

Saurabh Kumar

SO THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE WORLD CAN COME TO BE: PUTTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC USE




NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES

Bangalore, India

SO THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE WORLD CAN COME TO BE:
PUTTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC USE

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
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Published by

National Institute of Advanced Studies
Indian Institute of Science Campus
Bangalore - 560 012
Tel: 2218 5000, Fax: 2218 5028
E-mail: admin@nias.iisc.ernet.in

NIAS Working Paper

Cover photo:

The UN Security Council chamber at the UN headquarters in New York, USA -- vacant but also empty, devoid of any attempt to address the foremost challenge to its mandate for maintenance of international peace and security -- the nuclear weapons conundrum, kept alive by the deterrence trope -- in all its sixty five years.

Price Rs. 250/-

Typeset & Printed by

Aditi Enterprises
aditiprints@gmail.com

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PREFACE

This submission is an edited version of the inputs contributed to the Informal Group on the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (RGAP) for a Nuclear Weapon Free and Non-Violent World set up in December last under the Chairmanship of Hon'ble Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar, M.P. It grew out of the work on nuclear weapons and national security undertaken during September-December last year, as the T.V. Raman Pai Chair that I was privileged to occupy during that period at the gracious invitation of Prof. V.S. Ramamurthy, Director of the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.

Grateful thanks are due therefore to him and other faculty colleagues in the NIAS fraternity for their receptivity to a rank outsider and for generously sharing their time and expertise that served to stimulate the quest for alternatives, as well as to fellow members of the RGAP Group for dialogic discussions on ways of advancing the vision of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of a world without nuclear weapons. Prof. Ramamurthy's warm welcome of new ideas, and liberal mandate for the Chair, was most conducive for the somewhat free-wheeling explorations suited for policy oriented research.

Also to Ms. Shruthi Shivabasavaiah, Research Associate in NIAS since May, for her valuable research assistance, as well as other NIAS researchers for their interest and help from time to time, which together significantly alleviated the 'Input-Output ratio' of the labours !

And to the excellent team of administrative and library staff led by Shri Srinivas Aithal and Ms. Hamsa Kalyani for their unfailing courtesy and all round support at all stages.

Any errors of judgement -- and judgements abound aplenty in the paper, as might be expected in a policy study -- or of a factual nature or others are, needless to say, my own. Every effort has been made to check the veracity, and

completeness, of the facts on which the judgements are based but, that notwithstanding, a note of caution may be in order because this exercise had, of necessity, to be almost entirely a library and I-net enabled one based on experience.

A word about the question of 'practicality' and 'realism' that any talk of disarmament invariably evokes, almost on a knee-jerk basis. An opinion in this regard has, it is submitted, to be formulated with reference to alternatives available for attaining the same, or a demonstrably better, end state. (The aim of all politico-military strategy is, or should be -- borrowing from US strategic theorist, Colin Gray -- to enable enjoyment of a 'better peace', in the sense of leaving the nation better off, in terms of peace, than in its absence. That conceptualization can provide a sound, common sensical, litmus test for defining "better end state".) It surely cannot be based solely on the difficulties (whether real or imagined) that are bound to bedevil any attempt at thinking through, and beyond, the maze of paths well trodden by. A dichotomy between the 'practical' and the 'ideal' is at times a false one, reflecting an unwitting pre-disposition in favour of the status quo. In this context, the resounding silence in the strategic studies literature in the country of what should/could/might or must be done by India in order to spare itself the unmanageable risks of a nuclear conflict or incident (which may occur not of its own volition, or even as a result of Murphy's Law taking its toll, but of factors fractionating from the volatile situation in its neighborhood) -- with its notorious, unpredictable and uncontrollable, consequences on a scale, and of a magnitude, unprecedented hitherto -- speaks volumes. That (risk quandary) is, in fact, not addressed adequately most of the time, if at all; leaving the nation condemned, unsaid, to live with it -- or, as might well turn out to be the case (exceptional luck apart), perish because of it.

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“Born in a land, I wake in a globe.” (Micheal O’Siadhail)

ABSTRACT

Existing initiatives and proposals for nuclear disarmament, both inter-Governmental and unofficial ones, are appraised vis-a-vis the Indian approach, with a view to identifying possibilities of synergy for exploration of new pathways to a Nuclear Weapon Free World (NFWF).

Their contents are examined w.r.t the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (and the subsequent Working Paper submitted by India in 2006 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the designated UN body for negotiations on disarmament issues) and other policy statements from time to time, as the only state with nuclear weapons that is unreservedly committed to a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Convention (as well as to agreed and irreversible steps to prepare the ground for commencing negotiations on it).

A hard look at the plethora of proposals in recent years shows that, some (largely superficial) commonalities and convergences aside, only a few of them can withstand critical scrutiny in terms of their underlying conceptualization (much less match the holistic vision, clarity and comprehensiveness of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan and the rigor of the Indian approach in general). These are identified.

It is argued that the NPT, whose avowed aim is to curb proliferation of (all) nuclear weapons of all countries (over levels prevalent at the time of its negotiation in the mid-sixties, and not just curbing proliferation of countries possessing nuclear weapons beyond the '1967 five', as is commonly but mistakenly taken to be the case) -- and which enjoins its

members to exert themselves, inter alia, in favour of nuclear disarmament (with a five yearly review process to introspect on the impact of their collective commitment and cogitations) -- must also to be considered along with these proposals in any such reckoning because it (the NPT) exerts significant influence on the nuclear disarmament discourse.

The role played by the NPT review process is analysed accordingly, taking into account also the goings on in the IAEA, where the NPT obligation to foreswear nuclear weapons is given operational effect. Taking stock of the situation as it stands after the 2010 Review Conference, the successful leveraging of the basic bargain of the NPT by the non-aligned movement (NAM) to its advantage on this occasion is assessed positively, with an optimistic prognosis for the 2015 Review Conference.

Two other favourable factors -- widespread recognition of the growing disutility of, and (hence) urgency of reaching closure on, nuclear weapons now (due, mainly, to the spectre of nuclear terrorism sparing none), no matter what the perceived 'strategic stability' benefits, or felt security needs, of a few individual states possessing them, and the world-wide anxiety to bring the 'CTBT', as yet effete, to a successful denouement at the earliest -- are noted in passing.

Taken together, these developments are indicative, it is assessed, of the significant change in the political climate of mainstream activity on these international security issues ('non-proliferation' and disarmament) over the last few years. They have put the nuclear weapon wallahs in the security establishments of the possessing states on the defensive as never before, and this has opened a window of opportunity for renewed disarmament activism. (A window that stands substantially enlarged as a result of the dramatic decline in the economic fortunes of the USA and Europe, and the concomitant up-and-coming changes in the global geo-economic, and geo-political, landscape.)

A bold Indian initiative leveraged on this welcome turn might therefore be timely and opportune. There is a good chance of the NFWF aspiration being clinched at the next NPT Review Conference in 2015, if India were to decide to work with NAM to (persuade it to) make a determined assault on the nuclear weapons fib in these next years in preparation for that occasion.

The suggested approach of India taking it upon itself to do some heavy lifting for this purpose -- by turning its national nuclear prowess into a 'global public good', by placing its nuclear arsenal on the negotiating table (for being traded off for agreement on elimination and outlawing of these weapons of mass destruction globally, a la the Biological & Chemical Weapons Conventions) -- is not all that novel, or radical (or unrealistic), as it might appear to be at first. It would simply be a return to the 'first principles' of India's 'game-changing' strategic calculus in foreign affairs in the post-independence era (that would, of course, call for mustering of political will, and demonstration of deft diplomacy, commensurate with the magnitude of the task and prospective gains at hand if it is to see the light of day).

The recommendation is premised on the reading that what is required at the present historical juncture is not re-invention of the nuclear disarmament wheel (or its improvement or polishing to perfection), of which there is a surfeit of sorts, so much as brainstorming on effective ways of imparting it momentum, which is what remains woefully wanting despite a long list of illustrious individuals having thrown their weight behind it from time to time.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper is an offering in response to the question "what can be done to actualise the vision of the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan" (for a world without nuclear weapons) that challenged the 'Informal Group on the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for a Nuclear Weapon Free and Non-Violent World' as it began its deliberations. The possibility of finding, or forging, synergies with the ideas and endeavours of others active in the field of nuclear disarmament presented itself naturally as an obvious first choice for exploration, along with other currents in the mainstream of activity in the international security arena such as the NPT (Treaty on Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and its review process.

2. These are therefore taken up for examination in this paper. Section II takes

a hard look at the various Governmental and non-Governmental initiatives, and concludes that while some do reflect congruence in greater or lesser degree, there are difficulties with the underlying conceptualisation of many. And that, in any case, more important than the 'what' (is to be the content of the nuclear disarmament process) question, at the present historical juncture, is the 'how' (to get the nuclear disarmament process going) question. The remaining Sections (III- VIII) accordingly focus on the NPT review process in recent years because of its weighty potential for effective action in this regard. They make a positive prognosis for the next (2015) NPT Review Conference, and also a (somewhat unorthodox) suggestion for India to seek to influence its outcome (from the outside) by putting its nuclear prowess to politico-diplomatic use. The concluding section (Section IX) attempts

an outline of a possible strategy to that end -- for catalyzing NAM's efforts for nuclear disarmament within the NPT's review process, with a view to clinching the NFWF ideal now on that occasion.

II. EXISTING INITIATIVES - A SURVEY

3. A very large number of proposals and initiatives for nuclear disarmament have been put forward, internationally, in recent times (please see Annexure I for a listing):

- ◆ Official, i.e. those put forward at the inter-Governmental level, including Resolutions tabled by countries in the UN GA (which serve the same purpose essentially as proposals);
- ◆ Quasi-official, i.e. those sponsored by individual Governments but representing the views of independent experts and scholars etc. commissioned by them, or those advanced by former political office holders *au fait* with thinking in official circles in their countries and
- ◆ Unofficial, i.e. those emanating from non-Governmental bodies (advocacy groups and think tanks).

4. Taken together, they form a veritable treasure trove of good ideas on nuclear

disarmament related issues that can serve as valuable source material for working out an effective, global, plan of action for nuclear disarmament, whenever the international community is able to reach agreement on the task of undertaking such an exercise (as distinct from mere enunciation of goals) in earnest.

[At the same time, there is a complexity about them that deserves note at the outset. Many of them have been put forward by leading public figures or former military/civil officials/political leaders with first hand experience of nuclear weapons. As such, they carry a lot of weight, independent of their contents (which, it has to be said, are of uneven quality -- particularly in terms of the consistency, and clarity, with which they call for nuclear weapons to be done away with, and carry that call to its logical conclusion, viz. complete elimination and outlawing leading to abolition of these WMDs, as has been achieved in case of biological and chemical weapons, without fear or favour).

The most well known of them all, e.g., is the 'Hoover Plan' put forward by the "Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse" from the US - Kissinger, Schultz, Nunn and Perry. In a series of (annual almost) articles in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011 that began by making the case for a change in (US)

thinking on nuclear weapons, if proliferation of nuclear weapons and military related technologies were to be checked effectively, they argued in favour of nuclear disarmament (and even of doing away with these WMDs altogether). However, they ended up back-tracking from that forthright position on the disarmament-non-proliferation link (and pleading, essentially, for retention of some nuclear weapons as a hedge against uncertainty, be it in a clever manner -- i.e. trying hard not to be seen by their discerning audiences to be regressing on their earlier endorsement of the vision of a world without nuclear weapons).

There is also the related question about the motivation underlying many of the proposals, particularly the official and quasi-official ones. The element of opportunism, and cynical calculation, in a barrage of proposals (almost all from the establishments of the 'North') professing nuclear disarmament making their appearance in the run up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference -- preventing a breakdown in which was crucial (from their point of view) for sustenance of the 'non-proliferation regime' -- could not remain hidden from most observers, at least not in India, with its long experience of grappling with the disingenuous arguments and sophistry (because of its upright stand against the NPT going back to the

negotiations in the mid-60s) that have bedeviled the discourse in the field of international security ever since.]

5. In addition, there is the NPT aimed, avowedly, at curbing (all) proliferation of nuclear weapons, which enjoins its members to exert themselves, inter alia, in favour of nuclear disarmament (and which has a five yearly review process to introspect on the impact/results achieved). It is, strictly speaking, not in the category of initiatives/proposals for nuclear disarmament but has, nevertheless, to be considered along with them (like the UN GA Resolutions) in any such reckoning as the present one because it too exerts influence on the nuclear disarmament process and discourse. And quite some influence, in fact, as discussed later.

6. This Section attempts an appraisal of the commonalities and contradictions between the approach of these initiatives and proposals and that of India, with a view to exploring possibilities of partnership in pursuit of the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. (The position in regard to the NPT is taken up separately, in detail, thereafter, as mentioned above.)

7. The chart in Annexure IIA (borrowed from a UN Office of Disarmament Affairs sponsored project - <http://cns.miis.edu/>

stories/100423_disarmament_proposals.htm) gives an overview of over 40 (post-1995) proposals, with their contents academically arranged in tabular form in respect of (specific aspects of) different dimensions such as:

(i) their rationale, as e.g.

- ◆ danger of use (of nuclear weapons)
- ◆ danger of proliferation to other state/non-state actors
- ◆ illegality of use/possession
- ◆ immorality, impracticality, military disutility

(ii) their operative provisions for disarmament (and collateral) measures, as e.g.

- ◆ total elimination of nuclear weapons
- ◆ no-first use/non-use of nuclear weapons
- ◆ negative security assurances
- ◆ prohibition of testing (CTBT etc.)
- ◆ curbs on modernization of arsenals
- ◆ verification mechanisms
- ◆ transparency - of arsenals, fissile materials
- ◆ curbs on delivery vehicles
- ◆ de-targeting

(iii) their operative provisions for non-proliferation measures, as e.g.

- ◆ universalisation of NPT
- ◆ securing against terrorist and non-state actor access
- ◆ export controls
- ◆ dealing with non-compliance issues

(iv) the legal and political framework within which action/advance is envisaged, as e.g.

- ◆ Nuclear Weapons Convention
- ◆ Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
- ◆ Strengthened role of UN (for collective security arrangements), Special Sessions of the UN GA on disarmament, strengthened IAEA (for verification), etc.

