bulkapur Village, Sankarpalli Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Services Sector	108.49

39	39	Maytas Properties Private Limited	Bachupally Village, Quthbullapur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	29.85
40	40	Maytas Properties Private Limited	Gundla Pochampalli Village, Medchal Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	14.16
41	41	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Rajapur and Pollepally Village, Balangar and Jedcharla Mandal, Mahaboobnagar District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Pharmaceutical (formulations)	101.17
42	42	Maytas Properties Private Limited	Gopanpally village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	15.92
43	43	Serene Properties Private Limited (Earlier K. Raheja Corp. Pvt. Ltd.)	Pocharam, Hyderabad	AP	IT/ITES	26.91
44	44	GENPACT INDIA	Ranga Reddy, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	20.23
45	45	Navayuga Legala Estates Private Limited	Serilingampally mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	10.218
46	46	Whitecity Projects International Private Limited	Survey No. 238 to 260, Kaza Village, Mangalagiri Mandal and S.No. 23-29 and 55-71, Kantheru Village, Tadikonda Mandal, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	45.8
47	47	WIPRO Limited	Gopanapally Village, Vattinaguapally, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	40.46
48	48	V. R. Enterprises	Ananthasagar Village, Hasanparthy Mandal, Warangal District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	10.12
49	49	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Madikonda Village, Hanamkonda Mandal, Warangal District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	14.32

50	50	GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited	GMR Hyderabad International Airport, Shamshadbad, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Airport based Multi product	101.2
51	51	VGTM Urban Development Authority	Mangalagiri Mandal, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	16
52	52	Sri City Pvt. Ltd. (Satyavedu Reserve Infracity Private Limited)	Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Multi Product	1023
53	53	Parry Infrastructure Company Private Limited	Kakinada Town, East Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Food Processing	101.175
54	54	GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited	Shamshadbad, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	SEZ in an existing Airport (Aviation)	100
55	55	MAS Fabric Park (India) Private Limited (MFP)	Chintavaram Village, Chillakru Mandal, Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Textile and Apparel	229.29
56	56	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Putlampalli Village, Cuddapah Mandal, Cuddapah District Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	21.35
57	57	Parsvnath SEZ Ltd. (Former name Parsvnath Developers Limited)	Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotech	10.11
58	58	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Nellore, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Leather	107.49
59	59	Infosys Technologies Limited	Pocharam Village, Ghatkesar Mandal, Rangareddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT	119.87
60	60	Infosys Technologies Limited	Pocharam Village, Ghatkesar Mandal, Rangareddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT	60.93
61	61	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Chittor District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	32.57
62	62	APIIC	East Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	10.41
63	63	Tata Consultancy Services	R.R. District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	30.35
64	64	Cognizant Technology Solutions India Private Limited	Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	16.19

65	65	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Prakasham District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Building Products	106.36
66	66	M/s. IFFCO Kisan SEZ Limited.	Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Multi product	1023
67	67	Ananth Technologies Limited	Kancha Imarat, Raviryal village, Mashweram Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	10.12
68	68	Rassai Properties & Industries Limited	Hindupur, Anantapur District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Multi Services	415.6
69	69	Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Limited	Medak District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Pharmaceutical	106
70	70	Devbhumi Realtors Pvt. Ltd.	Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES, E/H, S/W	10.12
		Vivo Bio Tech Limited	Pregnapur Village, Gajwel Mandal, Medak District, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotech	10.93
71	71	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Aerospace and Precision Engineering Industries	101.17
72	72	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Multi Product	1032
73	73	Raagamayuri Builders Private District	Kurnool District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	12.15
74	74	APIIC	Gambheeram Village, Anandapuram Mandal, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	20.23
75	75	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Kommadi Village, Madhurwada, Visakhapatnam District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	17.25
76	76	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Kukatpally Village, Balanagar(Mandal), Ranga Reddy district, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	10.11
77	77	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Shamshabad Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	10.11
78	78	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Qutbullapur (Mandal), Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	20.23

79	79	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Hayat Nagar (M), Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	40
80	80	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Madhurawada Mandal, Visakhapatnam District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	15.78
81	81	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Chinakondur (East), Andhra Pradesh,	AP	Pharmaceutical Products & medical devices including Addictives	100
82	82	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Akutotapally, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Textile and apparel, garments and fashion accessories	100
83	83	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Mahabubnagar, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Agriculture and Livestock products and related services	108.356
84	84	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Medak District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotechnology	20.23
85	85	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	FTWZ	40.469
86	86	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Mahabubnagar District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	FTWZ	41.056
87	87	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Mahabubnagar District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Gems and Jewellery	16.2
88	88	Godrej Real Estate Private Limited	Patancheru Village & Mandal, Sanga Reddy Taluk, Medak District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	13.76
89	89	Lahari Infrastructure Limited	Shankarpally Village, Shankarpally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotechnology	10
90	90	S2tech.com India Private Limited	Gudur Village, Kandukur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Electronic Hardware including IT/ITES	10.12
91	91	Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited	Bhongir, Nalgonda District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Light Engineering SEZ	101.17

92	92	Biological E. Limited	Kolthur Village, Shameerpet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotechnology	10.21
93	93	Anrak Aluminnium Ltd.	APIIC Industrial Park, Makavarapallem Mandal, Visakhapatnam District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Alumina/ Aluminium Refining, smelting, associated processes, products and raw material industries sector	779.43
94	94	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Ratchumarripali Village, Pulivendula Mandal, Kadapa District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotech	31.186
95	95	Andhra Pradesh State Co-operative Marketing Federation Limited (AP Markfed)	Karimnagar town, Karimnagar District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	10.12
96	96	Madhusheel Infra Projects Private Limited	Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	IT/ITES	10.88
97	97	Dr.Reddy's Laboratories Ltd.	Srikakulam District Andhra Pradesh	AP	Pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceuticals ingredients	110
98	98	JSW Aluminium Limited	S. Kota, District Vizianagaram District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Alumina sector	240
		Sundari Theme Ventures-Private Limited	Kolthur Village, Shamirpet Mandal, R.R. District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotech	10.12
99	99	Real Griha Nirman Pvt. Ltd.	Hindupur, Ananthapur District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotech SEZ	28.34
100	100	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC)	Shameerpet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotech	20.44
101	101	M/s. Krishnapatnam Infratech Pvt. Ltd.	Chillakur Mandal, Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Multi Product	1023
102	102	M/s Indus Gene Expressions Limited	Kodur and Settipalli villages, Chilamathur Mandal, Ananthapur District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotech	10.53

103	103	Shantha Biotechnics Limited	Muppireddipally village, Toopran Mandal, Medak District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotech and related activities	10.12
104	104	Suchirindia Infrastructure Private Limited	Turkapally village, Shameerpet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotechnology	13
105	105	M/s. Lepakshi Knowledge Hub Private Limited	Chillamaturu Mandal, Ananthapur District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Aerospace & Precision Engineering	115.41
106	106	M/s. Lepakshi Knowledge Hub Private Limited	Chillamaturu and Gorantla Mandal, Ananthapur District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Biotechnology	11.88
107	107	M/s. Lepakshi Knowledge Hub Private Limited	Chillamaturu Mandal, Ananthapur District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	FTWZ	40
108	108	M/s. Radiant Corporation Private Limited	Plot No. 20, APIIC Industrial Park, Muppireddypalli village, Toopran (Mandal) Medak District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Electronics Hardware and Software and related activities	10.23
109	109	M/s. Kakinada SEZ Private Limited	Ponnada, Mulapeta, Ramanakkapeta villages in Kakinada, East Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh	AP	Multi Product	1013.6

Chandigarh

110	1	Chandigarh Administration	Chandigarh	CH	Electronics and IT/ITES	31.4966
111	2	Chandigarh Administration	Chandigarh	CH	IT/ITES	26.96

Chattisgarh

112	1	Naya Raipur Development Authority (NRDA)	Naya Raipur, Chhattisgarh	CG	IT/ITES	10.77
113	2	M/s. Lanco Solar Private Limited	Mahroomkala, Mahroomkurd and Chaveli villages, Rajnandgaon District, Chhattisgarh	CG	Solar	101

Dadra Nagar Haveli

		Omnibus Industrial Development Corporation of Daman & Diu and Dadra & Nagar Haveli Limited (OIDC)	Kharpada, Naroli, Dadra & Nagar Haveli	DNH	IT/ITES	14.125
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114	1	Omnibus Industrial Development Corporation of Daman & Diu and Dadra & Nagar Haveli Limited (OIDC)	Khardpada, Naroli, Dadra & Nagar Haveli	DNH	Gems and Jewellery	11.465
		Alok Infrastructure Private Limited	Village Surangi near Silvassa in the Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli	DNH	Textiles	80
115	2	AEC Marketing Pvt. Ltd	Village Morkhal Silvassa, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli	DNH	Gems and Jewellery	12.16

Delhi

116	1	M/s. Delhi Metro Corporation	Shastri Park, Delhi	DL	IT	6
117	2	Delhi State Industrial Information Development Corporation Ltd.	Baprola village, Delhi	DL	IT	10.52
118	3	Delhi State Industrial Information Development Corporation Ltd.	Baprola village, Delhi	DL	Gems and Jewellery	16.73

