On The Optimal Coordination Of Uninformed Agents by an Informed Principal
Published By: CDE on eSS | Published Date: August, 30 , 2006They consider organizations with a single principal and many agents who
interact in an environment with the following features: (a) Nature imperfectly
informs the principal via a state-contingent signal, but not
the agents, about the state of the world, (b) the principal selectively
shares this information with the agents, thereby endogenously endowing
them with private information that is coarser than his own, (c) the
principal assigns action spaces to the agents, and (d) an agent’s control
over the choice from his assigned action space is inalienable. [Working Paper No. 147] URL: [http://www.cdedse.org/]
Author(s): Sudhir A. Shah | Posted on: Mar 30, 2011 | Views(1001) | Download (111)