8. A reading of the proposals (or even of just the entries in the Chart) shows that there is considerable variation amongst them, in the attributes or specific aspects they espouse, downplay or avoid touching upon altogether -- deliberately or otherwise. This is not surprising because each reflects the particular circumstances of its origins (timing, broader international context at the time of release, specific concerns of the sponsors and so on) and rarely a comprehensive, text book, exercise undertaken on a clean slate, starting from scratch so to say, that might possibly have resulted in greater convergence amongst them all (professing

broadly the same objective - of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation).

9 Thus not all are categorical on the issue of (total) abolition of nuclear weapons -- clearly the most important, and crucial, aspect from the Indian point of view -- , with many paying no more than lip-service to that objective and some even remaining silent (in operative terms), stopping at 'non-proliferation' steps only. This has been taken as a touchstone for sifting the grain from the chaff, as it were -- those not categorical on the issue of doing away with nuclear weapons altogether were not taken up for detailed examination, since they are an obvious 'no go' for India (because of their perpetuating, implicitly if not explicitly, a privileged category of nuclear 'haves' in some form or another). The list in Annexure II B gives the remaining eighteen proposals/initiatives that are forthright on the issue of total abolition of nuclear weapons (in addition to the UNGA Resolutions, that reflect the overall trend of opinion in the international community, and a few others, important for other reasons -- as e.g. the stature of the individuals sponsoring them).

[Included in these eighteen is the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document but this being sui generis, is left aside for the

moment, as it is taken up for detailed examination in the succeeding Sections.]

10. These selected proposals have been analysed in the framework of the Indian standpoint (spelt out in Annexure III, on the basis of the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, the subsequent Working Paper submitted by India in 2006 at the CD and other policy statements from time to time) and tabulated in the chart in Annexure IV A (to give a comparative bird's eye view of where they stand vis-a-vis the Indian approach). Annexure IV B presents the (same) results of the analysis in a different format more suited for scrutiny of individual proposals, rather than an overview. And, finally, annotated extracts of notable aspects of each of them are given below, with a view to presenting a (more qualitative and overall) picture of their strengths and weaknesses from the point of view of the present exercise:

(i) Official level proposals:

(a) *UN Secretary General's Five Point Proposal (October 2008):*

Carefully crafted to avoid ruffling any (member state's) feathers, as appropriate for anyone in his (the UN SG's) position, the sub-text of this "five-point proposal" clearly points in the right direction (of

abolition of nuclear weapons) even though it does not mention that as a goal, explicitly:

Recommends pursuit of nuclear disarmament by the NPT parties through "agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments.. ornegotiating a nuclear weapons convention."

Also commencement of P-5 discussion "on security issues in the nuclear disarmament process" within the Military Staff Committee of the UN SC (a novel idea, as these have not been held hitherto) and convening of a Summit on nuclear disarmament by the UN SC.

Other suggestions include "freeze (on) their own nuclear weapon capabilities" and making of "their own disarmament commitments" by "non-NPT states"; "new efforts to bring the CTBT into force"; greater transparency on nuclear arsenals etc, "global tabooon the very possession of (WMD)" - nuclear weapons included herein, presumably, but not mentioned explicitly.

[French President Sarkozy's response to the UN SG on behalf of the EU (Dec. 2008):

Smugly papers over the main issue of nuclear disarmament, apart from a clever play on words, by implicitly linking it to "general disarmament" and by invoking "an overall political and strategic perspective" as the guide for action (which is essentially one of 'non-proliferation' -- the need "to move towards a safer world at (the then yet to be) May 2010 NPT Review Conference", "universal ratification of the CTBT", fissile materials treaty, "measures of confidence and transparency" etc. The only mention of "elimination" (of anything) is in the context of tactical nuclear weapons and short and intermediate range missiles, that too eventually at the end of an (unspecified, indefinite) process, not immediately.

The sole concession made to cater to the UN SG's call for nuclear disarmament is "...beyond that, mobilisation in all the other areas of disarmament" - that comes at the end of a list of what are termed as "concrete and realistic initiatives" (as e.g. those listed above).]

(b) Ten Nation Initiative Berlin Statement (2011):

Concern over proliferation is the main spur. Predicated on the NPT as the "essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament". Makes "concrete

proposals for action on key elements of the (2010 NPT Review Conference) Action Plan", in effect overwriting the delicately balanced consensus of that document.

No operative provisions for advancing towards a 'world without nuclear weapons' - that is paid only lip service, backtracking from their categorical position of 2010; in fact, the 2011 statement makes no demands of the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) whatsoever, beyond reporting of their arsenals.

(c) Seven Nation Initiative (Norway etc.) 2005:

Concern over proliferation and nuclear terrorism is the main spur again. (Issued after the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the 2005 World Summit). Seeks universalisation of the NPT and early 'entry into force' of the 'CTBT'. Weak on operationalisation of the 'world without nuclear weapons' ideal and makes no demands of the NWS whatsoever.

(d) New Agenda Coalition (1998):

Categorical on the need for total elimination of all nuclear weapons of all states, with a clear cut "road map towards

a nuclear-weapon-free world". Fortright in calling upon "the Governments of each of the nuclear weapons states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to commit themselves unequivocally" to that end and "agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement". Unexceptionable to that extent.

Makes a pointed call, however, on "the three nuclear-weapons-capable states" to "reverse the pursuit of their respective nuclear weapons"..... "in order for nuclear disarmament to proceed " (emphasis added). Also to "adhere to the NPT, and accede to the CTBT without delay or conditions".

(e) Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) -1997, revised in 2007 by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and re-circulated in the UN by Costa Rica and Malaysia:

Unexceptionable in its approach, with comprehensive prohibitions covering all aspects of nuclear weapons related activities so as to ensure their total abolition, as might be expected of a draft Convention of its kind.

However, it carries over the definition of "Nuclear Weapons States" as per the

NPT (and of countries like India, Pakistan and Israel (and DPRK) as "nuclear capable states") -- with separate provisions applicable to, or pertaining to, "Nuclear Weapons States" in respect of not only destruction obligations (which would be understandable) but also in its provisions for membership of the Executive Council set up under the Convention and Entry-into-Force. Makes a 'status' distinction, thereby, between the NPT NWS and later nuclear weapon states. Unexceptionable, but for this aspect.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons has done a detailed study of the positions of all members of the UN (both of their Governments, based on their vote in the UNGA on the relevant resolution (on follow up to the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice) and on their official statements in the CD and other important gatherings, as well as of their publics, based on some public opinion surveys in each country) on the NWC idea (<http://www.icanw.org/files/NWC-positions-December2010.pdf>), rating them on a four star scale. 54 are rated as four star, i.e. "Very supportive, 88 "Supportive", 21 "Lukewarm" and 29 as "Sceptical". China is in the 3 star category (qualified support), while all the

other four NWS are opposed to it, despite overwhelming support amongst each of their publics. (This last aspect deserves note, for the possible leads it could provide for the contemplated Indian initiative.)

(f) 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document -- 13 Practical Steps:

Oft cited (for the unequivocal undertaking by the NWS in it to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, as well as for other related, important, affirmations) but overtaken by the (strengthened) consensus of the 2010 Review Conference (examined in detail in the succeeding sections).

(g) NAM Action Plan of April 2010 (submitted to the 2010 NPT Review Conference):

Takes clear cut positions on all nuclear disarmament related issues (that have obviously been finely chalked out in the course of intense (intra-NAM) negotiations during several NAM Summits over the years). Time tested formulations therefore, beginning with the overall chapeau that: "the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Lists a whole series of specific steps to that end. Careful to put in a caveat about sequencing (and prioritisation) of individual steps, declaring them all as "inextricably inked", obviously in the full knowledge that it (sequencing of individual steps) can make all the difference from the point of view of equity. Call for early entry into force of the 'CTBT', starting with ratification by the "nuclear weapon States" (not NPT NWS, which is not a category it uses).

Calls for "an international conference at 'the earliest possible date' to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a.....specified time-frame, including ...a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (Nuclear Weapons Convention)"

Several effective collateral measures to reduce dangers in the interim until elimination/abolition takes place.

Makes no distinction between "nuclear weapons states", as e.g. NPT NWS or others.

Unexceptionable, and clearly the proposal of choice for India.

(h) UN GA Resolutions:

In addition to these, there are five UN General Assembly Resolutions on nuclear disarmament (listed in Annexure II B under Official Proposals) that are tabled, and adopted, every year by overwhelming majorities. Leaving aside the one on a Convention for prohibition of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (Res. 65/80), which is (tabled by India but not pertinent here, being) a limited purpose one - to reduce the risk of outbreak of a nuclear conflict -, the remaining four are all on nuclear disarmament.

Of these four, the one (co)sponsored by India (Res. 65/76 on "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or use of nuclear Weapons") provides for an operative paragraph calling upon all states to commence "multilateral negotiations leading to early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention". It brings in most of the other elements of the Indian approach in its pre-ambular paragraphs, apart from this reference to a NWC in one of its operative paras covering core aspects (because the NWC, by its very definition, can be expected to address all aspects in an

integrated manner - hence the importance attached to it by all serious activists). Except for China, all the other NWS vote against it, as already noted above, with a total of 133 nations in favour, 28 against and 23 abstentions.

The other three are, however, not free of lacunae and India is therefore constrained to vote against, or abstain on, them. This is primarily because of the calls for, or references to, universalisation of the NPT they include, which obviously cannot be acceptable to India. Or for early entry into force of the 'CTBT', which too is a coercive demand on India and therefore also unacceptable (as explained in paragraph 47). That is the case even with Resolution (Res 65/56) sponsored by many NAM countries, which is otherwise on the lines of the NAM Plan of Action and so largely in keeping with the Indian policy approach. India therefore abstains on it (as also Pakistan and Russia), while USA, UK and France vote against it. China votes in favour. (The Russian abstention is, in all likelihood, because the Resolution calls for a 'no-first-use' undertaking.)

Of the other two, one (Res. 65/73) titled "United Action Towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" is a disingenuous one, in which the professed

objectives (as per the title) are subsumed, in the operative provisions of the Resolution, in larger non-proliferation provisions, which is where the main thrust of the Resolution is (with the nuclear disarmament paras addressed to the NWS being weakly worded -- without any time-bound element, rendering the exhortations to them to discharge their nuclear disarmament obligations almost meaningless). It is, not surprisingly, supported by all four NWS apart from China (which abstains, possibly because one of its operative paragraphs demands transparency, as a pre-requisite for advance on nuclear disarmament -- something that the Chinese are perhaps not ready for). Despite its call for universalisation of the NPT, India does not oppose (vote against) it but abstains. (Pakistan and Israel also abstain and the DPRK is the only country to vote against it.)

The other (Res. 65/59), an Arab sponsored resolution, again calls for universalisation of the NPT (whose operative thrust is purportedly against Israel, but which goes on to name India too, along with it and Pakistan, in that context). India is therefore constrained to vote against it (joined by USA, France and the DPRK, apart from Israel). The UK abstains, while China and Russia support the Resolution.

These aspects notwithstanding, there are obviously several elements in all these resolutions that can form the basis of a concerted common approach, if the shadow-boxing on the main issue of categorical commitment by all nations to give up all their nuclear weapons in a specified time-frame (which is what queers the pitch, essentially, at present for any kind of joint action internationally) were to be sorted out. But that will obviously require a fundamental shift in the basic positions and policies of the NWS, away from reliance on nuclear weapons for their security, so it will not be soon, we can be sure.

The problem in using UN GA resolutions as a basis for assessing positions of countries and possible pathways to nuclear disarmament is that there is a large element of posturizing and playing to the gallery (and to the publics of politico-military alliances), out of political considerations, in the voting record of most countries. Their voting pattern is therefore not a reliable guide to their stance in actual disarmament negotiations, much less so of their red lines (that emerge at later stages when the chips are down, but a prior guess about which is one of the determinants of drafts, negotiating stances and opening gambits for those planning initiatives and

proposals in this tricky field). Minus that micro-aspect (regarding individual country positions), however, they are a good indicator of the overall trend of international opinion, and in that respect, the Indian position has no reason to be disappointed (barring the NPT and 'CTBT' related bumps, which are, of course, very real issues that have to be tackled with care).

(ii) Quasi-official proposals:

(a) Blix Commission (2006):

Comprehensive approach, focusing on practical measures for reducing nuclear dangers in its 60 recommendations. References to non-proliferation (NPT) and disarmament obligations are balanced; does not seek to foist the NPT on non-parties.

However, its key weakness lies in the absence of any operative provision for elimination or prohibition of nuclear weapons, beyond asking all states possessing them to "address the issue of their continued possession of such weapons", "commence planning for security without nuclear weapons" and prepare "for the outlawing of nuclear weapons", which it professes to advocate.

Also it calls on India and Pakistan by name, nevertheless, to ratify the 'CTBT' and join "those other(s)" who are implementing a moratorium on production of fissile material for weapons purposes, without demanding the same of China (except as part of the five NWS).

(b) Canberra Commission (1996):

Very good content, as in the Blix Commission, but better -- does better by not fighting shy of calling for elimination and total abolition of nuclear weapons in unambiguous terms in its operative parts. Comprehensive and unexceptionable approach that is still not dated, really, despite being of 1996 vintage.

(c) Tokyo Forum (1998):

Formed in the wake of the Indian and Pakistani tests of 1998. Addresses the basic nuclear weapons related issues well, pragmatically but without losing sight also of the complete elimination desideratum amidst its primary concern about (horizontal) 'proliferation' dangers and that of an "unraveling of the NPT regime".

Forthright (and refreshing) in its approach, reflected inter alia in its

recommendation that the NWS "reaffirm the goal of elimination and take ...concrete steps towards this end" and call upon each of them to do their bit in parallel, without waiting for each other (and India and Pakistan not to make "the phased reduction and elimination..... even harder by building up their nuclear capabilities").

Quite original in recommending that the CD "revise its procedures....and carry out purposeful work, or suspend its operations", arguing that, inter alia, the consensus rule should be given up.

Forthright in addressing the exclusion of the issue of sub-critical tests - that is rarely done - while urging all (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and others by name) to accede to the 'CTBT' in order to bring it into force. Likewise, in respect of the issue of missile defences.

Recommendations include one to "stop and reverse proliferation in South Asia", which is elaborated upon to make several demands on India and Pakistan, including urging them "to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT as non-NWS".