Goa

119	1	Meditab Specialities Pvt Ltd	Bhut-Khamb, Kerim, Tal-Ponda, Goa	GA	Pharmaceuticals and Chemical Products	123.2
120	2	Paradigm Logistics and Distribution Private Limited	Phase IV - Verna Industrial Estate, Goa.	GA	IT/ITES	40.25
121	3	K. Raheja Corp. Pvt. Ltd.	Phase IV - Verna Industrial Estate, Goa.	GA	Services	105.91
122	4	Peninsula Pharma Research Centre Private Limited	Sancoale in Goa	GA	Biotech	20.36
123	5	Planetview Mercantile Company Limited	Verna, Goa	GA	Gems and Jewellery	13.28
124	6	Inox Mercantile Company Private Limited	Verna, Goa	GA	Biotech	48.48
125	7	Panchbhoomi Infrastructure Private Limited	Survey No. 260, Village Socorro, Bardez Taluka, North Goa District, Goa	GA	IT	18.5

Gujarat

126	1	Reliance Infrastructure Ltd.	Jamnagar, Gujarat	GJ	Multi product	1764.137
127	2	Dahej SEZ Ltd. (M/s. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn.)	Dahej, Gujarat	GJ	Multi Product	1768
128	3	Mundra Special Economic Zone Ltd.	*Mundra (Gujarat)	GJ	Multi Product	4498.757

129	4	Gujarat Hira Bourse	Ishhapor, Surat	GJ	Gems and Jewellery	74
130	5	Zydus Finance Ltd.	Ahmedabad.	GJ	Pharmaceuticals	48.83
131	6	Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Ahmedabad	GJ	Apparel	38
132	7	GIDC	Gandhinagar Electronic Estate, Gandhinagar, Gujarat	GJ	Electronics Products	28
		M/s. Essar Hazira SEZ	Choryasi, Distt, Hazira, Gujarat	GJ	Engineering	247.5222
133	8	CPL Infrastructure pvt. Ltd.	Moujhe Haripura, Taluka: Dhandhuka, District: Ahmedabad	GJ	Pharmaceuticals	200
134	9	Essar Jamnagar SEZ Developer Ltd	Jamnagar, Gujarat	GJ	Multi Product	1125
135	10	Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation	Jhagadia, Bharuch District, Gujarat	GJ	Ceramic and glass	170.7
136	11	Jubilant Infrastructure Ltd	Bharuch, Gujarat	GJ	Chemical	160
137	12	Aqualine Properties Private Limited	Mouje Koba, Taluka Gandhinagar, Distirct Gandhinagar, Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES	27.85
138	13	Calica Constructions and Impex Private Limited	Village Khoraj, Tehsil & Distt- Gandhinagar Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES	16
139	14	Kandla Port Trust	Kandla, Gujarat	GJ	Port based Multi product	640
140	15	Ganesh Infrastructure Private Limited (Earlier Mudgha (Thatlej) Complex Limited)	Village Chharodi Taluka Dascroi, District Ahmedabad, Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES	32.7123
141	16	Welspun Anjar SEZ Limited	Taluka Anjar, Village Varshamedi, Gujarat	GJ	Textile and Garment Sector	109
142	17	Jayant Oil and Derivatives Limited	Taluka Vagra, District Bharuch, Gujarat	GJ	Chemicals	122
143	18	N.G. Realty Pvt.Ltd.	Village Rajoda, District Ahmedabad, Gujarat	GJ	Engineering	230
144	19	Suzlon Infrastructure Ltd	Vadodara, Gujarat	GJ	Hightech Engineering products and related Services	101
145	20	Shivganga Real Estate Holders Private Limited	Sargasan (Sarkhej - Gandhinagar Highway), Taluka Gandhinagar, District Gandhinagar, Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES	52.606

146	21	City Gold Realty Private Limited	Sanathal (Sarkhej - Bavla Highway), Taluka Sanand, District Ahmedabad, Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES	10.724
147	22	Adani Townships & Real Estate Company Private Limited	Dantali Village on SG Highway, Ahmedabad, Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES	20
148	23	Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation	Biotech Park, Savli GIDC Estate, Village Manjusar, District Vadodara, Gujarat	GJ	Biotech	14.73
149	24	Gujarat Growth Centres Development Corporation Limited (GGDCL)	Moti Chiral GGDCL Estate, Village Moti Chiral, District Kutch, Gujarat	GJ	Handicrafts and Artisan	131.59.62
150	25	Chervil Infrastructure Private Limited (Nipiam Infotech Private Limited)	Gram Nimeta, Taluka Waghodiya, District Vadodara, Gujarat	GJ	IT	220
		M/s DLF Commercial Developers Limited-	Gandhinagar, Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES	10
151	26	M/s. Gift SEZ Limited (Gujarat Finance City Development Limited)	Gandhinagar, Gujarat	GJ	Multi Services	100
152	27	Asia Pacific Corporation Limited	District Kutch, Gujarat	GJ	Polymer based	101.17
153	28	Sterling Erection and Infrastructure Private Limited	Jambusar, Bharuch, Gujarat	GJ	Multi Product	1263
154	29	Mundra Port and Special Economic Zone Ltd. (MPSEZL) (Adani Power Private Limited)	Mundra Taluka, District Kutch, Gujarat	GJ	Multi product	2648.19 (6214.63) (2648.19)
155	30	E. Complex Private Limited	Village Rampara & Lunsapur, District Amreli, Gujarat	GJ	Engineering goods	156
156	31	Tata Consultancy Services Limited (TCS)	Gandhinagar, Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES	10.117
157	32	Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, Gujarat	Gandhinagar-Sarkhet Highway, Gandhinagar Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES SEZ-C	22.7
158	33	Dishman Infrastructure Limited	Bhamsara Kalyangadh Gangad, Taluka Bavla, District Ahmedabad, Gujarat	GJ	Engineering Industries	133.86
159	34	Dishman Infrastructure Limited	Kalyangadh Gangad, Taluka Bavla, District Ahmedabad, Gujarat	GJ	Pharma and chemicals sector	102.7409

160	35	J.B. SEZ Private Ltd.	GIDC, Panoli Industrial Estate, Panoli, Gujarat	GJ	Pharmaceuticals	130
161	36	SGV Infrastrucutre Private Limtied	Village Makarba, Taluka & District Ahmedabad	GJ	IT/ITES	11.4224
162	37	Larsen & Toubro Limited	Vadodara, Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES	10
		Strength Real Estate Private Limited	Vemali Village, Taluka- Vadodara, District Vadodara, Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES	13.74
163	38	Gaurinandan Property Holders Pvt. Ltd.	Village Badarabad Taluka Daskaroi, Dist. Ahmedabad, Gujatat	GJ	IT/ITES	16.1866
164	39	Pradip Overseas Limited	Village Bhamasra, Taluka Bawla, District Ahmedabad, Gujarat	GJ	Textile	109.48
165	40	Euro Multivision Ltd.	Survey No. 492, 504, 505(1), 505 (2), 506 Village Shikara, Taluka Bhachau, District Kutch, Gujara	GJ	Non- conventional energy including solar energy equipments/cell	11.63.47
166	41	Myron Realtors Private Limited	Sanathal Junction, Taluka Sanand, District Ahmedabad, Gujarat	GJ	IT/ITES	10.68
167	42	Mexus Corporation Pvt. Ltd.	Chala, Ta. Pardi, Valsad District	GJ	Electronics Hardware, Software including IT/ITES	11.11
168	43	Gujarat Hydrocarbons and Power SEZ Limited-Kolkata	Village Vilayat, Taluka Vagra, District Bharuch Gujarat	GJ	Oil and gas	108
169	44	Gujarat Hydrocarbons and Power SEZ Limited	Village Vilayat, Taluka Vagra, District Bharuch Gujarat	GJ	Oil and gas	140
170	45	Akshaypatra Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.	Village Agol Taluka Kadi, District, Mehsana, Gujarat	GJ	Food Processing	108.3
171	46	M/s. Adani Ports and SEZ (M/s. Mundra Port and Special Economic Zone Limited)	Village Dhrub, Taluka Mundra, District Kutch, Gujarat	GJ	FTWZ	168.41
172	47	M/s. Adani Ports and SEZ (M/s. Mundra Port and Special Economic Zone Limited)	Taluka Mundra, District Kutch, Gujarat	GJ	Multi Product	1840

