Repayment and Exclusion in a Microfinance Experiment
Published By: CDE on eSS | Published Date: February, 01 , 2013The experiment is designed to explore the effectiveness of such sanctions in
improving repayment incentives. Groups of 10 members are provided with joint-liability loans
for a specific investment project. If groups repay their loans, contributing members have the
option of excluding other members and those that remain play a public goods game. By varying
loan sizes across groups and allowing for heterogeneous gains from the public good within groups, the role of incentives in repayment decisions are identified [CDE Working Paper No. 227].
Author(s): Jean Marie Baland, Lata Gangadharan, Pushkar Maitra, Rohini Somanathan | Posted on: Mar 07, 2013 | Views(822) | Download (158)