(d) Mayors for Peace: Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol (2008):

Though conceptually a Protocol to be attached to the NPT, yet it has an extremely good perspective predicated explicitly on the basic bargain of the NPT Article VI (going to the extent of "considering that..... the discriminatory nature of the Treaty, wherein NWS parties are exempted from the prohibition on acquisition of nuclear weapons, is incompatible with pursuit in good faith of nuclear disarmament...." and "that full equality before international law must be established by elimination of all nuclear arsenals.....").

Concise and pointed in its operative provisions for complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Unique in mentioning obligations of the NWS first (to "cease forthwith" all activities prohibited for non-NWS, along with related measures such as "safe and secure storage" of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material, incorporation of nuclear weapons into nuclear doctrines) and only then those of "other states parties to this Protocol possessing weapons usable fissile material....." to do likewise.

More forthright and categorical in its operative provisions than most other proposals - "safe and secure storage" of all nuclear weapons and fissile material no later than 2015, followed by

negotiations for elimination of all weapons and delivery, launch and command and control systems aimed at a NWC no later than 2020.

(e) Juppé, Norlain, Richard, Rocard: Pour un désarmement nucléaire global (2009):

Prompted by fear of proliferation, in the absence of nuclear disarmament, and thrust is accordingly on limited, instrumental use of the latter in the service of the former - weak in its operative provision for abolition of nuclear weapons (no time bound element).

Makes bold to ask France not to shy away from assuming commitments.

(f) Claes, Dehaene, Michel, Verhofstadt: Towards a nuclear weapon-free world (2010):

Categorical on the basic question of abolition, even though proliferation of nuclear weapons was the main spur: (Like Obama), "we also want to make a plea for a world without nuclear weapons... No fundamental argument exists why this option is not feasible within a foreseeable timeframe. This problem.... demands a new commitment of all nuclear weapon states to achieve 'global zero'"

"The nuclear weapon states must respect international agreements calling for the elimination of their arsenals, which they have not done to date despite the obligation to disarm contained in the NPT, signed by all formal nuclear weapon states."

...."Beyond this (reductions in warheads, CTBT, FMCT, No-First Use, Prohibition of use etc), there is a need to begin multilateral negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. This treaty has to prohibit nuclear weapons, just as chemical and biological weapons are prohibited, and this within a fixed time-frame."

Despite this very good perspective, it focuses rather narrowly on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in its operative provisions, possibly because of its being a newspaper article written for Belgian and European audiences.

(g) Nordli, Brundtland, Willoch et al A Nuclear Weapon-Free World (2009):

A forthright piece with a very good overall perspective, which, while lauding the "Four Horsemen's path-breaking revival of the idea of a Nuclear Weapon free World (NFWF), emphasizes that "we have to be serious both about the vision (of a NFWF) and about the (concrete)

measures (to be taken to that end).....The goal must be a world where not only the weapons, but also the facilities that produce them are eliminated....."

".....The United States and Russia, which together account for more than 90 per cent of the world's arsenals, must take the first steps. They should reduce their arsenals to a level where the other nuclear weapon states may join in negotiations of global limitations..... All types of nuclear weapons - also the tactical ones - must be included in the negotiations. We urge Russia, which has big arsenals of tactical weapons, to accept this.....Establishment of missile shields should be avoided, for they stimulate rearmament."

Written on the eve of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, it was a one-off piece of the authors for throwing their weight behind the then burgeoning initiatives. Unexceptionable in its approach but no sustained espousal or advocacy.

(iii) Unofficial proposals:

(a) Article VI Forum, 2011 (Middle Powers Initiative):

Forthright and earnest in seeking establishment of a world without nuclear

weapons - early "enactment of a universal, verifiable, irreversible and enforceable legal ban on nuclear weapons".

Advocates a "comprehensive rather than a piecemeal" approach with involvement of all, not just states possessing nuclear weapons, and implementation of the UN SG's proposal through UNGA adoption of a "resolution establishing a preparatory process for negotiation of a convention or framework of instruments for the global elimination of nuclear weapons". (Draft Resolution for consideration of the UNGA prepared.)

Stresses the legal incompatibility of nuclear weapons with (existing) international humanitarian law as an imperative for achievement of a nuclear weapon free world.

All in all, unexceptionable in content. (Not clear, however, which 'middle powers', if any, support it, as claimed by its website.)

(b) Global Zero (2009):

Forthright in calling for complete elimination, with emphasis on multilateral negotiations, recognising realistically that " the only way to

eliminate the nuclear threat (of proliferation and risks of nuclear terrorism) is to achieve the phased, verified, multilateral elimination of all nuclear weapons - global zero". Offers a "practical, end to end strategy" for that purpose in a "four phased process for.....a legally binding international agreement for eliminating all nuclear weapons".

Avoids use of the NPT term "Nuclear Weapon States", sticking to "nuclear weapon countries" or "nuclear capable countries" (suggesting treatment of all states with nuclear weapons or capability on par - including on the question of "putting the entire fuel cycle of all countries under international safeguards" - unlike most other proposals).

Claimed, and considered, by many to be the foremost nuclear disarmament movement for its rapid growth since 2008 and success in innovative communication and reaching out to large sections of public opinion globally.

Good overall perspective.

However, the operational provision for negotiation of a global zero accord (legally binding international agreement) is placed in Phase 3 (2019-23), not upfront (even just to specify that as the

objective of the exercise), while those for "other nuclear weapons countries" (i.e. other than US & Russia) -- as e.g. to freeze their arsenals and "commit to reductions proportionate to those made by the US and Russia or for all nuclear capable countries to ...sign/ratify CTBT" -- come upfront in Phase 1. This results in iniquitous apportioning of burden sharing.

(c) *Roadmap to Abolition 2009* (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation):

A good, simple, four phased roadmap to abolition of all nuclear weapons, as suggested by its name; the very first two elements of which (in Phase 1) are "US commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons" and "US and Russia begin bilateral negotiations on ... elimination of their nuclear arsenals", followed soon after by initiation of "negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention". Subsequent sequencing of operational provisions is also more balanced (and less iniquitous) than other proposals.

Uses the NPT categorisation "Nuclear Weapon States" but only in a descriptive, and not normative, sense - its apportioning of responsibilities and obligations of all "nuclear weapons states" at various stages is (realistically) fair.

The elements "Complete the required ratifications of the CTBT so that it enters into force" and "Achieve universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards", however, come in Phase 2, before "Global conference to sign Nuclear Weapons Convention" in Phase 3, resulting in a degree of inequity.

(d) *Getting to Zero* (2011):

Aims at "build(ing) belief in the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and advocacy of the steps required to move in that direction". Forthright in declaring, while supporting the US-Russia reductions of their strategic weapons by a third, that "a reduction of a third is a good first step; however, we need to abolish nuclear weapons completely".

Not much information available, however, on specifics of their approach.

(e) *The Abolition 2000* (Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons):

Founded in 1995, after the NPT Review (and extension) Conference did not bring up the question of abolition of nuclear weapons on its agenda. Hence forthright in calling upon "the nuclear weapons states, declared and de facto, to take steps to achieve nuclear weapons

abolition" and urging "parties to the NPT to demand binding commitments by the declared nuclear weapons states to implement" a series of specific measures as e.g. "Initiate immediately and conclude negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework". (Brings in the idea that "when fully implemented, the convention would replace the NPT".) Does not hesitate to recognize that "this goal cannot be achieved in a non-proliferation regime that authorizes the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of states. Our common security requires the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Our objective is definite and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons."

Also against nuclear energy, as such (i.e. for civilian purposes as well), however:

(f) Pugwash (2007-12):

Possibly the oldest, and most prestigious of all the advocacy groups in terms of its membership and pioneering initial work in fostering dialogue across the ideological divide during the Cold War, the functioning of this group of Nobel laureates and intellectuals seems

to have fallen prey to routinisation and co-option by states. Also to omnibus inclusion of causes and concerns within its purview (perhaps to placate all members), and consequent loss of thrust in its activities.

Thus while the Eleventh (2007-2012) Quinquennium goals begin by listing the nuclear danger in clear terms ("Pugwash is strongly committed to the goal of abolishing all nuclear weapons. It is imperative that Pugwash constantly remind the international community ofand ... propose concrete steps towards their elimination"), the rest of the Document is long on description and analysis and short on prescription as to what needs to be done.

Action areas listed range from deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals, de-alerting and effective dismantlement of retired warheads to conventional weapons, small arms and land mines and include also economic deprivation, environmental deterioration, and resource scarcity and unequal access to resources, causes and motivations for terrorism etc.

The organisation's decision making also appears to be in difficulty - the document put out on a January 2010 meeting in Milan on the eve of the

2010 NPT RC covers various nuclear disarmament issues quite well but is described on its website to be the "sole responsibility" of two of its office bearers (and a Professor from the local host organisation), indicating failure to reach consensus on its contents within the organization as a whole.

(g) *El Baradei's Five Steps towards Abolishing Nuclear Weapons (2009):*

This forthright and cogently argued 2009 piece by the then Director General of the IAEA (and eminent lawyer), Dr. El Baradei, stands out for the categorical statement it makes on the disarmament-non-proliferation linkage: "the only way to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading and ultimately being used is to abolish them".

Likewise, on double standards:

"...if leading world powers believe their security depends on having weapons that could annihilate our entire planet.....how can we credibly expect other nations..... to refrain from seeking the same weapons?..... States with nuclear weapons...in particular, the five NWS party to the (NPT) must show that they are serious about their 40 year old legal commitment to scrap all nuclear

weapons....the division between nuclear weapon "haves" and "have-nots" is not sustainable in the long term" (emphasis added)

11. As would be noted from the above, the NAM Plan of Action is clearly the one that India could go along with all the way, unreservedly, as it is fully congruent with the long standing, and well considered, Indian approach both conceptually as well as in its operational provisions.

[This, of course, is not accidental, for the positions underlying the NAM Plan of Action are carefully negotiated ones, at successive NAM Summits and other important gatherings, with full Indian participation (and consent). It is only in the NPT forums, and therefore in relation to this Plan of Action submitted by NAM NPT parties to the 2010 RC, that an Indian input (and influence) is absent, so unless any of the NAM positions (on disarmament issues) are altered there - an unlikely eventuality -, there would be no reason for this NAM document to be not congruent with the Indian approach.]

12. Apart from the NAM Plan, the approaches of the Mayors for Peace Hiroshima - Nagasaki Protocol, Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, Canberra Commission, Article VI Forum (Middle

Powers Initiative), Roadmap for Abolition, Global Zero, Abolition 2000, Tokyo Forum and International Campaign for Abolition of Nuclear Weapons also stand out and could be the proposals of choice, after ironing out of some aspects, for coalition building for taking things forward. The organizational strength of the groups and/or think-tanks sponsoring them (and suitability for joint action based on their overall political orientation and influence within the domestic polities of their respective countries) would, of course, need to be evaluated separately. (Some of those put forward by leading public figures and former leaders too would qualify, in addition, but they are more in the nature of one-off, opinion building, pieces and not complete proposals as such, so perhaps not much amenable to coalition building.)

13. Overall, there is a lot in these proposals and initiatives for disarmament activists in India, as elsewhere, to laud and welcome -- especially in the unofficial proposals, a number of which have been prepared by leading professionals with great commitment to the NWFV ideal and are therefore not disingenuous. They are rich in content, in that they take on the various arguments advanced by the powerful security establishments of the

Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) in favour of retention of nuclear weapons head on, and demolish them forcefully. Also, over the years (since presentation of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan at the third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1988), scholarly and expert understanding of the interconnectedness of issues, and of their sequencing, has grown significantly, resulting in more complete and comprehensive proposals having been put forward. Any serious global exercise of drawing up a road map, or Plan of Action, for reviving and activating the nuclear disarmament process would immensely benefit from these works, all labours of love.

14. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about some of the other proposals, official and quasi-official ones particularly. They suffer from (serious) lacunae or shortcomings in their conceptualisation -- from the Indian point of view, that (rightly) seeks embedding of all (professedly nuclear disarmament) steps in an overall context hinged on the complete and time-bound elimination, leading to abolition, of all nuclear weapons of all nations in a non-discriminatory manner. The faulty conceptualization stems from their (unstated, i.e. implicit) acquiescence in the

(inherently hegemonistic) positions of the NWS, reflected in their anxiety to steer clear of the red lines of the latter in the name of 'realism'. That leads them to leave the question of abolition, or even prohibition of use, of nuclear weapons, out of their purview.

[Helpless in getting the NWS to accept restraints and responsibilities not to their liking, they go about concentrating their fire, and passion and proclivity for profiling and publicity, on the others instead (viz. the 'potential' nuclear weapon states). The quintessential 'non-proliferation' approach, in other words, which remains satisfied with 'arms control' (reductions in the arsenals of the two leading NWS from one absurdly high level to another somewhat less absurd level, as "deep cuts" that the rest of the world ought to applaud), while busily devising better and better ways of closing 'proliferation risks' -- as e.g. through the 'CTBT' now (after failing to throw their weight behind the nuclear test ban idea effectively during the Cold War, when it might have impeded the arms build up of the superpower they were in alliance with) and international control of the fuel cycle, now that more and more countries from the developing world want to go in for nuclear power. (These measures would be unexceptionable, needless to say, if appropriately contextualized in an equitable overall framework.)]

15. This is not to argue for India distancing itself from such initiatives, much less for shunning them as unworthy of engagement because of their weaknesses or faulty conceptualisation. Even if there is a single positive aspect in a proposal -- and quite clearly there is far more than that in almost every one of them --, elementary united front tactics would dictate that it needs to be looked upon as a potential ally by any nation serious about making a difference to the nuclear disarmament scenario. The positives would need to be encouraged and built upon, while trying to work around, or at least blunt the edges of, those aspects that do not, in the Indian view, serve the process well through a strategy of uninhibited engagement with all actors active in the field, no matter what their plank or motives.

16. As might be expected, these proposals (have) exert(ed) varying degrees of influence on the (international) decision-making process, depending upon the political push (and clout) of their sponsors, timing (historical juncture) etc. In general, none can be said to have proven to be the 'spark that set the prairie on fire'. This is obviously not due to lack of meritorious content, it could safely be surmised, but to want of political will and inclination on the part of Governments,

especially those of the NWS and their powerful allies, to consider the contents of such proposals seriously, even after the end of the Cold War, unless it suited them. (Individual elements of various initiatives proposed from time to time have, of course, been picked up by the powers that be on occasion -- so, in that sense, they can be said to have served as repositories of ideas now and then.)