Haryana

173	1	Haryana Technology Park (Selecto Systems Pvt. Ltd.)	Faridabad, Haryana	HR	IT	3
174	2	M/s. Uppal Housing Ltd.	Rathiwās Village, Gurgaon	HR	Multi-services	108.86
175	3	M/s. Luxor Cyber City Pvt. Ltd.	Village Sikohpur, District Gurgaon	HR	IT/ITES	28
176	4	Dr. Fresh Healthcare Pvt.Ltd.	Gurgaon	HR	IT/ITES	23.429
177	5	Orient Craft Infrastructure Ltd	Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Textile	114.84
178	6	Ansal Properties and Infrastructure Ltd	Village Bhigan and Kurad Ibrahimpur, near Murthal, Dist. Sonapat, Haryana	HR	Engineering goods	100
179	7	Assotech Realty Pvt Ltd	Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ ITES	10.62
180	8	DLF Limited	Sector 30, DLF City, Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	12.06
181	9	Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited	Village Ghata, Gurgaon, Haryana, very close to NH-8	HR	IT/ITES	40.48
182	10	DLF Cyber City Developers Limited	Sector No. 24 & 25A, DLF Cyber City, DLF City, Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	10.73
183	11	Global Health Private Limited	MediCity, Sector 38, Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Biotechnology	17.41
184	12	Suncity Haryana SEZ Developer Pvt. Ltd.	Jhund Sarai, Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT	67.64
185	13	Metro Valley Business Park Private Limited	5th Mile stone, on Gurgaon - Faridabad Road, Opp. Ansal Valley View Apartments, Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT	10.393
186	14	M/s. Parsvnath Developers Limited	Gurgaon-Sohna Road, Gurgaon, Haryana (earlier at Delhi Jaipur National Highway)	HR	IT/ITES	43
187	15	Ansal Properties and Infrastructure Limited	Village Badshapur, Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	10.93
188	16	Ascendant Estates Private Limited	Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	15.2
189	17	Bentex Towers Pvt. Ltd	Roje Ka Gujjar, Distt. Gurgaon (Gurgaon)	HR	Multi-Services	168
190	18	Ireo Investment Holding III Ltd. (Gp realtors pvt.ltd)	Ghata, Behrampur and Balola in District Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Electronic Hardware, IT/ITES	40
191	19	Reliance Haryana SEZ Limited	Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Multi services	440
192	20	Gurgaon Infospace Limited	Gugaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	11.58

193	21	GP Realtors Pvt. Ltd.	Phase II in the villages of Ghata & Behrampur in district Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Electronic Hardware and IT/ITES	11.03
194	22	GP Realtors Pvt. Ltd.	Phase III in the villages of Balola & Behrampur in district Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Electronic Hardware and IT/ITES	17.18
195	23	Mohan Investments and Properties Private Limited	Shijra Kilabandi, Village Badshahpur, District Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	28.04
196	24	Mayar India Limited	Rakha, Rani Ka Singolla, Nimoth, Tehsil Sohna, District Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Biotechnology	41.57
197	25	Raheja Haryana SEZ Developers Private Limited	Village Hamirpur, Khatawas, Saidpur, Dhanawas and Wazirpur District Gurgaon	HR	Engineering	102
198	26	Canton Buildwell Private Limited	Gurgaon, Faridabad Road NCR of Delhi	HR	IT/ITES	10
199	27	Unitech Realty Projects Limited	Tikri, Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	10.52
200	28	DS Realetors Private Limited	District Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT	56.65
201	29	Sohna Buildcon Private Limited	District Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Electronic Hardware including IT/ITES	10
202	30	Mittal Infratech Private Limited	District Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	10.52
203	31	Starex SEZ Developers Pvt. Ltd.	District Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	10
204	32	Perpetual Infracon Private Limited	Sector 81, Villages Budena, Faridabad and Prahladpur, District Faridabad, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	21.78
205	33	Gracious Buildcon Private Limited	Sector 102, Village Kherkimajra, Tehsil and District Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	11.1
206	34	Goldsouk International Gems & Jewellery SEZ Private Limited	Revenue Village of Babra Bankipur, Tehsil and District Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES (Gems and Jewellery)	16.19
207	35	Anant Raj Industries Ltd.	Sonepat, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	10
208	36	Wellgrow Buildcon Private Limited	Revenue Village of Babra Bankipur, Tehsil and District Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Electronics / IT & ITES	24.29
209	37	M/s. Sunwise Properties Private Limited	Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	10.121

210	38	Primose Buildworth Pvt. Ltd.	Village Sehsola, Tehsil Taoru, Distt Nuh, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	18.48
		Airmid Developers Limited	Village Pawala Khusropur, Gurgaon District, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	10.12
211	39	Progressive Buildestate Pvt. Ltd.	Gurgaon, Sohna Road (state Highway) in the Revenue Village, Ghamroj, Bhondsi & Mahendwada Tehsil Sohna, District Gurgaon	HR	Electronic Hardware & Software including IT/ITES	34.41
212	40	Ansal Colours Engineering SEZ Limited (Ansal Kamdhenu Engineering SEZ Ltd.)	Village Bhagan and Kurar Ibrahimpur, Near Murthal, District Sonapat	HR	Agro and Food Processing	10.124
213	41	Mikado Realtors Private Limited	Village Behrampur & Balola District Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Electronic Hardware, IT/ITES	11.028
214	42	Orient Craft Infrastructure Ltd.	Village Bans Hariya Dist. Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	26.56
215	43	Espire Infrastructure Corporation Limited	Mathura Road, Badarpur Border, District Faridabad, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	10.67
216	44	Best on Health Limited	Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	Biotech	40.78
217	45	Natasha Housing & Urban Development Ltd.	Panipat, Haryana	HR	Handicraft	10.522
218	46	M/s. Rose View Promoters Private Limited	IMT Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana	HR	IT/ITES	10.12

Jharkhand

219	1	Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority.	Adityapur (Jharkhand)	JH	Automobiles and components	36
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Karnataka

220	1	M/s. Biocon Ltd.	Bangalore	KN	Bio-technology	36
221	2	Shyamaraju and Company Private Ltd.	Krishnarajapuram, Bangalore	KN	IT/ITES	21.76
222	3	Manyata Promoters Pvt. Ltd. and DSRK Holdings Private Ltd.	Bangalore (Karnataka)	KN	IT/ITES	22
223	4	WIPRO Limited	Bangalore, Sarjapur	KN	IT	6
224	5	WIPRO Limited	Bangalore Electronic city	KN	IT	5
225	6	M/s. Vikas Telecom Limited	Bangalore East Taluk	KN	IT/ITES	37
226	7	M/s. Adarsh Prime Projects Pvt. Ltd.	Village Varthur, Hubli, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	27.91
227	8	Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board	Mangalore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	203

228	9	Cessna Garden Developers Pvt. Ltd.	Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	19.22
229	10	Global Village SEZ (Tanglin Developments Limited)	Banglore-Mysore highway Bangalore	KN	IT/ITES	26.673
230	11	Infosys Technologies Limited	Pajeeru, Kairangala, Kurunadu Village of Bantwal Taluk, Dakshina Kannada District, Karnataka.	KN	IT/ITES	123.61
231	12	Information Technology Park Ltd.	Whitefield Road, Bangalore.	KN	IT/ITES	10.879
232	13	Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board	Shimoga, Karnataka	KN	Engineering & related Industries	169.6
233	14	KIADB	Hassan, Karnataka	KN	Textiles	233.307
234	15	Infosys Technologies Ltd	Hebbal Industrial Area, Mysore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	25.45
235	16	San Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd	Whitefield, Bangalore	KN	IT/ITES	10
236	17	HCL Technopark Ltd	Jigani Industrial Area, Bangalore	KN	IT/ITES	11.05
237	18	Golden Gate Developers Pvt Ltd	Jala Hobli, Bangalore	KN	IT/ITES	26.304
238	19	Primal Projects Private Limited	Banglore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	10.36
239	20	Concord Investments (Banglore)	Banglore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	13.44
240	21	Ittina Properties Private Limited	Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	Electronic Hardware and Software including IT/ITES	15.732
241	22	Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board	Hassan, Hassan District, Kernataka	KN	Food processing and related services	159.733
242	23	Bagmane Developers Pvt. Ltd.	Raman Nagar, KR Puram, Bangalore North, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	15.5
		Divyasree Infrastructure	Bellandur Amani Kane, Off-Airport Road, Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	20.234
243	24	Chaitanaya Infrastructure Private Limited	Whitefield Main Road, Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	20.24
244	25	Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board	Hassan, Hassan District, Kernataka	KN	Pharmaceuticals	281.21

245	26	Karnataka Biotechnology and Information Technology Services (KBITS)	Electronics City, Phase III Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	Biotechnology	37.49
246	27	B.A. Tech Park Pvt. Ltd.,	Thumbe village, Bantwal Taluk, Karnataka.	KN	IT/ITES	12.02
247	28	Suzlon Infrastructure Ltd.	Near Mangalore Port, Karnataka	KN	Port-Based for Hi-tech engineering products and related services	259.32
248	29	Karle Infrastructure Projects	Nagavara Village Bangalore North Taluk	KN	IT/ITES/ BPO	10
249	30	Salarpuria Properties Pvt. Ltd.	Sonenahalli Village, K.R. Purama Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk	KN	IT/ITES	14.54
250	31	Gopalan Enterprises (India) Pvt Ltd.	Mahadevapura and Kaggadasapura, K.R.Puram, Bangalore	KN	IT/ITES, Software Development	14.27
251	32	Kinfotech Software Private Limited	EPIP, KIADB Industrial Area, Ganjimutt, Manglore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	10
252	33	Opto Infrastructure Limited	Village Kallahalli, Taluka Nanjungud, District Mysore, Karnataka	KN	EH/Software/IT /ITES	12.23
253	34	Mangalore SEZ Limited	Dakshin Kannada District, Karnataka	KN	Petrochemicals and petroleum	588
254	35	Bagmane Construction Private Limited	K.R. Puram, Banglaore North, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	12
255	36	Quest Machining and Manufacturing Pvt Ltd	Belgaum, Karnataka	KN	Auto, Aerospace and Industrial engineering	103.7209
256	37	Gopalan Enterprises (India) Private Limited	Hoodi Village, K.R. Puram, Whitefield, Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES, Software Development	10.53
257	38	High Street Developers Private Limited	Srirangapatna Taluk, Mandya District, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	44.25
258	39	Brigade Enterprises Private Limited	Ganjimutt, EPIP Industrial Area, Mangalore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	10.117
259	40	Gokaldas Images Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.	Bangalore Rural District, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES/BPO	10.36
260	41	Hera Realcon Pvt. Ltd.	Thirupalya, Taluka Anekal, District Bangalore	KN	IT/ITES	25.5
261	42	Bangalore Internatioanl Airport Limited	Devenahalli, Bangalore	KN	Airport based SEZ	113