17. That was the fate of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan too -- not to receive any serious attention at all, internationally, despite its conceptual clarity (and comprehensive scope) and, at the same time, pragmatic phased approach cognizant of ground realities (that did not fight shy of imposing, i.e. accepting, obligations on the threshold states like India as well upfront). In retrospect, and with the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that what was lacking in it was not content but calculation: realpolitik levers capable of kick-starting, and driving, a nuclear disarmament process on their own steam or, in fact, even of compelling consideration in any official multilateral forum.

[This is where the NPT review process comes in, promising (as argued in the following sections) far more efficacious possibilities of galvanising the nuclear

disarmament dialectic than any proposal or initiative on the anvil -- official, quasi-official or unofficial, singly or in combination.]

18. In sum, therefore, there may be no need for the international community to invest energies in addressing afresh the 'what' question (what needs to be done to get rid of the nuclear menace). There is enough material, analysed ad nauseum almost from every conceivable angle, for decision-makers to draw upon whenever they are ready to get off the mark. It is the 'how' question -- how to get nations, the basic units of international life (the NWS, really) to bite the bullet as it were and (collectively) take the steps necessary for 'actualising' the vision of a 'nuclear weapon free world' so elegantly spelt out on many an occasion in many a document -- that requires pondering over in a brainstorming, out of the box thinking, mode.

19. For it is here that the 'community' of nations has been stuck for over half a century now, unable to act on the call of the very first Resolution of the UN GA (of 1946) to do away with nuclear weapons adopted unanimously (and amply endorsed in spirit subsequently, over the years, in some form or another)-- because of one or the other of the 'Big Powers' (changing their minds and) not

finding it to be in their interest to allow concrete moves in that (agreed) direction.

[The hopeful signs of advance were many, almost to the decade:

♦ *in the early 60s, thick in the midst of the Cold War (but early on after sinking in of the paradigm shifting impact of the advent of the nuclear weapon on war and politico-military strategies), when the USA and the former Soviet Union managed to reach agreement on the famous Zorin-McCloy Principles in 1961 that included (most notably, for skeptics of the nuclear disarmament ideal in the now hardened security establishments of some NWS) not only "elimination of all stockpiles of nuclearand other WMD and cessation of their production" and "elimination of all means of delivery of WMD" but also " a programme...(to) ensure that (....disarmament is general and complete and) war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems";*

♦ *then again in the second half of the 70s, in the bloom of 'détente', when the Final Document of the first Special Session of the UN GA on Disarmament in 1978 adopted by consensus re-iterated the same message (of the need for elimination of nuclear weapons on priority);*

♦ *yet again in the mid-80s, when the 'Geneva spirit' of the fire-side chats between the two great (nuclear) iconoclasts, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev, had all but fructified at Reykjavik in 1986 (but for the impasse over Reagan's 'Star Wars' fantasy unrealized till today, almost three decades down) - narrowly missing the opportunity to take the promise of the 1985 Geneva Summit that a nuclear war "cannot be won and must not be fought" to its logical conclusion and declare that it "would not be fought";*

♦ *post-Cold War at the historic UN Millenium Declaration of 2000, in which Heads of States and Governments resolved "to strive for elimination of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons and to keep all options open for achieving this aim", and finally*

♦ *in September 2009, when the UN Security Council met at Summit level, under the Chairmanship of US President Obama on the theme of "Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament", and adopted Resolution 1887 aimed at creating "the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons" but stopped short of including a single nuclear disarmament step in its 29 operative paragraphs (which were all on 'non-proliferation' measures).*

Today it is hardly believable that it was the USA, under President Kennedy, that had given the clarion call in the UNGA in 1963 that "the (nuclear) weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us."]

20. Put differently, one might say that the need today is not so much to re-invent the disarmament wheel (or to polish it to perfection), of which there is a surfeit of sorts, as to brainstorm on finding effective ways of imparting it momentum, which is what remains woefully wanting despite a long list of illustrious individuals having thrown their weight behind it from time to time.

III. THE NPT

21. In addition to these proposals and initiatives for nuclear disarmament, there is the NPT aimed, avowedly (as noted at the outset), at curbing (all) proliferation of nuclear weapons (over levels prevalent at the time of its negotiation in the mid-sixties) -- the only treaty of its kind, professing to curb growth of nuclear arsenals, even though not a universal one -- which enjoins its members to exert themselves, inter alia, in favour of nuclear disarmament (and which has a five yearly review process to introspect on the impact/results of their collective commitment and cogitations).

It is, strictly speaking, not in the category of initiatives/proposals for nuclear disarmament as such but has, nevertheless, to be considered along with them in any such reckoning as the present one because it too exerts influence on the nuclear disarmament process and discourse. And quite some influence, in fact, especially in recent years.

22. The NPT was premised on an 'envisioned end of all nuclear weapons' -- even if not in as many words -- to quote from the belated acknowledgement of this fact by the 'Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse' from the US (Kissinger, Schulz, Perry and Nunn) themselves in their by now famous, path-breaking, 2007 article cited in para 4above.

[The basic bargain of the NPT is that (the vast majority of) states without nuclear weapons (on 1.1.1967) foreswore not to go in for them, in acknowledgment of the danger of proliferation of these weapons globally, in return for a solemn undertaking by the states that possessed nuclear weapons on that date to reduce, and eventually do away with, theirs. That bargain was encapsulated in Article VI of the NPT, in the form of an obligation (of all parties, those in the latter category -- the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) recognised in the Treaty -- in

particular obviously) to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".]

And Article VIII.3 of the Treaty provides for a review every five years "with a view to assuring that the purpose of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized". This has been done duly -- in the form of Review Conferences (RC) of the NPT parties every five years since its entry into force in 1970 taking stock of developments, even if more in form than in substance.

23. The long-winded wording of Article VI has, of course, been utilized by the NWS to the hilt (as was evidently the purpose of that carefully drafted language) over the years to wriggle out of the spirit of their obligation (to do away with their nuclear weapons, in order to pave the way for their abolition) by doing just about enough to be able to claim compliance with its letter (with the focus being kept on the act of "negotiating in good faith", rather than on producing meaningful outcomes in those negotiations). Such subterfuge has, however, been a subterranean exercise -- not a brazenly cynical one and, at least for form's sake, the provisions of Article

VI hold sway as the ultimate commitment (by the NWS) in the field of nuclear disarmament, for whatever it is worth.

24. This farcical exercise notwithstanding, it is the five yearly review process of the NPT (out of all of the myriad proposals, initiatives and ideas floating around in the field of international security studies) that provides the main vehicle for advancing towards the goal of nuclear disarmament -- for the vast majority of nations in the world, it has to be recognized; India's differences with (and dislike of) the NPT notwithstanding. This is because it is the largest inter-Governmental forum where the nuclear disarmament question -- that of elimination of nuclear weapons included -- is (supposed to be) on the table, at least implicitly. And on the basis of a legally binding obligation undertaken by the NWS, it must be remembered (as the eminent lawyer, and former Director General of the IAEA, Dr. El Baradei, amongst others, has reminded everyone) -- not just as a desideratum advocated by some eminent or ambitious individuals strutting the world stage. As such, it is by far the most weighty of all in terms of its influence and impact, inadequate though

that impact may have proven to be in absolute terms for clinching concrete action on nuclear disarmament so far. (This is notwithstanding the fact that the NPT review process takes place outside the official forums of the UN -- the CD, UN DC, UN GA, UN SC etc. -- and (politically speaking) in a comparatively light-weight, no more than a passing and peripheral, manner.)

25. The NPT and its review process have therefore to be taken seriously and reckoned with, it is submitted, for there simply is no other equally representative (or authoritative) game in town.

26. Not being a party to it, India has (rightly) stressed the non-universality of the NPT (and the consequent untenability of the repeated calls for its universalisation, re-iterated at the 2010 Review Conference). The country has (understandably) kept out of all deliberations conducted within the framework, or associated with, the NPT regime and, accordingly, not taken cognizance of its review process either (in general, and of its discourse on nuclear disarmament related aspects in particular) -- neither previously nor (last) time after the 2010 RC.

27. However, it is not in India's interest to (continue to) close its eyes to the developments within the NPT review process. The advances made therein may be creeping and miniscule and may be embedded, moreover, in a fundamentally flawed framework but they constitute the reference point against which nuclear disarmament issues (which have been a central concern of India's strategic security policy) are addressed by an overwhelming majority of nations in the world. India can therefore ill afford to (continue to) treat the NPT review process as a 'touch me not'.

28. Particularly so now, after the last (2010) RC made significant advance, as argued in the next two Sections below.

IV. THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE PROCESS: RECENT BACKGROUND

29. The NPT's review process acquired a significant political profile over the last few RCs, ever since the landmark 1995 RC, when the question of its future was on the anvil (and which extended it in perpetuity, much to the relief of the USA and other NWS and the industrialised countries in general).

[Even before that, the discovery of Iraq's attempts at clandestine acquisition of weapons

capability in the early 90s, which exposed the infirmities in the NPT, gave it (and its safeguards arrangements in the IAEA, with all their legalistic technicalities) an unprecedented salience. It led to moves (in the IAEA) to tighten the NPT's safeguards arrangement with the IAEA (which is the legal mechanism for giving operational effect to the pledge of the non-NWS to forswear nuclear weapons). These moves were resented by the developing countries, who were alert to the wrong (policing) direction, away from the promotional role of "accelerating the peaceful use of nuclear energy" stipulated in the IAEA's Statute as its Objective, in which these moves were likely to take the IAEA. This tussle resulted in a negative feedback into the NPT's review process (wherein the right of the non-NWS to peaceful uses of nuclear energy was an important discussion point, as one of the three pillars of the NPT -- the other two being nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation), turning it into an active political battleground between the industrialised and developing countries amongst its parties over basic issues of rights and obligations of non-NWS versus those of the NWS.

Although they were unable to resist adoption (and recommendation) of a "model Additional Protocol (AP)" by the IAEA's Board of Governors in 1997 to empower the IAEA to check for "undeclared" nuclear

activities and materials in the non-NWS party to the NPT, *inter alia*, through "challenge inspections", the developing countries were extremely resentful of this attempt to impose additional obligations on them, as non-NWS, while leaving the NWS untouched as far as their obligation(s) were concerned (because the model AP was not applicable to them).

{The NWS were left free to, and did go on to, conclude their own "Additional Protocols" drafted (by themselves) to stay within their self-defined red lines - a purely cosmetic exercise undertaken in the cynical calculation that so long as an Additional Protocol had been concluded by them with the IAEA, a semblance of balance in the additional obligations being sought to be foisted on the non-NWS could be claimed (counting on ignorance of the correct factual position, regarding the crucial difference in the nature of the two APs, on the part of large sections of the media and other non-specialist audiences) !}

Not surprisingly, many developing country non-NWS have refrained from signing the model Additional Protocol to this day.

The model Additional Protocol (widely, but wrongly, alluded to in the media and even in professional level literature as the

Additional Protocol, as if there was just one in existence) was to prove particularly controversial later, in the aftermath of the hyped justification advanced for the Iraq war and in the wake of the Iranian compliance conundrum (with Iran resiling from it after having signed and Egypt and others openly refusing to sign it unless Israel accepted it, along with full scope safeguards).

All this could not but have a bearing on the NPT review process as well.]

30. The(se) contentious debates in the IAEA came about at a time when the NPT was approaching the deadline of its 25th anniversary in 1995 (which carried with it a major question mark about the future of the Treaty -- because of uncertainty over the period of its validity, under its Article X.2, after expiry of 25 years since its entry into force in 1970). It had the consequence of further raising the NPT's profile (and, with it, the potential for realpolitik, as below).

31. The USA and other protagonists of the NPT were able to secure its indefinite extension at the 1995 RC, as they had been anxious to, but not without paying a political price (in the form of agreement on "principles and objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament") that included :

- ♦ a decision (Decision 1) to "strengthen the review process... ..with a view to assuring that the purposes... and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised";

- ♦ a decision (Decision 2) reiterating the "ultimate goal(s) of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons " (in the Preambular part of the decision) and a programme of action in the substantive part that was said to be important for "the full realization and effective implementation of article VI" and which included "the determined pursuit by the NWS of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons....." and

- ♦ a Resolution on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, inter alia, calling upon all countries of the region to accede to the NPT, and accept full scope IAEA safeguards on (all) their nuclear facilities.

NAM, the largest grouping within the non-NWS, tasted blood, so to say, with its successful extraction of US acquiescence in its long standing demand (at the behest of its Arab members) for a Middle East NWFZ, despite a singling out of Israel in all but name (and without its consent, as it was

obviously not present on that occasion). The negotiating lesson (of the leverage that was inherent in the review process, but had been allowed to lie dormant and unexploited hitherto) could not have been lost upon NAM in the course of all the wheeling and dealing at this landmark RC.

32. Thus began a process which was to gather momentum in the succeeding RCs. The next RC in 2000 adopted the oft-cited 13 "Practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI" (generally abbreviated as 13 Steps for Nuclear Disarmament in literature). They were spear-headed by the 'New Agenda Coalition' countries and included, most notably, an "unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals".

33. The 2000 RC set the tone for the strengthened review process called for at the 1995 RC, by implicitly focusing on the basic bargain of the NPT between the NWS and the non-NWS -- of the hard promise of 'non-proliferation', on the part of the non-NWS, versus the loose prospect of nuclear disarmament, through action on the part of the NWS. Not surprisingly, the proposition that "nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing", hardly heard

hitherto, found mention in the 2000 RC Document (even if tucked away in an obscure section on South Asia under Article VII). This was a first; subsequently this refrain began to figure more and more prominently in the discourse, in implicit acknowledgement of the idea as one whose time may have come.

34. The Bush Administration's scant regard for arms control and multilateralism in general (and consequent repudiation of the "13 Practical Steps" at the failed 2005 RC, which was unable to reach any agreement at all) did result in a regression but the setback was temporary and partial. The trend (of the 'realpolitik' potential of the non-proliferation-disarmament link gaining increasing acknowledgement in the public discourse) continued to grow stronger, what with the DPRK 'break-out scenario' and the risk of Iran following suit emerging to the fore during this period. Also increasing recognition, at the same time, of the vulnerability of nuclear fissile materials world-wide to theft and of the attendant risk of acts of nuclear terrorism.