262	43	Milestone Buildcon Private Limited	Chokkanahalli Village, Bangalore	KN	IT/ITES	10.117
263	44	Opto Infrastructure Limited	Village Dodda Basavanahalli and Chikkabasavanahalli, Talukas Shanthigrama Hobli and Hassan, District Hassan, Karnataka	KN	Manufacturing of Equipments, Devices Accessories including Consumables for Medical and other application (E/H & S incl IT/ITES)	100
		Hebe Infracon Private Ltd.	Thirupalya and Maragondanahalli Villages, Anekal Taluk, Bangalore Urban District	KN	Electronic Hardware, Software & IT/ITES	10.265
264	45	Concord India Private Limited	Kadugondi Industrial Area, Kadugondi Plantation Village, Bidarahalli Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	23.471
265	46	Renaissance Designbuild Private Limited	Mysore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	12.14
266	47	Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd.	Kattigenahalli and Venkatale villages, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore	KN	IT/ITES/BPO/Electronic Hardware	12
267	48	Gopalan Enterprises India Pvt. Ltd.	Kundalahalli and Nallurahalli villages K.R. Puram Hobli, Bangalore	KN	Biotech	10.95
268	49	Brooke Bond Real Estates Private Limited	Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES/BPO/EH	11.39
269	50	Karnataka State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd.(KEONICS)	Shimoga, Karnataka	KN	Electronic Hardware and Software including IT/ITES	14.5
270	51	M/s. Larsen & Toubro Limited	KIADB Industrial Area, Hebbal - Hootgally, Mysore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	10
271	52	M/s. Poornimadevi Tech Park Private Limited	Sulikere village, Kengari Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	13.11

272	53	M/s. Gopalan E-Park,	Village Koorgalli, Itwala, Hobli, Mysore Taluk, Mysore District, Karnataka	KN	Electronic Hardware and Software including ITES	11.35
273	54	Infosys Technologies Limited	Sarjapur village & Billapur Village, Anekal Taluk, Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	IT	24.446
274	55	Wipro Limited	Kodathi village, Varthur Hobli, Sarjapur Road, Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	19.46
275	56	Wipro Limited	Belagola Industrial Area, Mogarhalli village, Belagola Hobli, Srirangapatna Taluk, Mandya District, Mysore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	29.94
276	57	Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board	Devanahalli Near New International Airport, Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	Aerospace Industry	102
277	58	Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB)	Gamanagatti, Hubli Taluk, Dharwad District, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	12.15
278	59	M/s. Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited	Padur, Karnataka	KN	FTWZ	41.2
279	60	M/s. Bhuvana Comforts Private Limited	B.M. Kaval and Rachanamadu villages, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore, Karnataka	KN	IT/ITES	12.4
280	61	M/s. Manipal ETA Infotech Limited	Agara and Jakkasandra village, Begur Hobli, Bengaluru, Karnataka	KN	Electronic Hardware and Software including IT/ITES	11.2
281	62	M/s. Jubilant Infrastructure Limited	Kallahalli village, Nanjangud Taluk, Mysore District, Karnataka	KN	Biotech (Pharma)	10

Kerala

282	1	Cochin Port Trust	Vallarpadam	KL	Port Based	115
283	2	Cochin Port Trust	Puthuvypeen	KL	Port Based	285
284	3	M/s. Infopark, Kochi	Kusumagiri, Village Kakkanad, Ernakulam District (Kerala)	KL	IT/ITES	30.7683
285	4	M/s. Electronics Technology Park	Trivandrum, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	34.47

286	5	Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Dev. Corpn. (KINFRA)	Kizhakuttom, Trivandrum (Kerala)	KL	IT/ITES (IT, Animation and gaming).	10.121
287	6	Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Dev. Corpn. (KINFRA)	Kakkancherry near Calicut, Kerala	KL	Food Processing	12.52
288	7	Technology Parks - Kerala	Adjacent to Technopark Campus, TVPM	KL	IT/ITES	12.55
289	8	Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Dev. Corpn. (KINFRA)	Cochin, Kerala	KL	Electronics Industries	12.141
290	9	Unitech Real Estate Project Ltd.	Village Kunnathunadu, Taluk Morkala Desam, Ernakulam, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	10
291	10	Parsvnath Developers Limited,	Nedumbassery and Chengamanadu Villages of Aluva Taluk in Ernakulam District, Kerala.	KL	IT/ITES	30.76
		TCG Urban Infrastructure Holdings Limited	Cochin, Kerala	KL	Biotechnology	12
292	11	Smart City (Kochi) Infrastructure Private Limited	Kusumagiri, Kakkanad, Ernakulam District, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	53.838
293	12	Kerala State Information Technology Infrastructure Limited	Village Pallipuram, Taluk Cherthala, District Alappuzha, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	24.53
294	13	Kerala State Information Technology Infrastructure Limited	Block 19, Village Purakkad, Taluk Ambalapuzha, District Alappuzha, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	13.4415
295	14	Kerala State Information Technology Infrastructure Ltd.	Eramam Village, Thaliparambu Taluk, Kannur District, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	10.37.50
296	15	Kerala State Information Technology Infrastructure Ltd.	Cheemeni Village, Hosdurg Taluk, Kasaragod District, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	40.40.76
297	16	Electronics Technology Parks-Kerala (Techopark)	Pallipuram Village, Trivandrum District, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	19.21
298	17	Hindustan Newsprint Ltd.	Newsprint Nagar, Kottayam	KL	Pulp and Paper	126
299	18	Electronics Technology Parks - Kerala (Technopark)	Trivandrum, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	11.13
300	19	Kerala State IT/ITES Infrastrucure Company Limited	Kollam District, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	18

301	20	Carborundum Universal Limited	Electro Mineral Division, Kalamassery Development Plot, Ernakulam District, Kerala	KL	Non-conventional Energy Sources	10
302	21	MM Tech Towers	Chengamanadu Village, Alwye, Kerala	KL	ITES	11.15
303	22	Emaar MGF Land Ltd.	Chengamanadu, Alwaye, Kerala	KL	IT related SEZ	12.17
304	23	Sutherland Global Services Private Limited	Kalamassery, Kochi, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	10.1175
305	24	Uralungal Labour Contract Cooperative Society Ltd.(ULCCS Ltd.)	Nellikode village, Kozhikode, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	10.16
306	25	Bluestar Realtors (Private) Limited	Kalamassery, Kochi, Kerala	KL	IT	28.32
307	26	Cochin International Airport Limited,	Angamali villages, Ernakulam, Kerala	KL	Airport Based	100
308	27	Kerala State Information Technology Infrastructure Limited (KSITIL)	Nellikode & Pandeerakavu village, Kozhikkode District, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	10.121
309	28	Infoparks, Kerala	Taluk Kunnathunad, District Ernakulam, Kerala	KL	IT/ITES	12.5804
310	29	M/s. Cochin Port Trust	Southern end of Willingdon Island, Survey No. 2578/4, 1166, Thoppumpady Ramesaram village, Cochin, Kerala	KL	FTWZ	40.85

Madhya Pradesh

311	1	Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Dev. Corpn.	Indore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT	8
		M/s. Medicaps IT Park Pvt. Ltd.	Indore, M.P	MP	IT Park	11.936
312	2	Parsvnath Developers Limited	Indore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES	30.981
313	3	Madhya Pradesh State Electronics Development Corporation Limited (MPSEDC)	Ganga Malanpur, Near IIITM Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES	20.24
314	4	Writers and Publishers Limited	Chindwara, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES	18.9
315	5	Madhya Pradesh State Electronics Development Corporation (MPSEDC)	Village Purva, Jabalpur, Mahdya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES	36.437

316	6	Madhya Pradesh State Electronics Development Corporation (MPSEDC)	Badwai, Near Airport, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES	85
317	7	Zoom Developers Private Limited	Bada Bangarda, Indore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES	100
318	8	MAN Industries(India) Limited	Indore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES	10.44
319	9	Malwa IT Park Ltd.	Khajarana AB Road, Bypass, Indore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES	10.343
320	10	The Gwalior Agriculture Co. Ltd.	Dabra District, Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh	MP	Multi Services	100
321	11	Cassandra Realty Private Limited (100% subsidiary of Entertainment World Developers Private Limited)	MR-10 Road, Off by pass Road, Indore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES	13.72
322	12	Madhya Pradesh Audyogik Kendra Vikas (Jabalpur) Limited	District Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh	MP	Mineral and mineral based products	101.21
323	13	Madhya Pradesh Audyogik Kendra Vikas (Jabalpur) Limited	Village Umariya - Dungariya, Tehsil Shahpura, Distt. Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh	MP	Agro and Agro based Products	101.21
324	14	M/s. Hindulco Industries Ltd.	Bargawan District, Singroli (Formerly District Sidhi) Madhya Pradesh	MP	Aluminium sector	111.89
325	15	M/s. Tata Consultancy Services Limited	Indore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES/BPO/K PO	40.469
326	16	M/s. Infosys Limited	Village Tikgarita, Badsha and Badangarda, Near Super Corridor near Indore, Indore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT	52.643
327	17	M/s. Ruchi Realty Holdings Limited	village Kaanadia, Tehsil & District Indore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES	14.25
328	18	M/s. M.P. Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam (Indore) Limited	Village Rangwasa, District Indore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	Gems and Jewellery	10.924
329	19	M/s. Impetus Infotech (India) Private Limited	Indore, Madhya Pradesh	MP	IT/ITES	10

Maharashtra

330	1	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Rajiv Gandhi Infotech Park, Phase III, Hinjawadi, Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	229.3
331	2	M/s. Syntel International Pvt. Ltd.	Talawade Software Park, Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	16
332	3	Serum Institute of India Limited	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	Pharma & Biotech	23.1793
333	4	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Nandgaon Peth, Distt. Amravati, Maharashtra	MH	Multi Product	1010
334	5	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Kagal, Maharashtra	MH	Textile	104
335	6	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Krushnoor, Dist. Nanded, Maharashtra	MH	Pharmaceuticals	150
336	7	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Latur, Maharashtra	MH	Agro	200
337	8	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Shendre, Dist. Aurangabad, Maharashtra	MH	Alumium and Aluminium related industries	118.13
338	9	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Butibori, Dist. Nagpur, Maharashtra	MH	Textile	383
339	10	Wockhardt Infrastructure Development Limited	Shendre, Aurangabad Distt, Maharashtra	MH	Pharmaceutical	107
340	11	M/s. Bajaj Auto Limited	Waluj, Aurangabad	MH	Automobile and Automobile components	100
341	12	M/s. Hiranandani Builders	Powai, Mumbai	MH	IT/ITES	12.57
342	13	M/s. Sunstream City Private Limited (Zeus Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.)	Village Kopri, Taluka Thane, District Thane, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	54.22
343	14	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Distt Solapur, Maharashtra	MH	Textile Industry	195
344	15	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	District Yavatymal, Maharashtra	MH	Textile Industry	208

345	16	Sinima Meadows Limited(formely Claridges Hotels Pvt. Ltd.)	Chawk in Khalapur Taluka of Raigad Distt.	MH	Multi-Services	242
346	17	New Found Properties and Leasing Private Limited	Juinagar, Thane, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	21.41
347	18	Magarpatta Township Development & Construction Co. Ltd	Magarpatta City, Hadapsar, Pune	MH	Electronics hardware and software including ITES	11.98
348	19	M/s.EON Kharadi Infrastructure Pvt Ltd	Kharadi, Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	18
349	20	Wipro Ltd	Pune	MH	IT/ITES	20.23
350	21	Viraj Profiles Ltd	Village Aam Wada Tehsil, Distt Thane, Maharashtra	MH	Stainless Steel Engineering Products	235
351	22	Mahindra Gesco Developers Ltd	Village Owale, Ghodbunder Road, Thane, Maharashtra	MH	Bio-technology	28
352	23	Infosys Ltd	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	79.8
353	24	Kumar Builders Township Ventures Pvt Ltd	Hinjawadi and Mann, Pune, Maharashtra	MH	Electronics Hardware and Software including IT/ ITES	49.1
354	25	Flagship Infrastructure Pvt Ltd	Hinjwadi, Pune	MH	IT	28
355	26	Serene Properties Private Limited	Airoli, District Thane, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	14.07
356	27	Maharashtra Airport Dev. Corporation	Mihan, Nagpur, Maharashtra	MH	Multi product	1511.51
357	28	Balaji Infra Projects Limited	Dighi Port, District Raigadh, Maharashtra	MH	Port based SEZ for multi product inclusive of FTWZ	100
358	29	International Biotech Park Ltd.	Hinjawadi, Pune	MH	Biotech	13
359	30	Gitanjali Gems Limited	Panvel Village, Chiravat, District Raigad, Maharashtra	MH	Gems and Jewellery	10.2
		Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Ambarnath, Distt Thane, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	16.5
360	31	Royal Palms India Private Limited	169, Aarey Milk Colony, Goregaon (E), Mumbai	MH	IT/ITES	218

361	32	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Lote, Parshuram, District Ratnagiri, Maharashtra	MH	Pharma	200
		Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Bhadravati Industrial Area, Chandrapur District, Maharashtra	MH	Power-generation	1100
362	33	Wardha Power Company Pvt. Ltd.	Chandrapur District, Maharashtra	MH	Power Sector	102.159
		Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Usar, Raigarh Dist., Maharashtra	MH	Power-generation	103
363	34	Chiplun Infrastructure Private Limited (formerly M/s FTWZ Ltd.)	Mumbai	MH	FTWZ	40
364	35	City Parks Pvt. Ltd.	Gahunje, Taluka Haveli, District Pune	MH	Electronics, IT/ITES	30
365	36	Broadway Integrated Park Pvt. Ltd.	Village Tathawade, Taluka Mulshi, District Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10.55
366	37	Muttha Realty Private Limited	Village Lohagaon, Taluka Haveli, District Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10.27
367	38	Cornell Housing and Infrastructure Private Limited	Khari Village, Thane District, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	41
368	39	Lodha Developers Pvt. Ltd.	Thane, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	32
369	40	Manjri Stud Farm Private Limited	Pune Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	15.79
370	41	K. Raheja Universal	Navi Mumbai	MH	IT/ITES	20.64
		K. Raheja Universal (Infocity II)	Navi Mumbai	MH	IT/ITES	13
371	42	DLF Akruiti Infopark (Pune) Ltd.	Pune (Maharashtra)	MH	IT/ITES	24
372	43	Bombay Industrial Corporation	Mahul, Mumbai	MH	IT/ITES	12
373	44	Siddhivinayak Knowledge City Developers Private Limited	Village Bhosari (Bhojapur), Taluka Haveli, District Pune	MH	Electronic Hardware and Software including Information Technology Enabled Services	12.14
374	45	Dosti Enterprises	Thane, Maharashtra	MH	IT	45

375	46	Bilcare Limited	Maujhe Pimpri Budruk, Taluka Khed, Rajgurunagar, District Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10
376	47	Shirpur Gold Refinery Limited	Shirpur, District Dhulia, Maharashtra	MH	Gems and Jewellery	12.98
377	48	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	MIDC Industrial area at Akola District, Akola, Maharashtra	MH	Agro processing sector	100
378	49	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Airoli Software Park, District Thane, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	60.7
379	50	Royal Palms India Private Limited	Survey No. 169, Aarey Milk Colony Goregaon (East), Mumbai	MH	Gems and Jewellery	10
380	51	Dynasty Developers Private Limited	Plot No. PL-3, Rajiv Gandhi Infotech Park, Hinjewadi, Phase II, Village Marunji, Taluka Mulashi, District Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	20
381	52	Sanvo Resorts Private Limited	Near Panvel - Palaspephata Junction, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10
382	53	Indiabulls Industrial Infrastructure Limited	Nashik, Maharashtra	MH	Multi product	1023.43
383	54	Jindal Photo Limited	Igatpuri, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	12.23
		Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Ranjangaon, District Pune, Maharashtra	MH	Biotech and Related activities	30
384	55	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.	Chakan, District Pune, Maharashtra	MH	Research and Development	100

385	56	M/s. Inspira Infra (Aurangabad) Limited (Ajanta Pharma Limited)	Shendre, District Aurangabad, Maharashtra	MH	Pharma	100.43
386	57	M/s. Inspira Infra (Aurangabad) Limited (Ajanta Pharma Limited)	Shendre, District Aurangabad, Maharashtra	MH	Biotechnology Non-conventional Energy including Solar Energy equipment	10
387	58	Uttam Galva Steels Limited (UGSL)	Khopoli, Taluka Khalapur, District Raigad, Maharashtra	MH	Biotechnology	10.66
388	59	Uttam Galva Steels Limited (UGSL)	Khopoli, Taluka Khalapur, District Raigad, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	11.63
389	60	Navi Mumbai SEZ Private Limited (Kalamboli - Bio-Technology Division)	Kalamboli - Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	Bio Technology	63.74
390	61	Navi Mumbai SEZ Private Limited (Kalamboli - Light Engineering Division)	Kalamboli - Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	Light Engineering	179
391	62	Navi Mumbai SEZ Private Limited (Kalamboli - Pharmaceutical Division)	Kalamboli - Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	Pharmaceuticals	103.25
392	63	Reliance Infocom Infrastructure Private Limited	Dhirubhai Ambani Knowledge City, Koper Khairne, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	18.26
393	64	RNA Builders	Village Ghodbunder, Mira Road, Taluka and District Thane, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	13.5
394	65	Suyog Realtors Private Limited	Plot No. PL-23, IT Park, Butibori, District Nagpur, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	17.4
395	66	Ferrani Hotels Private Limited/Ozone Developers	Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	27.73
396	67	Base Realty Private Limited	Village Hinjawadi, Taluka Mulshi, Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10
397	68	Navi Mumbai SEZ Pvt. Ltd. (NMSEZ)	Dronagiri, Maharashtra	MH	Multi product	1250
398	69	GERA Developments Private Limited	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10.44
399	70	Sunny Vista Realtors Private Ltd	Village Bhokarpada, Panvel, District Raigarh, Maharashtra	MH	Services	135.12