35. By the time the US was ready to change over to the Obama Administration in end 2008, a spate of proposals cognizant of the near impossibility of any strengthening of the non-proliferation

regime without prior, or at least parallel, progress on the nuclear disarmament front were circulating amongst the strategic establishments of the US and those of other Western countries. Obama's Prague speech of April 2009 affirming "America's commitment to..... the security of a world without nuclear weapons" brought a certain gravity to these early straws in the wind, as also the September 2009 Summit of the UN Security Council on "Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament" convened by the USA and chaired by Obama himself (even though its operational parts dwelt, almost entirely, on 'non-proliferation' measures after beginning in the Preamble with a profession "to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons"). It was these ideas, scattered and amorphous as they were, that did the rounds in the open forum discussions and debates in the run up to the May 2010 RC (in addition to concerns about Iran's non-compliance and about the DPRK imbroglio), which thus took place against the above background of both heightened expectations, as well as wide-spread nervousness about the possibility of the NPT regime unraveling in the event of a repeat of the 2005 RC's failure to agree on anything (that seemed possible, indeed likely, at that time).

V. THE 2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE

36. The outcome of the 2010 RC was somewhere in between those two extremes -- though it was unable to agree on the Final Document (FD), as a whole, it was able to adopt the "Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions" part of the FD by consensus. (That left the "Review of the Operation of the Treaty" part of the FD outside the consensus -- and it therefore figures in the FD as the Conference President's understanding of what had transpired.)

37. The consensus part of the document (Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions) consists of four Sections -- one each on the so-called three pillars of the NPT (nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy) and one on "The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution". The first of these sections contains, most notably, an *"action plan on nuclear disarmament, which includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons" and a reaffirmation of "the unequivocal undertaking of the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals to which all States parties are committed under Article VI"*. (emphasis added.)

38. 64 action points, 22 of them on nuclear disarmament related aspects, are listed in the consensus document. Some of them are worth a read:

a) Action 1: Commitment to "the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons".

b) Action 3: Commitment (by the NWS) to "undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons", "in implementing the unequivocal undertaking (by the NWS) to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals".

c) Action 5: Commitment by the NWS to "accelerate concrete progress onnuclear disarmament...", together with a call on them to "promptly engage" to that end, with seven specific aspects spelt out:

- ♦ overall reduction;
- ♦ all types of nuclear weapons to be covered;
- ♦ diminution of role in security concepts, doctrines and policies;
- ♦ prevention of use;
- ♦ legitimate interest of non-NWS in further reductions in operational status of nuclear weapons;

- ♦ reduction of risks of accidental use and
- ♦ transparency.

The NWS are further "called upon to report the above undertakings to the 2014 NPT Prepcom" and the 2015 NPT RC is to "take stock and consider the next steps of the full implementation of Article VI".

(It is left to the NWS to decide how to "engage with" these measures in the interim and "report" on them by the time of the 2014 deadline.)

d) Action 6: The Conference on Disarmament (CD) to "immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament", within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work".

e) Action 20: All States parties to "submit regular reports, within the framework of a strengthened review process....., on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI.....".

f) Action 21: NWS "encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form for ...voluntarily

providing...information...". UN SG "invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the NWS".

g) Para B (iii) of the Section on Nuclear Disarmament: Recognition accorded, for the first time in an NPT context, to the need for a Nuclear Weapons Convention: "the Conference notes the proposals for nuclear disarmament of the SG of the UN to, inter alia, consider negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments....".

h) Para B (iv) of the Section on Nuclear Disarmament" Recognition of the "legitimate interests of the non-NWS in the constraining by the NWS ofqualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons".

i) Para A (v) of the Section on Nuclear Disarmament: Implicit acknowledgement of debate on the legality of use of nuclear weapons, which could be used as a tool for their (further) delegitimation : ".....deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons andneed for all Statesto comply with..... international humanitarian law".

39. It is notable, moreover, that the initial draft Report of Main Committee I on nuclear disarmament (which was released half-way down the Conference on May 14) had called for "the need to implement Article VI *within a time bound framework*". It had further called upon the nuclear weapon states to "convene consultations not later than 2011 to accelerate concrete progress on nuclear disarmament...." In addition, it contained a provision inviting the UN Secretary General "to convene an *international conference in 2014 to consider ways and means to agree on a road map for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame*, including by means of a universal, legal instrument". (emphases added.)

40. Such categorical formulations could not, of course, be agreed upon (for adoption by the RC in its FD) because of resistance from the NWS -- France and Russia mainly, and to a lesser extent USA & China. (UK reportedly stayed out of the discussions largely, reportedly for want of instructions from the newly formed Government.) On the idea of time-lines and legal frameworks (which, according to one analyst, accounted for a good bit of the time and heat in the debate), the Final Document simply affirmed that "the final phase of the nuclear disarmament

process should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, *which a majority of States parties believe should include specified time lines*". (emphasis added.)

41. Yet, even though the above-mentioned core aspects were diluted drastically, what is notable for the purpose of the present exercise (of exploring possibilities of advancing the vision of the 1988 RGAP of a world without nuclear weapons) is the very fact that they were brought up so -- in full cognition, we can be sure, of the high political value of the basic NPT bargain (for everyone, but for the NWS in particular) and, concomitantly, of the immense negotiating leverage it afforded as a result. And that is something that is unlikely to go away.

42. It is another matter that this leverage could not be put to effective use. The reason for this can be attributed to NAM (and New Agenda Coalition) Chair Egypt's opportunism in settling for diluted formulations behind the backs of other members (evident from the lauding of Egypt's "helpful role in bringing NAM countries around" in commentaries by pro-NPT analysts in their post-RC writings) in order to secure a deal with the Americans on the Middle East NWFZ in (separate) bilateral negotiations with

them. (The latter was, by all accounts, a key dynamic at the 2010 RC because of Egypt's deep attachment, widely assessed to stem from reasons to do with domestic politics under the Mubarak regime, to the Middle East NWFZ idea as a way of countering Israel's nuclear capability). But that can, and will, change -- apart from the new dispensation in Egypt now, because Iran is due to take over Chairmanship of NAM from Egypt in 2012 and can be expected to play the nuclear disarmament 'card' to the hilt at the next RC in 2015.

[N.B. This is a fortuitous, if challenging, circumstance from India's point of view. Iran could be encouraged, and assisted, to do so in a constructive way -- without overplaying its hand, as it is reported to have done at the 2010 RC, for the 2015 RC would be too good a disarmament opportunity to be missed in polemics or partisan ends.]

43. It is also notable, in this context, that the formulations on nuclear disarmament were not the only ones to be left weak in the finally agreed text of the FD. Those in the Sections on non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy (where much 'tightening' of loose ends was sought by the US and other countries of the North) are even weaker in comparison

to what was desired and pushed for. NAM countries (primarily, but non-NWS from the South in general) were able to block moves for strengthening of the non-proliferation 'tool box' (as it has been termed by one empathetic European analyst) -- declaration of IAEA's model Additional Protocol as a (mandatory) standard for safeguards verification in particular -- in retaliation for the absence of any comparable weighty commitment in respect of nuclear disarmament. Likewise in respect of attempts to beef up the costs of withdrawal from the NPT (to prevent recurrence of DPRK like errant behaviour) and 'multilateralise' the fuel cycle (to restrict spread of proliferation sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies to the nuclear new comers from the developing world). And the most contentious non-proliferation issue -- Iran's alleged non-compliance with its NPT obligations -- could not even be pressed for at the RC; the Western countries had to rest content with dealing with it outside the RC -- in the UN SC just about the same time - for fear of failure to have their way. (Of course, Iran too, for its own reasons, appears to have preferred that this be so.)

44. NAM's readiness to play hard ball -- a clear prerequisite for any significant advance on the nuclear disarmament

front in the future RCs -- need not therefore be in doubt anymore; how far it can go in pressing its weight is, of course, another matter that will depend, apart from the incumbent Chair, on many factors, including above all the overall international situation at the time of the next RC.

[That gives India a chance of making a weighty contribution, as discussed in the following sections, if it would be prepared to review its approach of remaining aloof from, and indifferent to, the NPT review process and step in as a 'player' ready to make strategic interventions from the outside. Especially so as the incoming NAM Chair - Iran, from 2012-15 - can be expected to take full advantage of the nuclear disarmament Achilles' heel of the NWS and play it to the hilt, as a 'card', in its present stand-off with the US and other Western powers' attempts to curb its relentless acquisition of proliferation sensitive technologies and materials (aimed at advancing itself into the category of the 'nuclear capable', capable of exercising 'recessed deterrence' of sorts without necessarily crossing the nuclear Rubicon). The knots inherent in the latter situation add to the possibilities of India positioning itself as a key interlocutor -- tactically as well -- if it would be ready, and find it worth its while, to play the game.]

45. In the light of the above, the half-way house compromise outcome of the 2010 RC should be assessed positively on the whole by those (disarmament activists world-wide) serious about effecting change but bereft of levers for bringing it about. And not just because "ideas once regarded as a pipe dream were now considered appropriate topics for mainstream debate" (as one account of the 2010 RC has put it) but also because of the degree of realpolitik that could be brought into play on this occasion on the strength of the 'non-proliferation-disarmament divide'. And of the ripening, and ripened, public opinion in favour of nuclear disarmament world-wide (no matter that this was not done to the full extent possible, allowing the NWS to get away yet again with a charade).

46. Overall, there is reason to hope, therefore, that the next RC could turn out to be a decisive one for the non-NWS seeking to hold the NWS to account on their Article VI obligations and secure from them an unequivocal commitment to finally deliver now on the goal of outlawing and elimination of nuclear weapons, a la the prohibition of other categories of WMD in the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions already concluded.

VI. THE NPT AND INDIA: BASIC CONTRADICTION

47. Where does India come in, in this account of the potential of the NPT's review process, with its record of opposition to that Treaty, as already noted in paragraph 26 ? The NPT process is obviously not free of problem(s) for India -- it could not be otherwise, given the fundamental contradiction between it and the Indian approach. This is reflected, above all, in the recurrent, almost evangelical, calls by the NPT parties for universalisation of the NPT: the 2010 RC asked States not parties to the Treaty to "accede (to it) *as non-NWS promptly and without any conditions*" (emphasis added), without considering it necessary to predicate that call on agreement on a nuclear weapon free world (NFWF) in any way.

[And in its partial, stand-alone, measures led approach -- its ready advocacy of the 'CTBT', international control ('multilateralisation') of the nuclear fuel cycle etc. as immediate priorities, without weaving them together into (or linking them in any way with) the overall objective of a NFWF. That would result in a diversion, as is well known, away from nuclear disarmament, towards 'non-proliferation'. Such an approach results, a la the classic

case of the NPT, in iniquitous apportioning of burdens between nations -- a feature that has constrained India to invariably stay away from stand-alone measures that are not embedded in a process of nuclear disarmament with a clear cut overall end result of prohibition of nuclear weapons specified therein.

The same is true, in some degree or another, of most of the other initiatives and proposals for nuclear disarmament that have been proposed from time to time, including many that are categorical about abolition of nuclear weapons. They (almost) all advocate immediate entry-into-force of the 'CTBT' -- as it stands -- and that is obviously problematic for India, which had striven hard to have an operational link with nuclear disarmament incorporated in the text of the Treaty in the crucial final stages of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1996 (and had to reject it when that proved to be impossible and India was named, on the other hand, without its consent and despite its objections, in the list of countries whose accession would be required for it to enter into force).]

48. These contradictions are, of course, not new. They reflect the skewed understanding and approach of the majority of nations to the nuclear weapons conundrum that India has long

experience of battling with in defence of its national sovereignty and dignity. It can therefore perhaps continue to do so in the face of these (2010 RC and others') calls for universalisation of the NPT and early entry into force of the 'CTBT' etc. as well -- by maintaining the 'opt-out' and 'live-and-let-live' approach taken hitherto, i.e. essentially by ignoring them, while staying out of these Treaties. That would be one way of dealing with these contradictions -- an easy way since it would not entail anything other than 'more of the same' by way of a policy response.

49. That would, however, be a defensive approach, it is submitted, with a sub-optimal outcome as it would be missing out on an excellent opportunity to advance the nuclear disarmament cause.

50. The challenge is to find a way of boosting, and tapping, the positive energy of the NPT's review process (and that of the 'CTBT' train and all other initiatives professing nuclear disarmament) without getting trapped in a defensive posture vis-à-vis their negativities. Of pro-actively leveraging on the NPT parties' aspirations and strivings for nuclear disarmament, while side-stepping the contradictions. A 'finesse' operation by India, in other words, making use of their

self-perception (in the words of one NPT insider) that 'it -- the NPT -- was central to all other attempts to bring about realization of a NFWF', to actualise that goal (of elimination of all nuclear weapons everywhere), without allowing the differences (over the differential obligations of the NWS and the non-NWS in the interregnum until the 'nuclear nirvana' state of a NFWF kicks in) to come in the way.

VII. OVERCOMING THE CONTRADICTION: POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC USE OF INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

51. Fortunately, this is feasible, impossible though it might appear at first to be.

52. The 'contradiction' between the NPT approach and the Indian vision of a nuclear weapon free world (NFWF) is over the means, and not the end(s). It can be gotten over, therefore (and turned on its head as it were), if India were to bypass the differences (over the means) and go for the end directly, constraining them (the NPT parties) to do likewise.

53. For that, the nation would need to be prepared to trade off its nuclear arsenal for the larger, long term, strategic interest of securing a world without nuclear

weapons. Thus, India could shift gears in responding to the 2010 NPT RC's (and others') call for universalisation of the NPT by going beyond the set 'neti' refrain (or hankering after acknowledgement of 'NWS' status, as some in the country have been prone to do) and declaring readiness to give up its nuclear weapons if all NWS (and others) were to make a legally binding commitment to do so, while re-iterating its inability to meet any expectations of its joining the NPT (whether as a non-NWS or as a NWS). In other words, a more active approach to the NPT's contradiction (within itself, between its professed objective and its operative provisions, which is also the contradiction with India) than the passivity underlying its policy so far.

54. Such a bold announcement/initiative is bound to have great impact at the next NPT RC in 2015, strengthening as it would the hands of NAM and other non-NWS for clinching the basic NPT bargain on that occasion by extracting a categorical (and legally binding) commitment from the NWS to match the Indian offer in some specified time-frame. The call for universalisation of the NPT would then have been finessed, catapulting its energy in reverse (in a judo like move, as it were) in the service of the grand goal of a NFWF.