400	71	Pride Infrastructure & SEZ Private Limited	Taluka Haveli, Zilla Pune, Maharashtra	MH	Electronics Hardware and Software including ITES	12.34
401	72	RNA Builders	Village Tivri and Rajawali, Taluka Vasai, District Thane, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	40.85
402	73	Navi Mumbai SEZ Private Limited	Ulwe, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES SEZ -A	21.13
403	74	Navi Mumbai SEZ Private Limited	Ulwe, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES SEZ - B	38.28
404	75	Navi Mumbai SEZ Private Limited	Ulwe, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES SEZ -C	13.53
405	76	Saloni Business Park Private Limited	Village Kharivli Taluka Wada, District Thane, Maharashtra	MH	Biotechnology Park	27.24
406	77	Modern India Property Developers Limited	Village Khalapur, Taluka Khopoli District Raigad, Maharashtra	MH	Electronic Hardware Software Incl. IT/ITES	14.77
		Juventus Builders and Developers Private Limited	Village Savroli and Dhamni, Taluka Khalapur, District Raigarh, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10.12
407	78	Fama Estate Private Limited	Village Shivkar and Chikale, Taluka Panvel, District Raigarh, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10.12
408	79	Rajiv Gandhi IT Park Co-operative Society Ltd. Aurangabad	Survey No. 27, Girner, Paithan Road, Tal Aurangabad, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10.21
		Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd.	Plot No. B-25, Shendra Five Star Industrial Area, Maharashtra	MH	Biotechnology	11.89
409	80	DLF Akroti Info Parks (Pune) Ltd.	Pune Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	11.83
410	81	Rameshwar Vaibhav Development Pvt. Ltd.	Taluka Sudhagad, Raigad	MH	IT/ITES	17.227
411	82	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation	Statara, Maharashtra	MH	Engineering	200
		Indo-Global Infotech City Private Limited	Village Hinjawadi, Taluka Mulshi, Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	13.35

412	83	Benchmark Realty Private Limited	Survey No. 17-19 (Part), Mouje Punawale Village, Taluka Mulshi, District Pune, Maharashtra	MH	Electronic Hardware and Software including IT/ITES	10
413	84	Township Developers India Private Limited	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	Engineering	126.6
414	85	M/s. Cavalcade Properties Pvt. Ltd.	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10.8
415	86	Sun Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd	Nashik, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10
416	87	Khed Economic Infrastructure Limited (Bharat Forge Limited)	Khed Taluka Pune District, Maharashtra	MH	Multi product	1085.92
417	88	Essel Infraprojects Ltd. (Formerly Pan India Paryatan Ltd.)	Gorai-Manori-Uttan Region, Mumbai	MH	Multi Services	110
418	89	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation	MIDC, Phaltan, District Satara, Maharashtra	MH	Engineering	101.25
		Vibhu Developers Pvt. Ltd.	Village Ghotawade, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	28.34
419	90	JSW Jaigarh Port Limited	Kunbiwadi, Tal and District Ratnagiri, Maharashtra	MH	Port Based SEZ	226.03
		D.S. Kulkarni Developers Limited	Village Fursungi, Tq. Haveli Distt. Pune, Maharashtra	MH	Multi services	101.2
420	91	Arshiya Technologies International Limited	Village Sai, Taluka Panvel Maharashtra	MH	FTWZ	68
421	92	Wakad Realty Pvt. Ltd.	Village Wakad, Tal, Mulshi Dist. Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10
422	93	Navi Mumbai SEZ Pvt. Ltd.	Village Ulwe, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	Multi Services	128.4292
423	94	Kirti Infrastructure	Pune, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	19.57
424	95	Navi Mumbai SEZ Pvt. Ltd.	Village Ulwe, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	Gems and Jewellery	33.5403
425	96	Yashprabha Enterprises	A.P.Pathardi, Taluka-Chiplun, Dist. Ratnagiri, Maharashtra	MH	Biotechnology	10.36
		Larsen & Toubro Ltd.	Powai, Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	10
426	97	Marathon Pachin Infrastructure	Raigad, Maharashtra	MH	Multi product	400
427	98	Empire Industries Limited (EIL)	Ambarnath, Thane distt., Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	14.16

428	99	Veritas Infrastructure Development Limited	Village Shahbaez, Taluka-Alibaug, Distt. Raigad, Maharashtra	MH	Biotech	11.54
429	100	M/s. Arshiya International Ltd.	Village Bori, Taluka & Distt. Nagpur, Maharashtra	MH	FTWZ	43.26
430	101	Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT)	Navi Mumbai, Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	Port Based Multi Product	277
431	102	M/s. Gigaplex Estate Private Limited	Gigaplex, Plot No. 5, MIDC Knowledge Park, Airoli, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra	MH	IT/ITES	13.15
432	103	M/s. SEZ Bio-Tech Services Private Limited	Manjri Budruk, Taluka Haveli, District Pune, Maharashtra	MH	Biotechnology	11.50675

Nagaland

433	1	M/s H.N. Company	Dimapur, Nagaland	NG	Multi Product	400
434	2	Nagaland Industrial Development Corporation Limited	Dimapur, Nagaland	NG	Agro and Food Processing	50

Orissa

435	1	Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO)	Chandaka Industrial Estate, P.S. - Chandrasekharpur, Tehsil - Bhubaneswar, District Khurda, Orissa	OR	IT	69.96
436	2	Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO)	Village Gaudakahipur and Arisal, P.S. - Jatni, Tehsil - Jatni, District Khurda, Orissa.	OR	IT (Knowledge Park)	101.8
437	3	Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO)	Bhubasnewar, P.S.- Chandrasekharpur, District-Khurda, Orissa	OR	IT/ITES	26.7
438	4	Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO)	Village Manoharpur (Kalinganagar Industrial Complex), P.S. - Duburi, Tehsil - Sukinda, District Jajpur, Orissa.	OR	Metallurgical based engineering, ancillary and downstream industries.	101.15
		Jindal Stainless Limited	Kalinga Nagar, Orissa	OR	Stainless Steel and Ancillary/Down Stream Industry	446

439	5	Vedanta Alumina Ltd	Distt Jharsuguda, Orissa	OR	Manufacture & Export of Aluminium	242.81
440	6	Gopalpur Special Economic Zone Limited	Gopalpur, District- Ganjam, Orissa	OR	Multi Product	1173
441	7	Hindalco Industries Limited	Sambalpur, Orissa	OR	Aluminium and aluminium products	115.94
442	8	Saraf Agencies Pvt. Ltd.	Chhatrapur, District Ganjam, Orissa	OR	Mineral Based Industries	105.19
443	9	Lanco Solar Pvt. Ltd.	Ramdaspur, Cuttack Distt., Orissa	OR	Solar	101
444	10	M/s. Suryo Infra Projects Private Limited	Mouza - Tulasideipur, Chandaka, Bhubaneswar, Orissa	OR	IT/ITES	10.526

Pondicherry

445	1	Pondicherry Special Economic Zone Company Ltd	Sedarpet, Karasur, Pondicherry	PON	Multi Product	346
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Punjab

446	1	M/s. Quarkcity India Pvt. Ltd.	Mohali, Punjab	PB	IT	20
447	2	Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.	Mohali, Punjab	PB	Pharmaceuticals	32
448	3	Lark Projects Private Limited	Village Landra, Mohali, Punjab	PB	Electronic hardware and software including ITES	10.89
449	4	Sukhmani Towers Private Limited	Nenetpur and Jawaharpur, Punjab	PB	IT/ITES	10.6
450	5	Sukhm Infrastructure Pvt Ltd.	Mohali (SAS Nagar) District, Punjab	PB	IT	10.58
451	6	ATS Estates (P) Ltd.	Dera Bassi District Patiala, Punjab	PB	IT/ITES	12
452	7	Shipra Estate Limited	Dera Bassi District S.A.S. Nagar, Mohali, Punjab	PB	IT/ITES	17.03
453	8	M/s Ishan Developers & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.	Village Khasa, G. T. Road, Amritsar	PB	Textile Park	102.032

Rajasthan

454	1	Mahindra Worldcity (Jaipur) Limited	Jaipur	RJ	IT/ITES	49
455	2	M/s. Vatika Jaipur SEZ Developers Ltd.	Jaipur	RJ	IT/ITES	20.23

456	3	Somani Worsted Limited	Khushkera Industrial Area, Bhiwadi, Rajasthan	RJ	Electronics Hardware and Software/ ITES	20
457	4	Mansarovar Industrial Development Corporation	Jodhpur, Rajasthan	RJ	Handicraft	131
458	5	GENPACT INDIA	Jaipur, Rajasthan	RJ	IT/ ITES	10
459	6	RNB Infrastrucure Pvt. Ltd.	Bikaner, Rajasthan	RJ	Textile sector (in- principle approval was granted for woolen sector)	103.41
460	7	Mahindra Worldcity (Jaipur) Limited	Jaipur, Rajasthan	RJ	Handicrafts	103.11
461	8	Mahindra Worldcity (Jaipur) Limited	Jaipur, Rajasthan	RJ	Engineering Including automotive/auto motive components	104.35
462	9	Mahindra World City (Jaipur) Limited	Village Kalwara, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur, Rajasthan	RJ	Gems and Jewellery	10.136
463	10	M/s. Mahindra World City (Jaipur) Limited,	Village Kalwara, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur, Rajasthan	RJ	IT/ITES	33.2545