[The NPT parties would not be able to reasonably reject such an Indian offer (especially if it were to be preceded by background lobbying and spadework within the NAM stalwarts and other active non-NWS -- South Africa, Malaysia, Egypt, Iran, Brazil, Mexico and others), and yet continue to demand that India join the NPT as a non-NWS, for that would be in violation of a basic tenet of international law and expose (and marginalize) their demand as hegemonic.]

VIII. CAVEATS AND CONDITIONS

55. This is a tall order, undoubtedly -- to have the nation decide to (unilaterally) place the national nuclear arsenal on the trading block in a bid to trigger a similar commitment by others (when Pakistan has determinedly been blocking agreement on a FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament in order to buy time to accumulate massive amounts of fissile material and expand its arsenal). But it should be possible to do, for the nation has a cast-iron case, with both the force of argument and moral force on its side -- the seemingly 'realpolitik' levers suggested in the preceding Section would only be the icing on that moral cake. And it would be worth doing so, it is submitted, given the historic gain (of ridding itself, and the world, of nuclear

weapons, once and for all and, with that, of the dangers of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and risks of escalation of any conflict to a level above the nuclear threshold as well).

56. Such an enormous task will naturally require a domestic, all party, consensus as a pre-requisite -- it would obviously be inconceivable without that. And appropriate preparation, within GOI at the official level through an inter-agency process (given the large number of 'constituencies' -- strategic security related Departments and organizations - - involved), based on a thrashing out of the possible security ramifications of the above mentioned suggestions, as perceived from the standpoint of different actors within the security establishment. (There really are none but this would need to be appreciated, and possibly explained, in order to pre-empt a war cry against 'unilateral' disbanding of the Indian nuclear weapons capability and 'status'.)

57. A White Paper could be prepared for this purpose, to establish that the optimal role for the nuclear weapons in the nation's possession was to serve as trading 'chips', to be exchanged for global agreement on abolition of nuclear weapons, i.e. to put them to politico-diplomatic use.

58. It could then be discussed, in-depth, in a closed door, all Party, forum in the relevant specialized bodies of Parliament (serviced by strategic experts from all fields -- military, technology, diplomacy etc.). Red lines could be set, in respect of the NPT, 'CTBT' etc, therein for endorsement by open cross-party deliberations in the (main) Parliament Houses themselves. These would enable GOI (MEA) to negotiate the seemingly impossible external terrain outlined in the preceding Section dexterously.

59. All this might appear, at first glance, to be a no go, practically. Something that might invite skepticism -- after all, it might be argued, is it not exactly what India was doing for long years prior to Pokhran II, with scant success ?

60. But it is really not so. To take the second objection first, there is a difference in the situation pre-Pokhran and now -- and a huge one at that -- which is not always appreciated while considering contemporary India's capacity to influence the discourse on global nuclear disarmament.

61. That difference lies in the fact that in the pre-Pokhran days, when India was in an advocacy mode, it had very little to bring to the negotiating table (while

making tall demands on others -- on the NWS). That is no longer the case. In seeking abolition of nuclear weapons now, India would be doing so as a 'State with Nuclear Weapons' (SNW) ready to close down its own shop. That would be no mean gain (for the 'non-proliferation regime' and its protagonists), and therefore cannot but weigh heavily with all concerned, including India's detractors from within the non-proliferation fundamentalists' fold, while responding to renewed Indian activism for nuclear disarmament on the lines suggested here.

[Plus there would be the very welcome consequence -- for the whole world -- of the Pakistani arsenal being roped in as well, in the process; something that is a source of nightmares for everyone but for which nobody has an answer. That would be a huge, an even bigger, gain (for all nations, China included -- though it may not be ready to acknowledge that to India or in public), which cannot but influence world reaction to the Indian initiative(s).]

62. And as to the first objection (about practicality), it is at heart a question of conceptual clarity on the use(s) to which the nation wishes to put its nuclear arsenal (and military prowess and politico-diplomatic standing, as a SNW) in the ultimate analysis -- mere military

and diplomatic profiling or to transact a hard strategic bargain for having them outlawed and actualizing the NFWF vision -- which is the larger, long term, strategic security interest of the nation by any rational argument. The answer, it is recommended, must be the latter -- i.e. trading them off for securing a world without nuclear weapons. For nuclear weapons are in no way essential, it is submitted, for safeguarding India's strategic security for all time to come and under all circumstances -- not at all. The real utility of nuclear weapons is political, not military -- as a lever, and leveler, of sorts. (This latter proposition has been argued in a separate forthcoming paper. Of course, in the interregnum until a NFWF materialises, the arsenal would have to be 'nurtured', i.e. developed, as per military requirements without let or hindrance.)

[In the absence of any such clear overarching directive, there is at present considerable confusion in the country (including in senior decision-making circles within GOI) on this basic question (of the nation's fundamental strategic orientation) -- which side of the nuclear divide is the nation on: an aspiring 'NWS', interested in securing some kind of a place under the

NPT Sun (with its unstated implication of having to keep a low profile on nuclear disarmament issues, as expedient for an 'emerging' country seeking to be accommodated within the existing power configuration), or a reluctant 'SNW' with an undiminished interest in, and commitment to, inducing a NFWF game-changer in the international system.]

63. There is no contradiction in this perspective whatsoever -- a world without nuclear weapons could, without any hesitation (or worry about accusations of hypocrisy etc.), be projected to be the nation's preferred outcome (for the future naturally, since it hasn't happened as yet), and the latter posture (of maintaining preparedness meanwhile) an inescapable duty (of the Government of the day) in the present demanded by current ground level realities, pending 'entelechy' of that grand vision.

IX. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A STRATEGY FOR CATALYZING THE 2015 REVIEW CONFERENCE BY SYNERGISING WITH NAM

64. A confluence of developments globally in the last few years, the May 2010 NPT Review Conference in particular, has opened a window of opportunity for India, for realizing its long

cherished -- and now (after the recent upheavals in Pakistan, casting grave doubts about the safety and security of its nuclear arsenal) also security impelled -- aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons.

[That RC took the trend (of the last three RCs) of play of realpolitik (pressing for the nuclear disarmament part of the essential NPT bargain by the non-NWS, led by NAM NPT parties) to a new high. As per the Final Document of the 2010 RC adopted by consensus, the NWS are required to report (on the results of their commitments for nuclear disarmament in that document (para 38 (c) above) to the 2014 Prepcom of the next, 2015, RC for it (the 2015 Review Conference)"to consider the next steps for the full implementation of Article VI" -- the first time ever the NPT parties have reached the point of placing the question of monitoring of "full implementation of Article VI" on the table. Though the NWS were able to ward off NAM & other non-NWS demands for even more categorical formulations (on disarmament aspects in general), they were (by all accounts) on the defensive - and this is the (source of an) opportunity that, it is submitted, needs to be recognised as such and grasped.]

65. This fortuitous development - of the NPT Review Conference juggernaut

having been set in motion in the right direction, of nuclear disarmament -- offers a favourable setting, with just the right lead time, for a fresh Indian initiative (for actualising the vision of the RGAP of 1988) to bear fruit. A carefully crafted strategy, timed to take advantage of the NPT review process momentum and markers in the next years leading up to the 2015 (as well as of the ripened international public opinion, reflected in the surge of proposals and initiatives for nuclear disarmament in recent years) can yield very good dividends.

[Another favourable factor in this regard is the keenness of an overwhelming majority of nations to see a successful denouement of the 'CTBT' process, which is in limbo at present. Although this is primarily because of the inability of the US to get its Senate to ratify the 'CTBT' text, India is also one of the countries named in its Annex XIV as those whose accession would be required before it can enter into force. This feature provides it (India) with a unique opportunity for pressing for abolition of nuclear weapons. Details in this regard would be dealt with in a forthcoming paper and are not dwelt upon here.]

66. This could be done by India taking a conscious decision to make politico-diplomatic use of the nation's nuclear

arsenal by trading them off for a NFWF
 -- to turn the national nuclear prowess,
in other words, into a 'global public good'
 -- as detailed in paras 51-54 in the
 Section on "Overcoming the
 Contradiction: Politico-diplomatic Use of
 Indian Nuclear Weapons". It could
 announce readiness to give up, i.e. 'roll
 back' (although that term has to be used
 with caution because of its loaded
 historical origins), the national nuclear
 arsenal on condition of a matching
 commitment by others.

*[This step would need to be taken in
 close coordination with NAM, on the basis
 of prior lobbying and spadework. The aim
 would be to so position the Indian posture
 that its nuclear weapons capability comes
 to be regarded by NAM as a lever, placed at
 their disposal notionally, for clinching the
 basic NPT bargain at the 2015 NPT Review
 Conference by extracting a legally binding
 commitment from the NWS to match the
 Indian offer in some specified time-frame.
 Under Iran's Chairmanship from 2012, NAM
 could hopefully be enlisted in support of such
 an Indian move.]*

*And it should be done as soon as possible -
 to allow maximum time for the secondary
 effects triggered by the Indian announcement
 to play themselves out and generate
 momentum between now and the 2015 NPT*

*RC preparatory cycle build up, which would
 get underway from May next onwards (when
 the first meeting of the Prepcom of the 2015
 RC is due to be held). By thus upping the
 ante in advance of the RC, the Indian
 initiative should be able to 'catalyse' it, while
 finessing the India-NPT stand-off in the
 service of the grand goal of a Nuclear
 Weapon Free World.]*

67. For this to be possible, the nation's
overall approach to nuclear weapons
would naturally need to be reviewed
internally, within the security
 establishment, first. The continued utility
of nuclear weapons would need to be
examined afresh, in the light of changing
 (and changed) circumstances facing the
 nation today as compared to 1998, with a
view to formalising the recommended
preference for putting them to politico-
diplomatic use by trading them off for a
NFWF. A White Paper may need to be
 prepared, on the basis of such a review, in
 order to facilitate a national consensus
 across the political spectrum.

68. An initiative by India in the UN and
in other international forums, in liaison
 with others active in nuclear
 disarmament, could then be planned on
that basis -- with conviction (rather than
 mere stepped up 'profiling' externally,
 sans conceptual clarity domestically on

the use(s) to which the national nuclear arsenal and capability is to be put).

69. It would be India's turn to preside over the UN Security Council (UN SC) again in November 2012. Nuclear disarmament could be the big ticket item India brings up on that occasion. That opportunity could be utilised to focus attention on the dangers, and unimaginable consequences, of nuclear terrorism and on the consequent need for redemption now, at the earliest without any further delay, of the oft repeated solemn pledges -- of almost all nations of the world, the NWS included, in some form or another in different fora from time to time -- for doing away with nuclear weapons altogether (in order to plug the possibility of leakage of war heads or fissile material to terrorist groups at root).

[The spectre of nuclear terrorism is the key spur to the current upsurge in favour of nuclear disarmament. There is widespread recognition across the globe of the need for a more effective non-proliferation regime and, as a corollary (or pre-requisite rather for that), for progress on the nuclear disarmament front, as noted earlier. This again is a favourable factor for disarmament activists, translating as it does (or at least can, if not already so) into a realization of

the need for urgency of reaching closure on nuclear weapons now (with states wanting to retain their nuclear weapons for their perceived 'strategic stability' or other security benefits no longer granted, or allowed, a 'veto' over this reasoned sentiment).

Although a world Nuclear Security Summit was held in April 2010 at US initiative, and is to be followed by another in April 2012 in Seoul, these are gatherings held outside the official UN system (with participation limited to selected invitees capable of contributing, in the US assessment, to awareness raising and opinion building spadework that these gatherings are essentially limited to undertaking) and the subject has perhaps not figured in the UN Security Council in a formal way. It may therefore be appropriate for India to seek a UN SC meeting on this theme during its Presidentship, taking off from the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit (that would have taken place by then, six months prior to it), to decide on effective follow up measures in the highest security forum available to the international community at large.

Further, the meeting could perhaps be convened at Summit level -- the UN Secretary General's 2008 suggestion for a Summit level meeting of the UN SC on disarmament lies untouched, as it were, that India might try to pick up and link with this theme -- by

seeking to build upon the last Summit level UN SC meeting on "Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament" convened by the USA in September 2009 (which had adopted Resolution 1887 avowedly "to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons").]

70. It may then be the right occasion to place on record the major announcement on India's readiness to turn its national nuclear capability into a 'global public good' (paragraph 66), so that it can become the reference point, hopefully, for a re-framing of the international debate on international security issues anew. It would be the first time that a nuclear weapons power would have offered to give up its nuclear weapons, for none of the NWS, China included, has done so as yet. Hopefully, such an offer might trigger a demand for others – the NWS in particular – to follow suit.

4 *[This would obviously require intense preparation and spade-work with all members of the UN SC and others concerned; above all a stepped up, and more earnest, Indo-US dialogue in pursuit of US President Obama's 2010 New Delhi commitment to work (together with India) "to forge a strong partnership to lead global efforts for non-proliferation and universal*

and non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament". Similar, albeit less intense may be, dialogues with other P-5 countries, and with NAM and other non-NWS active on nuclear disarmament issues (as well as with select think-tanks and advocacy groups as identified in Section II), would need to be put in place right away, given the none too long lead time left between now and then.]

71. A UN SC Resolution (building upon Resolution 1887 adopted by it in September 2009) could then be thought of, and attempted, accordingly to embody such a consensus on redeeming the nuclear weapons abolition pledge, if it can be forged -- even if it be a minimalist one, 'in-principle', only, well short of the formal Indian position (seeking no less than a legally binding commitment for time-bound and total elimination of all nuclear weapons from all nations).

[In case even a minimalist consensus (on a Resolution on nuclear disarmament) is not forthcoming, it might at least be possible to secure one on action oriented deliberation on effective ways of preventing any possible act of nuclear terrorism (and on agreed principles and procedures for tracing it back to, and affixing responsibility on, states on or from whose territory the non-state actors perpetrate the act, should they nevertheless manage to do it).

And a (brainstorming) dialogue on that (technically complex) subject, a tangible gain in itself, might possibly create space for a discussion also on the obvious 'at root' solution of the nuclear terrorism problem -- of doing away with nuclear weapons altogether, as the best way of forestalling that danger (already hinted at by India at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010) -- without the NWS (who are averse to accepting nuclear disarmament on the formal multilateral agenda) opposing it in that context at least, hopefully.