Tamil Nadu

464	1	M/s. Flextronics Technology (India) Pvt. Ltd.	Sriperumbudur, Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	Electronics Hardware and related services	101
465	2	M/s. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd.	Siruseri, Chennai	TN	IT/ITES	70.5
466	3	M/s. ETL Infrastructure Services Ltd.	Pallikarnai, Chennai	TN	IT/ITES	10.5
467	4	M/s. Hexaware Technologies Ltd.	Siruseri, Chennai.	TN	IT/ITES	11
468	5	M/s. Syntel International Pvt. Ltd.	Siruseri, Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	16
469	6	DLF Info City Developers (Chennai) Ltd.	Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	15
470	7	M/s. Xansa India Ltd.	Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	10
471	8	Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu Ltd.	Sholinganallur village, Tambaram Taluk, Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	159.04

472	9	Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu Ltd.	Vilankurichi, Coimbatore North Taluk, Coimbatore District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	11.76
473	10	Mahindra World City Developers Limited.	Mahindra World City, Taluk Chengalpattu, Kancheepuram District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT , Hardware and bio-informatics	262.13.8
474	11	ETL Infrastructure Services Ltd.	Uthukuli Village, Erode Distt., Tamil Nadu	TN	Textiles	101.62
475	12	Shriram Properties and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd	Sriperumbudur near Chennai	TN	IT/ITES	10
476	13	State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu (SIPCOT)-[earlier approval to Consortium of Shoe Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd.]	Chennai	TN	Footwear	60
477	14	State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamilnadu Limited	SIPCOT Industrial Area Sriperumbudure, Tamil Nadu	TN	Electronics / Telecom hardware and support services, including trading and logistics activities	190.42
478	15	Coimbatore Hi-tech Infrastructure Pvt Ltd.	Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	60.73
479	16	M/s. Cognizant Technology Solutions India Pvt Ltd.	Siruseri, Chennai	TN	IT/ ITES	11
		Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd (NSL Ltd)	Sholinganallur, Tambaram-Taluk, Kanchipuram District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	17.32
480	17	Arun Excello Infra Pvt. Ltd.	Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu	TN	Electronic Hardware & software including ITES	10.93
481	18	Span Ventures Pvt. Ltd.	Eachanari, Coimbatore	TN	IT/ITES	10.441
482	19	Anush Infrastructure	Paiyanur, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	40.56
483	20	Hacciendaa Infotech & Realtors Pvt. Ltd.	No. 51, Sholinganallur Village, Old Mahabalipuram Highway, Tambaram Taluk, Kancheepuram District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	26.62
484	21	Bannari Techno Park Limited	Kalapatty Village, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	26.94

485	22	Lotus Footwear Enterprises Ltd. (Cheyyar SEZ Developers Pvt. Ltd.)	SIPCOT Cheyyar Industrial Park in Mathur, Mangal Villages, Thiruvannamalai District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Footwear	111.34
486	23	Suzlon Infrasstructure Limited	Coimbtore Tamilnadu	TN	High tech. Engg.	107.28
487	24	Platinum Holdings Private Limited	Navallur, Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	Hardware and Software	10.57
488	25	AMRL International Tech City Ltd. (Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited (TIDCO))	Nanguneri Taluk, Tirunelvel, Tamil Nadu	TN	Multi Product	1020
489	26	New Chennai Township Private Limited	Seekinakuppam Village, Cheyyur Taluk, Kancheepuram District, Tamil Nadu.	TN	Engineering Sector including Auto Ancillaries.	126.26
490	27	New Chennai Township Private Limited	Seekinakuppam Village, Cheyyur Taluk, Kancheepuram District, Tamil Nadu.	TN	Multi services	121.41
491	28	J. Matadee Free Trade Zone Private Limited (formaly - J.Matadee Eco Parks Pvt. Ltd)	Mannur Village, Sriperembdur Taluk, Kancheepuram Distt., Tamil Nadu	TN	FTWZ	40
492	29	Velankanni Information System Pvt. Ltd	Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	61
493	30	TIDCO	Ennore, Tiruvallur, Tamil Nadu	TN	Multi Product	1172.44
494	31	SNP Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.	Zamin Pallvaram Village, Chinglepet Taluk, Kanchipuram District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	10.19
495	32	Tamil Nadu Industrial Development corporation (Tril Infopar	Taramani, Chennai, TamilNadu	TN	IT/ITES	10.11
496	33	Tamil nadu Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd.	Taramani, Chennai, TamilNadu	TN	IT&ITES	10.68
497	34	State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu	SIPCOT industrial growth cener, oragadam, kancheepurum district, Tamil Nadu	TN	Electronic hardware	140.69
498	35	ETA Technopark Pvt. Ltd.	Old Mahabalipuram Road, Chennai	TN	IT/ITES	10.37

499	36	Chennai Business Park Private Limited	Kanchipuram District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES/BPO and Electronics Industries	11.78
500	37	Rudradev Township Private Limited	Solankurini Village Madurai Taluk, Madurai District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	30.82
501	38	Foxconn India Developers (P) Ltd.	Papankuzhi and Chittur, Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu	TN	Electronic Hardware	11
502	39	Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu (ELCOT)	Perumbakkam and Sholinganallur Village, Tambaram Taluk, Kancheepuram District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	80.81.5
503	40	Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu (ELCOT)	Gangaikondan Village, Tirunelveli Taluk, Tirunelveli District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	40.48
504	41	Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu (ELCOT)	Navalpattu Village, Tiruchirapalli Taluk, Tiruchirapalli District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	49.89
505	42	Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu (ELCOT)	Hosur Taluk, Krlishnagiri District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	70.08.5
506	43	Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu (ELCOT)	Jagir ammapalayam Village, Salem Taluk, Salem District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	66.50.5
507	44	Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu (ELCOT)	Ilandhaikulam Village, Madurai North Taluk, Madurai District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	11.70.5
		Estra IT Park Private Limited-	Mount Poonamalee High Road, Iyyapanthangal, Porur, Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	10.189
508	45	CCCL Infrastructure	Tuticorin, Tamil Nadu	TN	Food Processing	121.5
509	46	Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu (ELCOT)	Vadapalanji Village, Madurai South Taluk, Madurai District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	86.46.5
510	47	Ranipet Footwear and Leather Products Special Economic Zone (Earlier State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu Limited (SIPCOT)	SIPCOT Industrial Complex Ranipet Phase - III, Tamil Nadu	TN	Leather	106

		Unitech Infopark Ltd.	Villag Nallambakkam, Taluk Chengalput, Kancheepuram, Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	10
511	48	True Developers Private Limited	Arasur Village, Palladam Taluk, Coimbatore District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Electronic Hardware including IT/ITES	11.58.5
512	49	Perundurair Engineering SEZ by SIPCOT	Perundurair, Erode District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Engineering	106.55.5
513	50	Jafza Chennai Business Parks Private Limited	Vallur Village, Ponneri Taluka, Tirvallur District, Tamil Nadu	TN	FTWZ	136.38
514	51	Rakindo Kova Township Pvt. Ltd.	Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	10.12
515	52	SAIL Salem SEZ Private Limited	Salem, Tamil Nadu	TN	Steel	112.34
516	53	Best and Crompton Engineering Limited	Chengadu Village, Sriperumbudur Taluk, Kancheepuram District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Electronic hardware	10.774
517	54	State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu Limited (SIPCOT)	Tirunelveli Taluk Tamil Nadu	TN	Transport Eng.Goods for manufactring of all types of tyres	103.23.8
518	55	State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu (SIPCOT)	Thiruvannamalai District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Auto mobile/automobile parts/auto ancillary and support services including trading and logistic activities	103.24
519	56	DSRK Holding (Chennai) Private Limited	New No. 51, (Old No. 138), Sholinganallur Village, Tambaram Taluk, Kanchipuram District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	16.187
520	57	Frontier Lifeline Pvt. Ltd.	Edur/ Elavur Village, Gummudipundi Taluk, Thiruvallur District, Chennai, Tamil Nadu	TN	Biotechnology sector	17.18

521	58	Jay Gee Hitech Infraventures Private Limited	Venkadu Village, Sriperumbudur Taluk, Kancheepuram District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	11.89
522	59	Nagarjuna Oil Corporation Limited	Kayalpattu Village Cuddalore District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Petrochemical/ Petroleum	104.0079
523	60	NEPC India Limited	Vadambancheri Village, Palladam Taluk, Coimbatore District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Non-conventional Energy(Solar)	24.88
524	61	Emaar MGF Land Limited	Pattanam Village, Palladam Taluk, Comibatore District	TN	IT/ITES	17.75
525	62	GVK Perambalur SEZ Private Ltd.	Perambalur district, Tamil Nadu	TN	Multi product	1053.856
526	63	Hall Marc Techno Park Private Limited	Saravanapatty village, Coimbatore District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES including Electronic Hardware	11.5904
527	64	M/s. KPR Developers	Arasur village, Coimbatore District, Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES and Electronic Hardware	20.5
528	65	L&T Shipbuilding Limited	Kattupalli village, near Ennor, Tiruvallur District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Heavy Enginnering	317.9497
		Larsen & Toubro Limited	Combatore Distt., Tamil Nadu	TN	IT/ITES	11.0388
529	66	State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu Limited (SIPCOT)	Bargur, Uthangarai and Pochampalli Taluk, Krishnagiri District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Granite processing industries and other allied machinery/ manufacturing	153.83
530	67	M/s. Sterlite Industries (India) Limited	TV Puram, Tuticorin, Tamil Nadu	TN	Copper	128
531	68	M/s. PRP Granites Exports	Kalkurichi, Chandran Kulam and Mallankinari Villages, Kariyapati Taluk, Virudhnagar District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Granite	104.373
532	69	M/s. V.V. Mineral	Thiruvambalapuram village, Radhapuram Taluk, Tirunelveli District, Tamil Nadu	TN	Mineral and Mineral based Products	166.66

Uttarakhand

533	1	State Industrial Development Corporation of Uttaranchal Ltd	Sitarganj, Udham Singh Nagar, Uttaranchal	UR	Multi Product	440
		State Industrial Development Corporation of Uttaranchal Ltd (SIDCUL)	Dehradun, Uttaranchal	UP	IT/ITES	14.2
534	2	Parsvnath Developers Limited	Sahastra Dhara Road, Dehradun, Uttaranchal	UR	IT/ITES	14

Uttar Pradesh

535	1	Wipro Ltd.	Greater Noida	UP	IT/ITES	20
536	2	M/s. Moser Bear India Ltd.	Greater Noida	UP	Non-Conventional Energy including Solar Energy equipment	11.9
537	3	M/s. Ansal IT City and Parks Ltd.	Greater Noida	UP	IT/ITES	30.41
538	4	M/s. Seaview Developers Ltd.	Noida	UP	IT/ITES	12.15
539	5	HCL Technologies	Noida, UP	UP	IT/ITES	16.91
540	6	NIIT Technologies Limited SEZ	Plot No.TZ-02, Sector-Tech Zone, ITES Park, Greater Noida, UP	UP	IT/ITES	10.12
541	7	OSE Infrastructure Limited	Plot No. 001, Block C, Sector 67, Noida, Uttar Pradesh	UP	IT	10.12
542	8	Pavitratham Constructions Private Limited	Noida, U.P.	UP	IT/ITES	22.22
543	9	Unitech Infra-con Limited	Greater Noida, U.P.	UP	IT/ITES	30.25
544	10	Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC)	Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh	UP	Textile	103.72
545	11	Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC)	Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh	UP	Leather	103.85
546	12	Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC)	Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh	UP	Engineering goods	102.75
547	13	Perfect IT SEZ Private Limited	Plot No.6, Sector 144, Noida Uttar Pradesh	UP	IT/ITES	10

548	14	Uppals IT Projects Pvt. Limited	Greater Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh	UP	Electronic hardware and software including IT/ITES	30.83
549	15	Aachvis Softech Pvt. Ltd. (Formerly Falcon Commercial Developers Limited)	Plot No. 7, Sector 144, Noida, Uttar Pradesh	UP	IT/ITES	10
550	16	Unitech Hi-tech Projects Private Limited	Plot No. 1, Sector 144, Noida, Uttar Pradesh	UP	IT/ITES	10.08
		Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.(UPSIDC)	Tronica City, Ghaziabad, UP	UP	IT/ITES	10.975
551	17	Uppal Housing Limited	Knowledge Park V, Greater Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar, UP	UP	Electronic Hardware and Software including IT/ITES	10.52
552	18	Hari Fertilizers Limited (Jhunjhunwala Vanaspati Ltd.)	Sahupuri, Distt. Chandauli, UP	UP	Multi services SEZ with FTWZ and 25 MW Captive Power Plant	103.63
553	19	Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC)	Bhadohi, District Sant Ravidas Nagar, Uttar Pradesh	UP	Carpet and Handicrafts	103.96
554	20	Sarv-Mangal Realtech Pvt. Ltd.	Plot No. 001, Sector 140-A, Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar, UP	UP	Electronic Hardware and Software including IT/ITES	10
555	21	Gallant Infrastructure Private Limited	Plot No. 202, Sector KP-V, Greater Noida, UP	UP	IT/ITES	33
556	22	Jubilant Infracon Private Limited	Plot No. 3, Sector 140A, Noida, UP	UP	IT/ITES	10.17
557	23	Max-Digi Infotech Private Limited	Noida, Uttar Pradesh	UP	IT/ITES	10.08
558	24	IVR Prime IT SEZ private Limited	Noida, Uttar Pradesh	UP	IT/ITES	10
559	25	DLF Commercial Developers Limited	Noida, Uttar Pradesh	UP	IT/ITES	10.0256
560	26	Diamond IT Infracon Pvt. Limited	Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh	UP	IT	10

561	27	CBS International Projects Private Limited	Noida, Uttar Pradesh	UP	IT/ITES	10
562	28	Golden Tower Infratech Pvt. Ltd.	Noida, UP	UP	IT/ITES	10
563	29	Diamond Software Developers Pvt. Ltd.,	Plot No. 11, Sector -144, Noida	UP	IT/ITES	10
564	30	R.C. Infosystems Pvt. Ltd.	Plot No. TZ-09, Technical Zone, Greater Noida	UP	IT/ITES	10
565	31	Wellgrow Infotech Private Limited	Noida, UP	UP	IT/ITES	10.457
566	32	Arshiya Northern FTWZ Limited	Village Ibrahimpur, Junaidpur Urf, Moujpur, Bulandshar	UP	FTWZ	54.66 App 40.076
567	33	Anand Infoedge Pvt. Ltd.	Plot No. 1, Sector 143, Greater Noida Express Way, Uttar Pradesh	UP	IT/ITES	10
568	34	M/s. Artha Infratech Private Limited	Plot No. 21, Sector Techzone-IV, Greater Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh	UP	Electronic Hardware & Software including IT/ITES	10

West Bengal

569	1	M/s. M.L. Dalmiya and Company Ltd.	Kolkata, West Bengal	WB	IT/ITES	48
570	2	M/s M.L Dalmiya & Co. Ltd	Kolkata (West Bengal)	WB	Leather Products	44
571	3	DLF Info City Developers (Kolkata) Ltd.	Plot No. II/1, Block-II F, Action Area - II, New Kolkata Township, Rajarhat, Kolkata, West Bengal	WB	IT/ITES	10.12
		Oval Developers Private Ltd	Mouza Banagram, District 24 Pargana (South), West Bengal	WB	Electronic Hardware and Software	12.14
572	4	Riverbank Holdings Pvt Ltd (Bata India)	Riverbank Holdings Pvt Ltd (Bata India)	WB	IT Sector	10
573	5	Enfield Exports Limited	Panagarh Bazar, District Burdwan, West Bengal	WB	IT/ ITES	26
574	6	Shapoorji Pallonji andCo. Ltd	A-III, New Town, Rajarhat, Kolkata, West Bengal	WB	IT/ ITES	20
575	7	Enfield Infrastructure Limited	Chandpur Champagachi, near Rajarhat (24 pgn. North), West Bengal	WB	IT/ITES	20
576	8	Unitech Hi-tech Structures Limited,	Rajarhat Dist. North 24 Parganas, Kolkata, West Bengal	WB	IT/ITES	19.58

		Shantiniketan Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.	Bolpur, Shantiniketan, W.B.	WB	IT	80.334
577	9	Enfield Infrastructure Ltd	Uttar Gazipur, South 24 Parganas (earlier Kalyani) West Bengal	WB	IT/ ITES	16
578	10	Abex Infocom (P) Ltd.	Dist: 24-Parganas South.	WB	IT	40
579	11	Salarpuria Properties Private Limited	District, West Bengal	WB	IT/ITES	10.27
580	12	Bengal Shristi Infrastructure Development Limited	Asansol, West Bengal	WB	IT	10.207
581	13	Tata Consultancy Services Limited	IT Plot IIF/3, Action Area II, New Town Kolkata, West Bengal	WB	IT/ITES	16.19
582	14	Capstone Developer Private Limited	Mouza: Karaidanga, Bhatipouta, Kharamba, (24 Parganas South West Bengal)	WB	IT/ITES	10.43
583	15	Bengal Shriram Hi-tech City Pvt Ltd.	Utarpara, Kolkata	WB	IT/ITES cum auto ancillary software development	24.2
584	16	Orion IT Parks Pvt. Ltd.	Rajarhat, Kolkata, West Bengal	WB	IT/ITES	28.33
585	17	Haldia Free Trade Warehousing Private Limited	Haldia, West Bengal	WB	FTWZ	45.72
		Videocon Realty and Infrastructures Limited	Jalpaiguri, West Bengal	WB	IT/ITES including Electronic Hardware	10
586	18	Bengal Shapoorji Infrastructure Development Pvt. Ltd.	West Bengal	WB	IT	10
587	19	Enfiled Energy Ltd.	Burdwan District, West Bengal	WB	Non-Conventional Energy including Solar Energy equipment	10.12
		JSW Bengal Steel Limited	Godapiasal, Alboni, West Medinipur in the State of West Bengal	WB	Steel	1804
		Shyam Steel Industries Ltd.	Barasat, West Bengal	WB	IT/EH & SW incl ITES	11.35

588	20	Enfield Realtors Limited	Kanksa, Panagarh, Dist Burdwan, West Bengal	WB	Non- Conventional Energy including Solar Energy equipment	10
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