The lowered sights here should need no explanation. Working for a world without nuclear weapons will obviously require a sustained initiative, with each step seeking to build upon the previous one in a graduated manner over a period of time and in liaison with other like-minded nations. This exercise in the UN SC (suggested above) would therefore only be the beginning of a long haul, and it may be advisable to limit its objectives to triggering the critical first step -- of securing consensus on an 'in-principle' kind of commitment, be it non-legalistic and implicit, capable of opening the door for a discussion on (eventual) abolition of nuclear weapons in some (not entirely unspecified, even if not clearly time-bound) future -- so that the ball is set rolling. Everything else -- and there would obviously be much left to be done -- can follow in due course, with

the process gathering momentum hopefully in every subsequent 'round' of deliberations-cum-negotiations, once a beginning has been made. Leaving everything else negotiable for subsequent parleys would also have the advantage of allowing a wider sense of ownership of the nuclear weapons abolition endeavour, that should help in making it a sustained one. The large body of work of prestigious think-tanks, academics and activists world-wide would be of immense value at that stage, once the start-up friction/resistance at the inter-Governmental level has been overcome (and the need of the hour shifts to a more practical agenda -- of injecting substance to the process of 'cleaning up' and eradication, of weapons and weapons-grade fissile material).

Pakistan (and Israel) would need to be tackled, as also Russia and France (as well as China). The resistance of the latter three might possibly be in a different, less difficult, category - not as die-hard may be, as Pakistan, which might try to take cover under the 'national survival in the face of an existential threat from a more powerful neighbour' security argument for withholding assent).

Ways of holding them all, the P-5 in particular, to the by now well established norm (even if it be an 'imagined' one) against nuclear weapons, manifested in

myriad commitments for doing away with these WMDs made by them over the years (as responsible members of the international community) in a variety of international compacts, the NPT RCs above all in case of the NWS, would need to be devised through solid, and skillful, spadework (in concert with other powers whose relations with Pakistan and China are free of the kind of bilateral sensitivities that mark India's relations with these two nuclear armed neighbours). China can be expected to be mindful of its image internationally, so may not be able to come out with its reservations (on its being required to make

a legal commitment to eliminate its nuclear weapons in a specified time-frame) in the open brazenly, as Pakistan could well be imagined to do unhesitatingly.]

72. Successful or not in getting the world to rid itself of its nuclear weapons, an Indian initiative on the lines discussed above should, at the very least, be able to influence the disarmament (and international security) dialectic positively. That, in itself, would be a gain incompare and a distinctive contribution in keeping with the best traditions of the nation's historical trajectories.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AP	Additional Protocol (to the safeguards agreements concluded by members of the IAEA with the agency, with a view to authorizing it additional powers to verify the pledges made by them in regard to non use of nuclear energy for non- peaceful purposes)
CD	Conference on Disarmament (in Geneva), the standing body designated by the UN for negotiation of all disarmament agreements
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FD	Final Document
FMCT	Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty
GOI	Government of India
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
NAM	Non-aligned movement
NPT	Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWC	Nuclear Weapons Convention
NWFW	Nuclear Weapons Free World
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
NWS	Nuclear Weapons State (defined, under the NPT, as one which possessed nuclear weapons as of 1.1.1967)
non-NWS	A non-Nuclear Weapons State (defined, under the NPT, as one which did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1.1.1967)
RC/NPT RC	Review Conference of the NPT (held five yearly)
RGAP	Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (submitted to the UN GA in 1988)
SNW	A state with (i.e. in possession of) nuclear weapons
UNGA/UN GA	UN General Assembly
UNSC/UN SC	UN Security Council
UNSG/UN SG	UN Secretary General
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
1967 FIVE	Another way of referring to the NWS

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Legend: ✓: Explicit statement x: Implicit, inferred or partial statement lb: Legally binding nb: Non-legally binding

Notes:

- *1: Establish an international agency to promote and support the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy sources.
- *2: Avoid developing nuclear weapons with new military capabilities or for new missions and not to blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons.
- *3: The proposal offers recommendations for US policy only.
- *4: Enhance cooperation on the development of missile defense systems according to the Joint Declaration on New Strategic Relationship of 2002 and to consult with the United Kingdom, France and China on their potential participation.
- *5: Develop warhead dismantlement verification techniques.
- *6: Examine if the prohibition of nuclear weapons is desirable and possible; identify and promote the creation of the necessary conditions, notably an effective verification system as well as an international security system.
- *7: Accepts the idea of "Fuel Banks" under multilateral control. But it does not pronounce on multilateral enrichment centers.
- *8: Complete and implement the Trilateral Initiative between Russia, the US and the IAEA. Initiate the further development of verification capabilities.
- *9: Extend the US-Russian START I Treaty.
- *10: Consider the Additional Protocol as being the verification standard required under Article III of the NPT.
- *11: discuss the issue
- *12: Homogenize record-keeping and archiving of data related to nuclear programs. Establish an international/universal fissile material accountancy system.
- *13: Adopt domestic legislation criminalizing the act of illicit proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials.
- *14: Close and just prior to reaching zero, consider entrusting an international body with a small nuclear arsenal.
- *15: Consider the option of maintaining virtual arsenals.
- *16: Secure the effective re-training and/or re-employment of those people possessing the know-how to build nuclear weapons.
- *17: Eliminate all nuclear weapons production plants.

- *18: Zero may as well be understood as zero warheads deployed.
- *19: Stop uranium mining; special recommendations for India, Pakistan, Israel and the official nuclear weapon states.
- *20: Reduce and monitor fissile material stockpiles.
- *21: Resolve all outstanding issues/disputes on the role and status of Missile Defense systems.
- *22: Missile defense should be accompanied by cooperative development programs and confidence-building measures to avoid negative backlashes/repercussions on international peace and security, including the initiation or exacerbation of arms races.
- *23: Block the financing of illicit proliferation networks.
- *24: Promote Research and Development on proliferation-resistant features for civil nuclear technology and facilities.
- *25: The UNSC to pass a generic resolution adopting in advance a set of measures to be applied in future cases of non-compliance.
- *26: Institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and strengthen it by opening participation.
- *27: Declare no use against NPT-compliant non-nuclear weapon states.
- *28: Declare use of nw illegal.
- *29: Australia should reduce the role of nw in ist security policies, review reliance on extended deterrence by the US.
- *30: Application of the AP should be condition of all nuclear exports, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should develop criteria for cooperation with nnws, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should be reconstituted within the UN system
- *31: The SC should state that NPT withdrawal will be regarded as prima facie a threat to peace and security.
- *32: Conventional arms imbalances should be addressed; disarmament education should be enhanced.
- *33: We will actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, based on our conviction that education is a powerful tool for mobilizing further disarmament and non-proliferation efforts globally by enhancing awareness and understanding among our citizens.

ANNEXURE II B

SELECTED PROPOSALS/INITIATIVES FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

OFFICIAL PROPOSALS:

UNGA RESOLUTIONS:

Res. 65/56 "Nuclear Disarmament"; 2010

Res. 65/59 "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world"; 2010

Res. 65/72 "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons"; 2010

Res. 65/76 "Follow-up on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons";

Res. 65/80 "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons"; 2010

OTHER OFFICIAL LEVEL PROPOSALS:

UN Secretary General's Five point proposal; 2008

Berlin Statement by Foreign Ministers; April 30, 2011

Seven-Nation Initiative: Declaration by the seven Foreign Ministers; 2005

The New Agenda Coalition: Declaration by Ministers for Foreign Affairs 1998

Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (Costa Rica and Malaysia); 2008

NAM Plan of Action to 2010 NPT Review Conference; 2010

2000 NPT RevCon Final Document: 13 practical steps; 2000

2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan; 2010

QUASI- OFFICIAL INITIATIVES:

WMD Commission (Blix Commission): Weapons of Terror; 2006

Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; 1999

Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; 1996

Mayors for Peace: Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol; 2008

Nordli, Brundtland, Willoch, Bondevik, et al A Nuclear Weapon-Free World; 2009

Claes, Dehaene, Michel, Verhofstadt: Towards a nuclear weapon-free world; 2010

Schmidt, Weizsäcker, Bahr, Genscher: Toward a nuclear-free world; 2009

Juppé, Norla, Richar, Rocard: Pour un désarmement nucléaire global; 2009

UNOFFICIAL PROPOSALS:

A Global Law to Ban Nuclear Weapons - Middle Powers Initiative, 2011

Getting to Zero: Goals and Objectives; 2011

Global Zero: Action Plan; 2010

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation: A Roadmap to Abolition; 2009

Pugwash Eleventh (2007-2012) Quinquennium; 2007

Pugwash Milan document; 2010

The Abolition 2000 (Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons); 1995

Elbaradei: 5 Steps towards abolishing Nuclear Weapons; 2009

ANNEXURE III

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS BASED ON THE INDIAN STANDPOINT

The essential elements of the Indian standpoint could be outlined as follows, based on the 1988 RGAP and the 2006 Working Paper submitted by India at the Conference on Disarmament, and various policy statements from time to time:

A legally binding commitment by all nations to

- I. The overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition of nuclear weapons based on
 - a) Universality, i.e. all nations to be covered;
 - b) Comprehensiveness, i.e. all categories of weapons to be covered;
 - c) Time-bound framework, i.e. the above mentioned commitments not to be left as a “long term” goal for the indefinite future;
 - d) Effective multilateral verification measures;
 - e) Non-discriminatory application of all provisions, i.e. with full equality between all nations. (This is expected to follow from the above but is listed as a separate desideratum, nevertheless, to cover any unanticipated aspects.)

II. Interim (and collateral) measures, for facilitating the above and for prevention of nuclear war, risk reduction, etc.:

- a) Non-proliferation, both
 - ♦ vertical (inter alia, through a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing and effectively verifiable control of further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes) as well as
 - ♦ horizontal (NPT like injunctions against transfers etc., but from outside the NPT; export controls; non-discriminatory multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel cycle)
- b) ‘No-First-Use’, leading logically to ‘Non-use or threat of use’ (of nuclear weapons)
- c) De-alerting – i.e. separation of warheads from delivery vehicles.

There are, of course, several other desiderata that have been articulated by Indian leaders and diplomats from time to time, depending upon the occasion and forum, but the above would appear to constitute the core of the Indian position, the bare essentials without which India would seem to find it difficult to go along with any proposal.

[This is, of course, a matter of reading the Indian official position for nowhere is it (the bottom line) spelt out in as many words. Nor is it likely to be for the rationale, and limits, of strategic policies have invariably (and understandably) to be left inexplicit.

Thus e.g. a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Convention, which India is an ardent advocate of (and which is well known to form an important plank of its policy), has not been included in the above - on the premise that while it is indeed a desideratum for Indian policy, it would fall, in the ultimate analysis, in the category of 'means' and not an 'end'. I.e. if it turns out that conditions are not propitious for securing a NWC, while a legally binding commitment to the NFWF goal appears separately to be within sight, India is unlikely to spurn it or allow the 'best to become the enemy of the good'. But this is unlikely to be true of any of the five elements listed in section I. above]

These elements can therefore provide a framework for analysis of the various

proposals on the anvil internationally – the extent to which their operative provisions include these elements in some form or another, or are at least compatible with these elements (or, to put it the other way round, are at least not incompatible with these elements), would be a good indicator of the degree of congruence, or potential convergence, between them and the Indian position.

Annexure IV attempts such an exercise for selected proposals that subscribe, categorically, to the goal of nuclear disarmament aimed, eventually, at total elimination of all nuclear weapons of all nations, leading to their global abolition along with the biological and chemical weapons. The chart in Annexure IV A tabulates these selected proposals, analysed within this framework of the Indian standpoint to facilitate an overall bird's eye view. And Annexure IV B presents the same results individually, in case of each proposal, in a textual manner more suited for a detailed look within (at the contents of each proposal) individually.

Proposals (Rows)/Attributes (Columns)													
		Universality	Comprehensiveness	Treaty based framework	No administrative applications	Multilateral co-ordination	Verifiable non-proliferation - quantitative (nuclear test ban)	Verifiable non-proliferation - qualitative (finite nuclear fuel controls)	Regional non-proliferation - arrangements, or otherwise, etc., as in NPT	International non-proliferation - administrative	No First Use/Prohibition of Use	De-alerting - suspension of warheads from delivery vehicles	Remarks
Year	SELECTED PROPOSALS	Legally binding commitment to Overall Goal of Nuclear Disarmament leading to abolition based on				Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate abolition and for risk reduction and prevention of nuclear war							
	UNGA RESOLUTIONS												
2010	UNGA Res 65/80	Implicit	Implicit	Implicit	Implicit	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	POU	N.A.		Resolution calls for prohibition of use. Sponsored by India.
2010	UNGA Res 65/76	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Implicit in NWC	Implicit in NWC	N.A. but implicit	N.A.	Silent (N.A.)	N.A.	Advocates a NWC while seeking follow up on ICJ advisory but not comprehensive
2010	UNGA Res 65/56	Yes	Implicit	Yes	Yes*	Implicit	'CTBT'	Yes	Yes	Silent	NFU	Yes	*Except for reference to the NPT as the mainstay of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, which also obliges India to abstain on this NAM favoured resolution
2010	UNGA Res 65/72	Yes	Yes	No	No	Skirts it	'CTBT'	FMCT	NPT+	Silent but implicit	No	No	Operative thrust on universalization of NPT, 'CTBT', FMCT, and Model Additional Protocol of the IAEA, while paying lip service to global elimination of nuclear weapons. Hence supported by NWS except PRC (which abstains, possibly because of emphasis on transparency in the process of nuclear disarmament) India (Pakistan and Israel) too abstain, because of reference to NPT.
2010	UNGA Res 65/59	N.A.	Lip service	No	No	Silent	Silent	Silent	N.P.T.	Silent	Silent	Silent	Operational thrust is on universalization of NPT, India votes against it.
	OTHER OFFICIAL PROPOSALS												
2008	UN SG's 5 point proposal	Implicit	Silent	Silent	Silent but Implicit	Silent but Implicit	'CTBT'	FMCT	Implicit	Silent	Implicit	Silent	Value lies more in the spirit of the proposal than its letter
2011	Berlin Ten Nation Initiative	Not categorical	Implicit	Silent	Implicit	Silent	'CTBT'	FMCT	NPT+*	Silent	Silent	Silent	*(Model) Additional protocol of IAEA. Espousal of NWFW only to better push non-proliferation measures.
2005	Seven Nation Initiative	No	N.A.	N.A.	No	N.A.	'CTBT'	Yes	University of NPT	Yes	N.A.	N.A.	Focus entirely on non-proliferation. No demands on NWS at all.
1998	The New Agenda Coalition	Yes	Implicit	Silent	Yes	Silent	'CTBT'	FMCT	Implicit	Silent	NFU	Yes	Good but NPT oriented.
2008	Model Nuclear Weapons Convention	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N.A.	N.A.	* Special status to NPT NWS
2010	NAM Plan of Action to the NPT Review Conference	Implicit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Silent	'CTBT' +	FMCT +	Implicit	Implicit	POU	Yes	Unexceptionable. No reference to NPT.
	QUASI-OFFICIAL PROPOSALS												
2006	WMD Blis Commission	Silent	Silent	Silent	Implicit	Implicit	'CTBT'	Yes	Yes	Silent	Yes	Yes	Weak on nuclear disarmament, more on non-proliferation.
1996	Canberra Commission on Elimination of nuclear weapons	Yes	Yes	Yes, implicitly	Yes	Yes, implicitly	Yes	Yes	Yes	N.A.*	Yes	Yes	*Predates the idea. Unexceptionable comprehensive and equitable approach
1999	Tokyo Forum	Yes	Yes	Silent	Not categorical	Not categorical	'CTBT'	FMCT +	Yes	Silent	NFU	Yes	Heavy focus on "Stop and reverse proliferation in South Asia".
2008	Mayors for Peace Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Silent*	Implicit	Yes	Implicit	Silent	Implicit	Implicit	*Protocol to be attached to the NPT (leading to a NWC), so NPT provisions will apply
2010	Claes, Dehaene, Michel, Verhofstadt: Towards a nuclear weapon-free world	Yes	Yes	Implicit	Yes	Silent but Implicit	'CTBT'	FMCT	Yes	Silent	Yes	Silent	
2009	Nordt, Brandlund, Willoch, Bondevik, Stoltenberg: A Nuclear Weapon-Free World	Yes	Yes	Silent but implicit	Implicit	Silent	Silent	Yes	Yes	Silent	Silent	Silent	Focus mainly on Europe.
	UNOFFICIAL PROPOSALS												
2011	Middle Powers Initiative	Yes	Yes	Implicit	Yes	Implicit	Implicit	FMCT	Yes	Implicit	Yes	Silent	Strong on International humanitarian law.
2010	Global Zero: Action Plan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Implicit	Implicit *	'CTBT'	FMCT	NPT	Strong	Silent	Weakly	*Stresses effective verification drawing upon bilateral US/Russian experience.
2009	A Roadmap to Abolition - Nuclear Age Peace Foundation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Silent but Implicit	'CTBT'	Yes	NPT	Silent	Silent	Silent	
2011	Getting to Zero: Goals and Objectives	Yes	Yes	Silent	Implicit	Silent	'CTBT'	Yes	Silent	Silent	Silent	Silent	Information available/sketchy
1995	Abolition 2000: Founding Statement	Yes	Implicit	Yes	Yes	Silent but Implicit	'CTBT' +	Yes	Implicit	Silent	Yes	Silent	
2007	Pugwash: Goals of Pugwash in its 11th Quinquennium 2007-2012	Implicit	Silent	Silent	Implicit	Silent	Yes	Yes	Yes	Silent	Yes	Silent	Weak operationally
2009	El Baradei: 5 Steps towards abolishment NW	Yes	Implicit	Silent	Silent	Silent	'CTBT'	FMCT	Silent	Yes	Silent	Silent	Fortright (but not comprehensive)

Legend:

NFU = No-first use

POU = Prohibition of use

1. Almost none of the proposals stress the non-discriminatory aspect here

ANNEXURE IV B

ANALYSIS OF SELECTED NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS W.R.T THE INDIAN STANDPOINT

UNGA RESOLUTIONS

UNGA Res 65/59:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Lip service only
 - a) Universality: N.A.
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Lip service
 - c) Time-bound framework: No
 - d) Non-discriminatory application: No
 - e) Multilateral verification: Silent
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): Silent
 - b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Silent
 - c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): NPT
 - d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent

e) 'No-First-Use'/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Silent

f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Silent

REMARKS: Operational thrust is against Israel, and seeks universalization of NPT in that context but names India (and Pakistan, along with Israel), obliging India to vote against it.

UNGA Res 65/80:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Implicit
 - a) Universality: Implicit
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Implicit
 - c) Time-bound framework: Implicit
 - d) Non-discriminatory application: Implicit
 - e) Multilateral verification: N.A. but implicit
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): N.A.

- b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): N.A.
- c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): N.A.
- d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: N.A.
- e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: POU
- f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: N.A.

REMARKS: Resolution calls for prohibition of use. Sponsored by India, not on nuclear disarmament but for prevention of nuclear war.

UNGA Res 65/56:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes
 - a) Universality: Yes
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Implicit
 - c) Time-bound framework: Yes
 - d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes*
 - e) Multilateral verification: Implicit
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT

- b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Yes
- c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): NPT
- d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: No
- e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: NFU
- f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Yes

REMARKS: *Except for reference to the NPT as the “cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament”, and the call for universalisation of the NPT implicit in its call for the “full implementation” of the 2010 NPT RC Action Plan, which constrain India to abstain on this NAM favoured resolution.

UNGA Res 65/72:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes
 - a) Universality: Yes
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
 - c) Time-bound framework: No
 - d) Non-discriminatory application: No
 - e) Multilateral verification: Skirts it
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): FMCT c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): NPT plus d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: silent but implicit e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: No f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: No | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes e) Multilateral verification: Yes |
|---|---|

II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:

- a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): Implicit in Nuclear Weapons Convention
- b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Implicit in Nuclear Weapons Convention
- c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): N.A. but implicit
- d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: N.A.
- e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Silent (N.A.)
- f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: N.A.

REMARKS: Operative thrust on universalization of NPT, CTBT, FMCT, and Model Additional Protocol of the IAEA, while paying lip service to global elimination of nuclear weapons. Hence supported by NWS except China (which abstains, possibly because of emphasis on transparency in the process of nuclear disarmament). India (Pakistan and Israel) too abstain, because of the reference to the NPT.

REMARKS: Seeks a Nuclear Weapons Convention as part of follow up to the ICJ Advisory regarding obligation of NWS and others to negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament and deliver, but not comprehensive in scope

UNGA Res 65/76

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes, implicit
 - a) Universality: Yes
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
 - c) Time-bound framework: Yes

OTHER OFFICIAL PROPOSALS

UN Secretary General’s 5-point proposal:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes

- a) Universality: Implicit
- b) Comprehensiveness: Silent
- c) Time-bound framework: Silent
- d) Non-discriminatory application: Silent but Implicit
- e) Multilateral verification: Silent but Implicit
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT
 - b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): FMCT
 - c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Implicit
 - d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
 - e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Implicit
 - f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Silent

REMARKS: Value lies more in the spirit of the proposal than its letter.

Berlin Ten Nation Initiative:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes

- a) Universality: Not categorical
- b) Comprehensiveness: Implicit
- c) Time-bound framework: Silent
- d) Non-discriminatory application: Implicit
- e) Multilateral verification: Silent
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT
 - b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): FMCT
 - c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): NTP plus (Additional Protocol)
 - d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
 - e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Silent
 - f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Silent

REMARKS: Espousal of NFWF only to better push non-proliferation measures.

Seven Nation Initiative:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: No
 - a) Universality: No

- b) Comprehensiveness: N.A.
- c) Time-bound framework: N.A.
- d) Non-discriminatory application: No
- e) Multilateral verification: N.A.
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT
 - b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Yes
 - c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Universality of NPT
 - d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Yes
 - e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: N.A.
 - f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: N.A.
- c) Time-bound framework: Silent
- d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
- e) Multilateral verification: Silent
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT
 - b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): FMCT
 - c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Implicit
 - d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
 - e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: NFU
 - f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Yes

REMARKS: Focus entirely on non-proliferation. No demands on NWS at all.

New Agenda Coalition:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes
 - a) Universality: Yes
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Implicit

REMARKS: Good but NPT oriented.

Model Nuclear Weapons Convention:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes
 - a) Universality: Yes
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
 - c) Time-bound framework: Yes

d) Non-discriminatory application: Special status to NWS in administrative mechanism

e) Multilateral verification: Yes

II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:

a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): Yes

b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Yes

c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Yes

d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Yes

e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: N.A.

f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: N.A.

REMARKS: Uses NPT NWS categorization, and so a special status to them in the administrative mechanism provided for in it.

NAM 2010 Plan of Action:

I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes

a) Universality: Implicit

b) Comprehensiveness: Yes

c) Time-bound framework: Yes

d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes

e) Multilateral verification: Silent

II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:

a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT plus

b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): FMCT plus

c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Implicit

d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Implicit

e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: POU

f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Yes

REMARKS: Unexceptionable in its approach, no reference to NPT.

QUASI-OFFICIAL PROPOSALS

WMD Blix Commission

I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Weakly

a) Universality: Silent

b) Comprehensiveness: Silent

- c) Time-bound framework: Silent
- d) Non-discriminatory application: Implicit
- e) Multilateral verification: Implicit
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT
 - b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Yes
 - c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Yes
 - d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
 - e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Yes
 - f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Yes

REMARKS: Weak on nuclear disarmament, more focus on non-proliferation.

Canberra Commission on elimination of nuclear weapons:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes
 - a) Universality: Yes
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Yes

- c) Time-bound framework: Yes, implicitly
- d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
- e) Multilateral verification: Yes, implicitly
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): Yes
 - b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Yes
 - c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Yes
 - d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: N.A.*
 - e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Yes
 - f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Yes

REMARKS: *Predates the idea of multilateral control over the fuel cycle. Unexceptionable approach, that is not dated despite being of 1995/6 vintage.

Mayors for Peace: Hiroshima – Nagasaki Protocol:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes
 - a) Universality: Yes

- b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
- c) Time-bound framework: Yes
- d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
- e) Multilateral verification: Silent
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
- a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): Implicit
- b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Yes
- c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Implicit
- d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
- e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: POU, Implicit
- f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Implicit

REMARKS: *Protocol to be attached to the NPT leading to a NWC, so NPT provisions will apply.

Tokyo Forum:

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes, faintly
- a) Universality: Yes

- b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
- c) Time-bound framework: Silent
- d) Non-discriminatory application: Not categorical
- e) Multilateral verification: Not categorical
- II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
- a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT
- b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): FMCT +
- c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Yes
- d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
- e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: NFU
- f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Yes

REMARKS: Heavy focus on “Stop and reverse proliferation in South Asia”.

Nordli, Brundtland, Willoch, Bondevik, Stoltenberg: A Nuclear Weapon-Free World

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes

- a) Universality: Yes
- b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
- c) Time-bound framework: Silent but implicit
- d) Non-discriminatory application: Implicit
- e) Multilateral verification: Silent

II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:

- a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): Silent
- b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Yes
- c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Yes
- d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
- e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Silent
- f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Silent

REMARKS: Focus mainly on Europe

Claes, Dehaene, Michel, Verhofstadt: Towards a nuclear weapon-free world

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes

- a) Universality: Yes
- b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
- c) Time-bound framework: Implicit
- d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
- e) Multilateral verification: Silent but Implicit

II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:

- a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT
- b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): FMCT
- c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Yes
- d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
- e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Yes
- f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Silent

UNOFFICIAL PROPOSALS

Article VI Forum (Middle Powers Initiative):

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes

a) Universality: Yes	a) Universality: Yes
b) Comprehensiveness: Yes	b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
c) Time-bound framework: Implicit	c) Time-bound framework: Silent
d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes	d) Non-discriminatory application: Implicit
e) Multilateral verification: Implicit	e) Multilateral verification: Silent
II. <u>Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:</u>	II. <u>Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:</u>
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): Implicit	Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): FMCT	Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Yes
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Yes	Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Silent
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Implicit	Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Yes	‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Silent
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Implicit	De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Silent
REMARKS: Well-focused, Strong on International humanitarian law.	REMARKS: Available information very sketchy.
Getting to Zero: Goals and Objectives	A Roadmap to Abolition:
I. <u>Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on:</u> Yes	I. <u>Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on:</u> Yes

- a) Universality: Yes
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
 - c) Time-bound framework: Yes
 - d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
 - e) Multilateral verification: Silent but implicit.
 - II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT
 - b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Yes
 - c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): NPT
 - d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
 - e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Silent
 - f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Silent
 - c) Time-bound framework: Yes
 - d) Non-discriminatory application: Implicit
 - e) Multilateral verification: Implicit *
 - II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT
 - b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): FMCT
 - c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): NPT
 - d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Strong, but not on the non-discriminatory aspect
 - e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Silent
 - f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Weakly
- REMARKS: *Stresses effective verification drawing upon bilateral US/Russian experience.

Global Zero: Action Plan

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes
 - a) Universality: Yes
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Yes

Abolition 2000: Founding Statement

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes
 - a) Universality: Yes

- b) Comprehensiveness: Silent
 - c) Time-bound framework: Yes
 - d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
 - e) Multilateral verification: Silent but Implicit
 - II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT +
 - b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Yes
 - c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): implicit
 - d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
 - e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Yes
 - f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Silent
 - c) Time-bound framework: Silent
 - d) Non-discriminatory application: Implicit
 - e) Multilateral verification: Silent
 - II. Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:
 - a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): Yes
 - b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): Yes
 - c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Yes
 - d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Silent
 - e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or threat of use: Yes
 - f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Silent
- REMARKS: Weak operationally

Pugwash: Goals in its 11th Quinquennium (2007-2012)

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes
 - a) Universality: Implicit
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Silent

El Baradei: 5 steps towards abolishing nuclear weapons

- I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament leading to abolition based on: Yes
 - a) Universality: Yes
 - b) Comprehensiveness: Implicit

- | | |
|--|--|
| c) Time-bound framework: Implicit | c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly (deployment in & transfer to non-NWS): Silent |
| d) Non-discriminatory application: Silent | |
| e) Multilateral verification: Silent | d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-discriminatory multilateral control of the fuel cycle: Yes |
| II. <u>Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate the above and for risk reduction etc:</u> | e) ‘No-First-Use’/POU or threat of use: Silent |
| a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative (comprehensive ban on nuclear testing): CTBT | f) De-alerting - separation of warheads from delivery vehicles: Silent |
| b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative (control of production of weapons grade fissile material): FMCT | REMARKS: Forthright but not comprehensive. |